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The post-authoritarian period provides the socio-economic and political context 
within which good governance and democratic institutional building has taken place 
in Indonesia. As strategic actors in governance processes, intellectuals have 
significant roles in such institutional building. My thesis will uncover the socio-
political role of intellectuals in  East Java province, especially Surabaya, by utilising a 
political economy and political sociology analysis. The contribution of intellectuals to 
local governance processes and democratic politics in East Java is achieved not only 
through their roles as knowledge-producers and disseminators, but through their 
actions as participants in the struggle over power and wealth, as members of electoral 
campaign teams, local government advisers as well as propagandists. East Java 
intellectuals eased into taking up these roles because there had been no space for 
creating social bases for progressive forces in civil society under New Order 
authoritarianism. Hence, there was a strong tendency for East Java intellectuals to 
have been domesticated or co-opted into the structures of state corporatism. After the 
fall of Suharto and subsequent democratization,  predatory forces previously 
incubated under the New Order have not been sustained through coercion only but 
also by hegemonic strategies carried out by an intellectual apparatchik, including 
academicians, journalists and NGO activists. Because democratic institutions have 
been dominated by politico-business alliances in national as well as in local political 
arenas, the practice of governance tends to be dictated by predatory interests, serving 
neither the cause of the free market nor of empowering ordinary people. The thesis 
shows that intellectuals play a role beyond producing or disseminating ideas. In fact, 
various kinds of intellectuals have become directly involved in practices that ensure 
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the mutation of the good governance agenda associated with decentralisation and 















































Acknowledgement ...................................................................................................... iii 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... v 
Contents ....................................................................................................................... ix 
Chapter One: Introduction ......................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Argument and Approach .................................................................................. 3 
1.3. Methodological Approach ............................................................................... 9 
1.4. Thesis Structure ............................................................................................. 11 
1.5. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 13 
Chapter Two: Intellectuals and the Politics of Good Governance:   
Theoretical Considerations ....................................................................................... 16 
2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 16 
2.2. Intellectuals and Power Struggles .................................................................. 18 
2.3. Intellectuals and Governance: Theoretical Approaches ................................ 24 
2.3.1. The Neo-Institutional Approach .......................................................... 25 
2.3.2. The Neo-Foucauldian Critique: Knowledge and Power ...................... 35 
2.3.3. The Neo-Gramscian Critique: A New Imperialist Logic? ................... 40 
2.3.4. The Embedded Social Conflict Approach ............................................ 46 
2.4. Intellectuals and Power Struggles in Comparative Perspective .................... 49 
2.3.2. Intellectuals and power in United Kingdom and the United States ..... 50 
2.3.3. Intellectuals and Power Struggles in Latin America ............................ 54 
2.3.4. Intellectuals and social struggle in South East Asia ............................. 57 




Chapter Three: Historical Context of the Relationship between  
East Javanese Intellectuals and the Political Elite .................................................. 64 
3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 64 
3.2. The Early New Order era (1966-1972) .......................................................... 65 
3.2.1. The Political Economy Constellation of the Transition Period  
into the New Order Era ........................................................................ 66 
3.2.2. Hegemony and Repression in the Early New Order Era ...................... 69 
3.3. The Heyday of the New Order (1972-1988) .................................................. 83 
3.3.1. The Political Economy Constellation during the Heyday of  
the New Order Era ................................................................................ 84 
3.3.2. The Hegemony and Coercion Strategy during the Heyday of  
the New Order ...................................................................................... 87 
3.4. The Fall of Soeharto and the Birth of the Post-Authoritarian Era ................. 99 
3.4.1. Intellectuals and social struggle at the end of the Soeharto era ......... 100 
3.5. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 112 
Chapter Four: Intellectuals and Predatory Practices in Local Elections ........... 118 
3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 118 
3.2. Academics, Power and Networks ................................................................ 120 
3.3. The Political Economy Context of Local Elections .................................... 130 
3.3.1. Money Politics in East Java Local Elections ..................................... 131 
3.3.2. Elections and Political Co-Optation ................................................... 141 
3.4. Academics, Fraudulent Strategy and Utilisation of  
the Neo-Institutional Discourse ................................................................... 152 
3.5. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 162 
Chapter Five: Intellectuals and Predatory Power   
in Local Governance Processes ............................................................................... 166 
5.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 166 
xi 
 
5.2. The Role of Intellectuals: Producing Consent without Coercion ................ 169 
5.3. Appropriating Social Assistance to Consolidate Local Power .................... 180 
5.4. Local Development and Material Incentives ............................................... 187 
5.5. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 194 
Chapter Six: Intellectuals and Disorganised Social Movements in East Java: 
The Lapindo Mudflow Case .................................................................................... 198 
6.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 198 
6.2. The Chronology of the Lapindo Case and State Policies ............................ 201 
6.3. Intellectuals in the Lapindo Struggle ........................................................... 210 
6.3.1. Pagar Rekontrak ................................................................................. 218 
6.3.2. GKLL (The Lapindo Mudflow Victims’ Coalition) .......................... 220 
6.3.3. Geppress (The Movement for Supporting Presidential 
Regulation  No.14/2007) .................................................................... 224 
6.3.4. The Pro-Lapindo Intellectuals ............................................................ 229 
6.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 238 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion ..................................................................................... 242 



















The post-authoritarian period in Indonesia provides the socio-economic and 
political context within which good governance initiatives and the building of 
democratic institutions are able to take place. Indonesia’s intellectuals are strategic 
actors who have played significant roles in the country’s governance and democratic 
institution-building. The term ‘intellectuals’ refers in this thesis to these main four 
groups: academics who contribute to the production of scientific knowledge; experts, 
consultants and technocrats who produce policy advice and political 
recommendations; social and political practitioners such as journalists and NGO 
activists, whose positions are based on their capacity to create public discourse in 
civil society arenas; and artists, writers and columnists commonly called ‘public 
intellectuals’, who are engaged in debates about the moral principles that govern 
society. All these categories sometimes overlap (Gu & Goldman, 2004: 6).  
The good governance concept referred to in this thesis starts from the preposition 
that we are witnessing a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, which 
denotesgrowing mutual collaboration among various actors due to the state’s 
inabilityto maintain a monopoly on the expertise and resources necessary to 
govern(Pierre and Stokker 2000). It also implies technocratic policy makingand 
design that specifically connects the state, civil society and business, with the aim of 
addressing core development issues (Nelson and Zadek 2000: 5; Santiso 2001: 5). 
Furthermore, the realisation of good governance is meant to produce a state that is 
impartial, transparent and that protects the rights of citizens (Bevir 2009). It is notable 
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that the neo-liberal concept of good governance has been promoted strongly by 
institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Funds as well as the 
United Nations Development Program to enable institutional frameworks that would 
especially encourage state transparency, poverty reduction and public participation 
within a broader neo-liberalization process (Demmers, Jilberto and Hogenboom 
2004).   
Although there is a growing literature on good governance practices and 
democratic institution-building in Indonesia and on their consequences for political 
participation, much of this literature focuses on decentralisation as a hallmark of the 
democratisation process. There are no published works that focus primarily on the 
roles of intellectuals in the struggle for power among local elites and the 
consequences for good governance aspirations in post-authoritarian Indonesia. This 
dissertation seeks to address this gap by undertaking a political economy and political 
sociology analysis of East Java province and its capital city of Surabaya. 
East Java has one the highest population growth rates of all provinces in 
Indonesia, at 7.2% per annum. As the second most heavily populated province in 
Indonesia after West Java, the total population of East Java currently stands at 37.5 
million people (2010 Statistics Indonesian Population Census). The East Java 
province is administratively divided into 29 regencies (kabupaten) and 9 cities (kota) 
with Surabaya as the capital city.Surabaya is one of the biggest commercial and 
industrial cities in Indonesia, with a population of 2.765 million people (2014 World 
Population Review).Local politics in East Java is characterised by strong connections 
between political and business elites – relationsthat have had serious consequences for 
the development of good governance and democratic institutions in Indonesia more 
broadly since the fall of Soeharto’s New Order in 1998.Local intellectuals — as 
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experts in governance and as political consultants in local elections — have also had a 
significant influence on the building of political institutions. An analysis of the roles 
of local intellectuals in local governance in East Java and Surabaya, and in the forging 
of local-level political and economic alliances, thus provides new insights into the 
development of such institutions and the ways in which they operate. Intellectuals are 
commonly considered to be producers of knowledge who contribute to good 
governance and democratic institution building processes (Clark, 2000; Levine 2011). 
However, this thesis shows that intellectuals in East Java and Surabaya are not limited 
to roles in educational or social institutions, but also play a part in the dynamic 
struggles over power and resources in local arenas of politics.  
1.2.Argument and Approach 
This thesis argues that intellectuals and experts have played an increasingly direct and 
practical role in the exercise of governance at the local level of politics in 
contemporary Indonesia.In understanding these developments, the authoritarian 
period and its legacy cannot be ignored. Soeharto’s New Order regime (1965–1998) 
hadintervened deeply in civil society arenas, including in the mass media and 
universities, thereby subjugating intellectual life,while incorporating many 
intellectualsinto the regime as junior partners indominant politico-business alliances. 
Intellectual practices from the long Soeharto era have been modified and refitted to 
suit the needs of revamped predatory alliances in the democratic era. ‘Predatory’ 
power here refers to the activities of political, bureaucratic and business actors that 
hijack public institutions to advance their political and economic interests. More 
specifically, these activities involve private accumulation on the basis of access or 
control over public institutions and resources (Hadiz, 2010: 12). 
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While the post-Soeharto era has produced new institutions of democracy and 
market regulation under the discourse of good governance, dominant predatory 
alliances have adapted to the demands of operating within the new environment. They 
have utilised their control over democratic institutions at both the national and local 
political levels, to ensure that governance processes supporttheir own interests, thus 
serving neither the creation of liberal markets nor empowering people’s 
participation.In other words, Indonesian local elites have sought to consolidate their 
power and protect their wealth by selectively utilising the good governance agenda as 
a political strategy, without changing the dominant pattern of patrimonial plunder of 
local state resources (Choi and Fukuoka 2014: 85).  In achieving this, such alliances 
have deployedintellectuals as strategic agents, who have authority based on 
possession of specialised knowledge, to promote these interests within a newly 
democratised environment. In the most basic sense, such intellectuals help to provide 
legitimacy for policies and actions that amount to little more than primitive 
accumulation. 
In fact, experts and intellectuals have become an integral part of dominant 
predatory coalitions, involving political and business elites, at the local level.The 
capacity of predatory forces to absorb intellectuals into their alliances through 
material rewards and access to public resources hasin effect largely stifled the 
democratic voice of East Java’s intellectuals. Reformist and progressive intellectuals 
have been unable to find sufficiently powerful social bases to advance more 
substantive reformist  agendas, as is shown in the case of contempoary East Java. 
 This dissertation critiques three common academic approaches that are used to 
analyse the roles of intellectuals in development and governance practices – the Neo-
Institutionalist approach, the Neo-Foucauldian approach, and the Neo-Gramscian 
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approach. None of these three approaches considers the possibility that neo-
liberalagendas of institutional reform — which include the proliferation of good 
governance discursive practices pertaining to decentralisation — may be utilised by 
entrenched local elites to protect their own political and economic interests, or to 
accumulate economic resources. Consequently, these perspectives can only 
inadequately deal with the question of how intellectuals may play a part in the 
appropriation of the good governance agenda by many local elites, even if they are 
supposed to embody the sort of objective, scientific and technocratic knowledge 
privileged by the very same agenda (Hadiz, 2004: 698-99; Hout, 2009: 41-42). 
It is necessary to specify that the Neo-Institutionalism discussed in this thesis  
primarily refers to the ‘New Economic Institutionalism’. This differs from the 
Historical Institutionalism elaborated by political sociologists such as Evans and 
Skocpol in the 1980s. The type of Neo-Institutionalist approach with which this thesis 
is concerned has deeply influencedthe neo-liberal agenda promoted by international 
development agencies, experts, policy think tanks and sections of the mass media. 
The New Economic Institutionalism focuses on how institutional frameworks, norms, 
rules and regulations affect human behavior and societal development. It does so by 
largely adhering to neo-liberal economic principlespremised on the rationality of free 




                                                 
1Some scholars have identified several kinds of New Institutionalist theory. Firstly, there is 
Normative Institutionalism. This approach tries to explain how the norms of institutions 
determine and shape individual behavior. Secondly, there is Rational Choice or Neo-Economic 
Institutionalism. This approach assumes that behavior is a function of rules and incentives. From 
such a  perspective, institutions are systems of rules and inducements to behaviour in which 
individuals attempt to maximise their own utilities. Hence, the relevance of institutions is to find 
the equilibrium point between the selfish interests of different actors. Thirdly, there is Historical 
institutionalism. This approach tries to establish the historical roots of policy choices. The 
contention is that the way to find out the logic of institutions is to track its footsteps to uncover 
the initial decisions that creates policies from the beginning. Fourthly, there is Empirical 
Institutionalism, which argues that the system of government is fundamental in determining the 
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The Neo-Institutionalist approach presents technocratic intellectuals as experts 
who support development programs by providing technical assistance and the 
appropriate tools for policy-making processes.From this perspective, the challenge of 
the development program is to make reform a matter of technocratic design, in order 
to meet an objective ‘good’ as defined by the requisites of liberal markets, and to 
prioritise this over the demands of rent-seeking and predatory elites (Levine, 2011; 
Robison, 2006: 5). Local intellectuals, such as technocrats, academics and social 
activists, are thus seen to contribute positively to democratic and governance 
institution-building due to their knowledge and expertise (Bevir 2006; Craig and 
Porter, 2006; Talal, 2004; Putnam, 2000; Diamond, 1999; UNDP, 1993:21&World 
Bank, 1992). This thesis shows instead that the predatory alliances that developed 
during the New Order authoritarian era remained strong during the post-authoritarian 
era, and forged new close relationships with the national and local-level intellectual 
apparatus in order to maintain their social interests. It will also be demonstrated that 
the roles of intellectuals in local political and governance practices tended to serve 
these predatory interests, rather than advancing governance reforms. 
The Neo-Foucauldian approach sees good governance as a dominant 
knowledge platform for creating an international ‘regime of truth’.
2
 This approach 
                                                                                                                                           
way in which policies and decisions are being made by governments. For instance, some 
proponents of this approach suggest that the difference between presidential and 
parliamentarysystems will influence policy making processes and the decisions chosen by 
political elites. Among these, rational choice Neo-Institutionalism could be considered the 
backbone of good governance development agendas promoted by both international donors and 
domestic technocratic intellectuals. The ideas of rational choice Neo-Institutionalism that try to 
balance the personal interests of strategic actors are directly connected to the logic of neo-
liberalism that emphasises rational market exchanges within social spaces (B. Guy Peters 1999; 
Hadiz 2010). 
2
 This term derives originally from Foucault’s conception of the gap between truth and error (Foucault, 
1997: 145; 164). He adds that ‘truth isn’t outside power, or deprived of power’, but is actually 
‘produced by virtue of multiple constraints’ that evoke ‘regulated effects of power’. Thus, ‘each society 
has its regime of truth’, and by this expression Foucault means no less than five things: (i) ‘the types of 
discourse [society] harbours and causes to function as true’; (ii) ‘the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true from false statements’ and (iii) ‘the way in which each is sanctioned’; 
(iv) ‘the techniques and procedures which are valorised for obtaining truth’; (v) ‘the status of those 
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explores how the idea of good governance and civil society participation has been 
constructed as the outcome of technical intellectual intervention. From this 
perspective, the role of intellectuals should be specific rather than general, as an 
instrument to produce and reproduce a particular knowledge to discipline the 
population toward neo-liberal agendas (Li, 2011; Zanotti, 2005; Abrahamsen, 2000; 
Escobar, 1995). Based on an analysis of Indonesia’s recent historical power struggles 
in both the national and local context, it will be shown that the power of neo-liberal 
governance discourse has been blocked by dominant national-local predatory power 
alliances, within which local intellectuals have served as organic intellectuals. The 
role of intellectuals is therefore not confined to being knowledge producers that 
enable governance; they also facilitate local predatory elites, by using their 
educational credentials as experts to legitimise rent-seeking activity. 
The Neo-Gramscian approach sees intellectuals playing a prominent role in 
upholding neo-liberalism as hegemonic knowledge in the public space.It considers 
intellectuals to be deeply embedded in the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the 
working class. For Neo-Gramscian scholars, intellectuals, NGO activists and 
academics promoting ‘good governance’ are not only producers of knowledge who 
supportneo-liberal governance; they are also organically connected to the interests of 
the transnational capitalist class. At the same time, Left-wing intellectuals are 
connected with the working class and grassroots movements. The hegemonic battle 
between intellectuals who are connected with the bourgeoisie, and those connected 
                                                                                                                                           
who are charged with saying what counts as true’ (Foucault, 1976: 112; 13). ‘Truth’ is therefore ‘a 
system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and functioning of 
statements’, which is linked ‘by a circular relation to systems of power which produce it and sustain it, 
and to effects of power which it induces and which redirect it’. Foucault emphasises the need to 
transform our ‘political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth’ (where truth seeks to 
emulate the form of scientific discourse), in order to constitute a new ‘politics of truth’ (Foucault, 




with the working class is considered to take place in various arenas throughout civil 
society (Petras, 2007). This approach asserts that intellectuals and national-local elites 
have become the loyal apparatus of global capitalist interests, which in turn aim to 
exploit natural resources and society in the interests of global capital expansion 
(Robinson, 2008; 2003; Peet, 2007; Weller & Singleton, 2006; Carrol and Carson, 
2006; Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhoffer, 2006; Demmers, Jilberto and Hogenboom, 
2005; Harvey, 2003 & 2005; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001; Kiely, 1998; Strange, 
1996& Overbeek & Van Der Pijl, 1993). 
In contrast to such assertions, the interests of transnational capital have been 
inhibited and blocked by an existing social power structure that enables politico-
business alliances to expropriate public resources and local budgets for their own 
interests. The old predatory networksincubated by the New Order at the national and 
local levels have not been overcome;rather, they have been sustained, re-organising 
their power by creating new alliances. Such alliances have an intrinsic interest to 
oppose technocratic governance solutions advanced by international development 
organisations and their domestic allies when these obstruct rent-seeking activities. 
Paradoxically, the hijacking of the same technocratic governance solutions 
simultaneously enables such activity. Local intelligentsia, it will be shown,play 
important roles in that process of hijacking and legitimising their outcomes in the 
public arena. 
In order to understand the role that intellectuals have tended to play within 
dominant political alliances,it is important to consider the constellation of interests 
within civil society and state, and intellectuals’ roles within this. In making this 
argument, this thesis builds upon Gramsci's understanding of intellectuals as the 
social stratum that articulates and organises, as well as provides social legitimacy, for 
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the interests of every social group. For the dominant class, intellectuals act as a 
primary agent of legitimation for the existing social and political order, helping 
produce consent in civil society. In contrast, the task of dominated class intellectuals 
is to try to challenge the hegemonic project of the dominant class and advance a 
counter-hegemonic project in order to articulate the political interests of their own 
class (Gramsci 1971; Schwarzmantel 2015). Based on this framework, this thesis 
suggests that the roles of intellectuals in local governance are determined by their 
position in historically specific social struggles, and by their roles and functions in the 
attempt to advance the social alliances and political and economic interests to which 
they are attached.From this viewpoint, it is not possible to understand the struggle for 
good governance, the building of democratic institutions and political participation, 
without considering the roles of intellectuals in such struggles and alliances and vice 
versa. 
1.3.Methodological Approach 
An embedded social conflictapproachis used herein to dissect the roles, functions and 
positions of intellectuals in East Java’s post-authoritarian governance processes. This 
approach explains that the process of development can be understood as part of the 
social struggle between between different interests and social forces shaped bythe 
overarching structure of power, inherited from the New Order and reshaped according 
to the exigencies of the money politics-fuelled democracy that succeeded it. 
Therefore, this approach suggests that institutional efforts promoted by technocrats 
are difficult to implement in the context of a structure of power that still reflectsthe 
dominance of predatory social interests (Robison 2010, 26). Indonesia’s intellectuals 
work within particular power relationships and cannot act in isolation from struggles 
for power and wealth in Indonesian society.It is these power struggles that shape how 
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the ideas about governance are translated into practice. It is contended that 
intellectuals’ contributions to policy-making processes in East Java are situated within 
power relationships that rely on maintaining forms of governance very different from 
the democratic, transparent and accountable forms being recommended (Robison, 
2010: ii). 
To explore these issues, acritical inquiry-orientedmethodology is useful.Its 
core assumptions are: firstly, ideas are mediated by power relations in society. 
Secondly, certain groups in society are dominant over others and exert coercive and 
ideologicalforce on subordinate groups. Thirdly, what is presented as social fact is not 
separated from the interests of social groups. Fourthly, knowledge is not neutral, for it 
is connected to competing social interests. (Gray 2014: 27). By utilisingcritical 
inquiry-based research, this study aims to achieve a multi-layered and complex 
understanding of the local power struggles and good governance practices which have 
occurred in post-authoritarian Surabaya and East Java. In particular, this research will 
supplement the established macro-historical approach with the approach of micro-
politics, which is concerned with specific manifestations of broad social processes 
within local arenas of power. 
Interviewing various East Java social actors is obviously important to uncover 
the connections between intellectuals andthe various social forces competing for local 
power, as well asintellectuals’contributionto the maintenance ofsocial and political 
alliances.Semi-structured interviews were used. What is typical of semi-structured 
interviews is that they have a flexible and fluid structure, unlike structured interviews, 
which contain a structured sequence of questions to be asked in the same ways to all 
interviewees. The pattern of semi-structured interviews is organised around an 
interview guide, which contains topics, themes or areas to be covered during the 
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course of interviews. The present research deployed interview guides that varied 
according to the social position of the interviewee – thus, the questions asked of 
government bureaucrats would not be exactly the same as those asked of an academic 
or journalist. These questions pertained to matters ranging from personal experiences 
and witness accounts of important events to more higher-minded issues like the 
objectives of democratic governance. The logic of semi-structured interviews is to 
generate data interactively. This means that both interviewer and interviewee play 
active, reflexive and constitutive roles in the process of knowledge construction. The 
relatively open, inclusive, flexible and interactive format is intended to develop 
interviewees' accounts based on their own perspectives, perceptions, experiences and 
understandings (Mason 2004: 1021-1022). This dissertation also analyses official 
documents and local intellectual publications, to help unravel the roles, positions and 
affiliations of intellectuals within local power dynamics. Finally, data obtained 
through various sources were triangulated in order to validate findings. This type of 
triangulation involves the use of different sources of data/information from different 
times and social situations as well as types of peoples, to find out different points of 
views on specific issues and establish valid outcomes (Bryman 2003; Guion 2002). 
This thesis uses initials rather than full names for some actors, but statestheir 
position or roles and their involvement in some governance practices. The reason is to 
protect some intellectuals’ standing before the public audience given their 
involvement in some of the activities described. This thesis also uses initials to refer 
to  some sources in order to protect the safety of the individuals concerned.    
1.4.Thesis Structure 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two explores and critiques the Neo-
Institutionalist, Neo-Foucauldian and Neo-Gramscian approaches to understanding 
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good governance and the roles of intellectuals as knowledge creators. Based on the 
political economy approach proposed by Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison (2004), 
Chapter Twoclaims that the roles of local intellectuals in governance practices depend 
largely on the social and political context in which they are embedded. 
Chapter Three discusses the historical context of the relationships between 
national and local intellectuals and politico-business elites during the New Order era. 
This chapter will show that New Order strategies toward intellectuals fostered strong 
dependence by intellectuals on the state apparatus and isolated themfrom other social 
forces. Meanwhile, deep-level state intervention in intellectual and social life created 
a process of inclusion and exclusion of types of knowledge, which contributed to the 
production of a mainstream ideology that served state interests. Hence, a particular 
kind ofacademic authority was created which helped to legitimise New Order rule. By 
elaborating the historical context of the relationship between intellectuals and 
dominant forces in Indonesia, this chapter shows the genesis of intellectuals’ 
absorption into predatory power alliances in East Java in the post-authoritarian era. 
ChapterFourquestions how local networks in Surabaya and East Java, which 
connect intellectuals and political elites, are activated to defend entrenched dominant 
social interests in the democratic era. It discusses the roles of Surabaya’s political 
consultants — drawn from academia and the intelligentsia more generally —in the 
manipulation of the democratic process. To provide a broader context, the chapter 
also compares electoral practices in Surabaya and East Java with some national level 
experiences, with a focus on the roles played by the intelligentsia therein. As we shall 
see, intellectuals have been directlyinvolved in money politics and electoral fraud, as 
well as using academic knowledge to legitimise the position of the elites in the public 
sphere. The chapter also explains why many academics in East Java, especially in 
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Surabaya and particularly in the Social Sciences, have been drawn into these 
predatory political activities. 
Chapter Five examines the roles and contributions of intellectuals in the actual 
implementation of ‘good governance’ agendas in East Java and Surabaya in the post-
authoritarian era. Intellectuals have acted to legitimise ‘good governance’ programs 
by laying claims to scientific knowledge and impartiality. In reality, however, these 
programshave tended to reinforce the social position of dominant local politico-
business interests and predatory local elites, who in turn have used public resources to 
sustain their power and economic interests.  
Chapter Six examines whether East Java’s intellectuals also play a role in 
grassroots political participation, and whether they contribute to articulating the 
aspirations of marginalised communities in policymaking processes. East Java’s 
intellectuals do play a significant role in helping to articulate grassroots agendas and 
influence public opinion.However, this is not enough to dislodgedominant social 
forces occupying the political arenas and civil society, who shape political and 
governance processes to serve their interests. Theoverriding effect can be used as an 
example of how, in post-authoritarian era East Java, democratic institution-building 
does not automatically facilitate the collaboration of intellectuals with the community, 
to advance the interests and aspirations of marginalised people. 
Chapter Seven is a conclusion that summarises the thesis’ findings. 
1.5.Conclusion 
This thesis aims to provide five key contributions. Firstly, it contributes to an 
understanding of how Indonesia’s intellectuals utilize the idea of good governance 
and democratic institution-building for their own political and economic interests. It 
provides insights into how the collaboration between intellectuals and local politico-
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business elites actually shapes good governance and democratic institution-building 
as part of contests over power and resources. Secondly, it shows that the practice of 
good governance and democratic institution-buildinghas helped to validate a power 
structure that continues to obstruct broad-based political participation in Indonesia. It 
also shows the role intellectuals have played in legitimising this process in East Java 
and Surabaya. Thirdly, this thesis contributes to an understanding of how and why 
ideas of good governance, democratic institution-building and political participation, 
as promoted by international development organisations, are adopted, adapted or 
resisted by local political and economic elites. More specifically, it delves into the 
contribution of local intellectuals in resolving the contradictions between technocratic 
ideas and governance practices in the interest of local elites. Fourthly, this dissertation 
contributes to the broader literature on the social role of intellectuals. It provides 
insight into how the social role of intellectuals is not only defined by their capacity to 
produce and circulate knowledge but also by their particular position in concrete 
social and political struggle. Finally, this dissertation contributes to our understanding 
of how the relationships between intellectuals, business and political elites and NGOs 
in local political and economic practices in Indonesiaintersect with national-level 












 This chapter critically evaluates three approaches for understanding good 
governance and the social and political roles of intellectuals within them: the Neo-
Institutional,Neo-Gramscian and Neo-Foucauldian. The Neo-Institutional approach is 
the one that has produced the good governance discourse in the first place. It has been 
dominant in both the academic literature and that produced by technocratic 
intellectuals in international funding agencies. It has also gained the interest of many 
civil society organisations and social movement activists in developing countries. The 
other two perspectives, taking their inspiration from Marxist and Foucauldian 
intellectual traditions respectively, are generally related to critiques of internationally 
funded good governance agendas. Each, however, has its own understanding of the 
role of technocratic intellectuals in the promotion of neoliberalisation processes. 
 None of these approaches, however, accounts for the possibility that neo-
liberal agendas of institutional reform, which include the proliferation of 
decentralisation discurses, could be utilised by entrenched local elites to protect or 
even advance their own political and economic interests. As a consequence, they can 
only inadequately explain how intellectuals can play a part in the usurpation of the 
good governance agenda by many local elites, even though they are supposed to 
embody the sort of objective, scientific and technocratic knowledge privileged by the 
very same agenda (Hadiz, 2004: 698-699). 
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 It is important to explore this question because of the greater salience of local 
contestations over power and wealth that have accompanied democratisation and 
decentralisation in Indonesia. From this viewpoint, the present thesis goes beyond the 
findings of such authors as Hadiz (2010) and Robison and Hadiz (2004). It raises new 
questions, introduced in this chapter, about the dynamics of contestation over power 
and resources at the local level and their ability to absorb a range of seemingly 
contradictory interests, including those based on expert knowledge. This thesis offers 
an approach which views the position and roles of intellectuals as social actors as 
deeply embedded in power struggles between social forces in a specific social 
context. Therefore, intellectuals’ contribution as knowledge producers within political 
and governance processes, rather than providing solutions that stand above social and 
political conflict, is determined by their connections with particular social forces in 
local social and political struggle. 
 It is argued that such intellectuals and experts have played an increasingly 
direct and practical role too in governance practices at the local level of politics in 
Indonesia, which has come to be more contentious since the implementation of the 
decentralisation policy. In fact, they have become an integral part of new coalitions of 
power. The genesis of the collaboration between intellectuals and local predatory 
power alliances in the post-authoritarian era is inseparable from processes occurring 
during the New Order era. Since there was no space for the creation of social bases 
for liberal and progressive forces in civil society, most East Javanese intellectuals 
were co-opted into the New Order’sstate corporatism. The New Order’s co-optation 
and deep intervention in civil society arenas such as the mass media and universities 
not only produced the political subordination of intellectuals, but also created social 
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alliances based on the common interests of politico-business elites and prominent 
intellectuals. 
 Following the emergence of electoral democracy in the Indonesian post-
authoritarian era, the capacities of predatory forces, incubated under the New Order, 
were not only sustained by their occupation of political society, but also enhanced by 
the legitimation and hegemony strategies of intellectuals. Post-authoritarian 
elitesappear to have accepted the institutions of liberal democracy and market 
regulation, associated withthe good governance discourse. However, sincepolitico-
business alliances continue to dominate democratic governance institutions in both 
the national and local arenas of politics, the logic of these institutionalisation 
processes has tended to follow the interests of predatory power — neither serving the 
creation of the market nor bolstering people’s participation. Due to the absorbtion of 
intellectuals into local predatory alliances,they have participated in the mutation of 
the good governance agenda into practices that sustain predatory politics at the local 
level. 
2.2.Intellectuals and Power Struggles 
Scholars have understood the role of intellectuals in vastly different ways. According 
to the phenomenological view, intellectuals are people who carry out the work of 
thinking, while having the courage to speak truth to power (Said, 1994; Lasch, 1997, 
1965; Coser, 1965). On the other hand, the structuralist view emphasises social 
structures as the context within which intellectuals carry out their activities and which 
shapes the roles and functions that they undertake (Bourdieu, 1988; Gramsci, 1971; 
Gouldner, 1985; Eyerman, 1994). 
 Karl Mannheim’s concept of ‘free-floating intellectuals’ is commonly 
understood to mean the capacity of intellectuals to transcend their personal motives 
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and interests. In other words, their ability to detach themselves from their own social 
backgrounds makes it possible for intellectuals to attain objective scientific 
knowledge. To be sure, he recognises that intellectuals are entangled in social reality 
and that this inevitably would influence their understanding of it. Nevertheless, 
Mannheim believes that intellectuals could transcend their social backgrounds 
gradually through a process of socialisation within educational institutions — the 
most important of which is the university — where different ideas and viewpoints are 
encountered. Mannheim assumes that the increase in the number of intellectuals 
drawn from various classes, and socialised within the university, would result in a 
‘higher’ level of understanding of total social reality (Mannheim, 1992; Mendel, 
2006; 27-32). 
 Mannheim also argued that intellectuals functioned as mediators, being 
capable of grasping more of the ‘real world’ than others. Methodologically, he 
claimed that natural science methods cannot be used for dealing with cultural objects, 
insisting on a rigid distinction and separation between the human (or social) sciences 
and the natural sciences. This implies dualism, however, as Jorge Larrain explains, 
which ‘leads to epistemological idealism in the field of natural sciences and 
encourages relativism in the field of social science’ (Larrain, 1979: 103). This 
undermines Mannheim’s notion of intellectuals as free-floating, given that his 
relativisation of thought contradicts his understanding of thinkers as impartial and 
objective. Manheim conceded the dangers of relativism, but asserted that these could 
be neutralised through the pursuit of a truth that was in a process of permanent 
development. However, he has been criticised for the failure of his attempt to provide 
an overarching ‘metascientific’ thesis, eventually resorting to an empiricist call for the 
‘direct observation of the facts’, despite his earlier insistence on the ‘perspectivistic’ 
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(inevitably partial and limited by each individual’s perspective) nature of all truth 
(Craib, 1977: 27). Mannheim never fully answered his philosophical colleagues’ 
accusations that his outlook was virtually tantamount to relativism, although he never 
ceased to assert his rejection of relativism itself (Mannheim, 1952 (1928), 1960 
(1929) & 1967 (1935)). Mannheim’s approach is based on an assumption that the 
sphere of education is free from power interventions. He thus tends to ignore the 
possibility that interventions by powerful interests into educational institutions can 
determine the orientation of knowledge that is internalised through them. 
 Pierre Bourdieu has presented a different view of intellectuals and society. For 
him,intellectuals claim authority over knowledge based on their possession of 
symbolic power with regard to areas within the scope of their expertise. In contrast 
with Mannheim, Bourdieu’s intellectuals pursue their particular interests to advance 
their own positions within the scientific field and in the struggle over the definition of 
what is legitimate science. Nevertheless, Bourdieu also defends the autonomy of 
intellectuals in the public sphere and criticises technocratic scientists who sell their 
expertise to corporations, states and political parties. For Bourdieu, intellectuals 
sacrifice their intellectual autonomy and integrity once they invite external groups to 
determine research agendas. Further, he rejects the practice of intellectuals being 
affiliatedwith political parties and social movements in order to bring about social 
transformation. In this way, Bourdieu rejects the idea of organic intellectuals as 
proposed by Gramsci. For him, the struggle of intellectuals to preserve their 
autonomy and to advance a scientific contribution to social life opens up opportunities 
to challengeprevailing social relations, therefore creating opportunities to transform 
the existing social order (Bourdieu, 1990; Swartz, 2013). 
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 However, if we extend the analysis of intellectuals and their social 
relationships beyond the European context (the focus of Bourdieu’s works), for 
example to Indonesia in the post-authoritarian era, we will find that the capacity of 
intellectuals to contribute to social transformation cannot be separated from 
contestation between social forces over power and wealth.In other words, the notion 
that critical intellectuals can ‘criticise power’ independently of their position within 
the broader constellation of power and interest makes little sense in contexts such as 
post-authoritarian Indonesia, and mostly likely in many other contexts as well. In 
Indonesia, universities and research institutions have been entangled in bureaucratic 
and political alliances going back to the New Order era. This, and the weakness of 
oppositions to predatory power, greatly limit the capacity of Indonesia’s intellectuals 
to exercise the role assigned by Bourdieu.  
 Referring to Gramsci, Ron Eyerman (1994: 9) places some intellectuals in a 
relationship with social movements, as part of collective efforts that might contribute 
to profound social changes. Discarding Gramsci’spreference for class analysis, 
however, Eyermanfocuses on social movementsas the most viable affiliation of 
contemporary critical intellectuals. He argues that social movementshave become the 
new collective actors and sites of collective identity formation. However, Eyerman 
ignores how the dynamics of social class and the configuration of the political 
economy influence the role, function and position of intellectuals in any given 
context. For instance, the capacity of the big bourgeoisie in the United States and 
Western Europe to influence dominant political elites, in part by funding various 
research institutions and think-tanks, contributes greatly toward the dominance of 
neo-liberal ideas in state and civil society (Harvey, 2005). 
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 This thesis uses a Gramscian theoretical framework in order to explain the 
relationship between intellectuals and social struggle. Gramsci’s (1971) idea that all 
people are intellectuals – but not all people have the function of intellectuals – is 
adopted. Gramsci categorised two types of intellectuals with respect to their 
connectedness to social structures, differentiating between ‘traditional’ and ‘organic’ 
intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals claim to reside in the proverbial ivory tower, 
where they supposedly remain autonomous and politically independent. In historical 
reality, this type of intellectual contributes to the defence of the interests of the 
dominant class. Regarding the Italian context in which Gramsci formulated his ideas, 
traditional intellectuals possessed a declining structural connectedness to the waning 
feudal ruling class of the period. In contrast, organic intellectuals possess structural 
connectedness to particular classes and express their political and social engagement. 
Both the hegemonic and the dominated classes possess their own organic intellectuals 
(Baud and Rutten, 2004: 3). For Gramsci, each social group that comesinto existence 
creates a social stratum of intellectuals in order to give it meaning, articulate its 
interests, organise their political interests, and legitimise their actions in civil society. 
He also maintained that the social role of intellectuals in any context should be placed 
within the specific configuration of power and interest in which they have to operate. 
 For Gramsci (1971: 5-8), intellectuals as a social category are not independent 
but intricately connected to the broader social formation in which they find 
themselves. Their role is not defined by the intrinsic nature of intellectual activity, but 
in the ensemble of relationships within which such activity takes place. This 
intellectual activity is shaped to a large extent by the historical function that 
intellectuals take on to articulate competing positions in concrete struggles. This is 
why, as we shall see below, the position and role of Indonesian intellectuals today has 
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to be understood in relation to the configuration of social and political power during 
the New Order era. This was a formative period, wherein the role of intellectuals as 
knowledge producers was deeply influenced by alliances that came to develop mainly 
within the state apparatus. 
 Gramsci observed how the role of the state in reproducing social class power 
depends on its capacity to exert physical repression and to ensure mass internalisation 
of the dominant ideology. Ideology is fundamental not only to represent the system of 
ideas that articulate dominant social interests, but also to intellectually legitimise 
coercive practices and to create consensus among those being dominated. Ideology is 
never socially neutral; it is always related to class power, according to Gramsci. The 
ideology of the bourgeoisie, for example, is said to be dominant in capitalist societies 
and is embodied in the state apparatus. The latter’s capacity to reproduce power 
relations requires the internalisation of that dominant ideology, both at the state level 
and in the ensemble of organisations commonly called civil society (for example, the 
church, universities, mass media and the cultural apparatus). Therefore, political 
resistance requires the dissemination of dominated subaltern ideology, which is 
produced and disseminated by other intellectuals against the state (Poulantzas, 2014: 
28). 
 Importantly, Gramsci’s view of civil society is different from the liberal 
Tocquevillean perspective. In contrast to that perspective — which presents a 
homogenous civil society as a counterbalance to state power — Gramsci argues that 
aspects of civil society can help to facilitate political domination through the 
mobilisation of consent to hegemony. Meanwhile the space provided by civil society 
becomes an arena for the dominated classes to create historical blocs that may 
produce counter-hegemonic ideas. Hence, civil society constitutes a sphere within 
24 
 
which political forces representing the variety of interests in society may contest state 
power (Hewison & Rodan, 2012: 27; Hedman, 2006: 6-7). 
 Still, the main role of civil society’s institutions is to facilitate the mobilisation 
of consent or hegemony, according to Gramsci, and intellectuals play an important 
role in this exercise. It is with such an understanding of civil society that this thesis 
interrogates its development in the New Order era and in the present democracy. As 
Rodan (1996) has argued, civil society is a site of struggle over how power is 
distributed, so it cannot be completely separated from state power. Civil society 
organisations are, by definition, deeply involved in struggles over power (Bernhard, 
1993; Rodan, 1996; Hewison & Rodan, 2013). It is shown herein that intellectuals 
have been deeply involved in such struggles in Indonesia. The historical roots of the 
role of intellectuals in politics at the national level, and more specifically in East Java 
is demonstrated, showing that the close relationship between intellectuals and East 
Javanese predatory elites formed under the New Order continues to restrict the ability 
of most intellectual groupings to contribute to genuine reform agendas in the post-
authoritarian era. 
2.3.Intellectuals and Governance: Theoretical Approaches 
The discussion now moves to an examination of approaches that locate the position of 
intellectuals in processes of reform and institution-building associated with the ‘good 
governance’ agenda. It pays particular attention to the dominant approach, that ofNeo-
Institutionalism, particularly as it is anchored on many of the assumptions of Rational 
Choice theory. It also explores critiques of the Neo-Institutionalist approach that have 
emanated from Neo-Gramscian analysis, proponents of Neo-Foucauldian thinking, 
and finally, the works of scholars that see governance institutions and their function 
as being embedded in historicallyspecific social conflicts. How different approaches 
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view intellectuals’ role in policy and governance in turn reflects the different views of 
the social role of intellectuals discussed above.  
2.3.1. The Neo-Institutional Approach 
Neo-Institutionalism and Development  
The Neo-Institutionalist approach to development isdominant within international 
development organisations, such as the World Bank, USAID, the Asia Foundation, 
the Asian Development Bank, and the German Organisation for Technical Co-
operation, as well as private organisations such as the Ford Foundation. It has 
generated a voluminous literature on governance, decentralisation and democracy. 
From the Neo-Institutional perspective, the challenge of development is to 
make reform a matter of technocratic design, in order to meet an objective ‘good’ 
defined by the requisites of the market, over the demands of rent-seeking and 
predatory elites (Robison 2006; 5). The basic aim is to establish market-facilitating 
institutions to shape individual behaviour in ways that would ‘rationally’ support the 
workings of the free market (Rueschemeyer, 2009: 205-07; Hadiz, 2010: 25-
27).Hence the reform agenda focuses on promoting institutional arrangements to 
protect governance processes and policymaking from undesirable, market-corrupting, 
political interference. Technocratic intellectuals occupy an important role in this 
approach, as experts, located above power struggles, who support development 
programs by promoting technical assistance and providing the appropriate tools for 
the policy-making processes.  
Craig and Porter (2006) see the rise to prominence of Neo-Institutionalism 
within mainstream development assistance orthodoxy and practiceas the vector of the 
disruptions to poor and rich societies alike — caused in both cases by a series of 
economic crises in the late twentieth century. These crises, they suggest, were 
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wrought by neo-liberal designs for the creation of self-regulating markets. The Asian 
crisis in 1997, in particular,and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) formula for 
responding to it, raised critical questions about the neo-liberal agenda driven by the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Even prior to this crisis, leading 
development institutions, most notably the World Bank, had already begun to respond 
to a series of political and economic crises by shifting their agenda from strict neo-
liberal structural adjustment programs of the Washington Consensus to more 
inclusive Poverty Reduction and Good Governance agendas by the late 1990s.  
 The term ‘good governance’, as used by the IFIs, refers to a strategy of 
market-led development through institution-building, drawing on intellectual 
innovations in economic theory. Then Senior Vice-President and Chief Economist of 
the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz launched a new manifesto for development in the late 
1990s, declaring that the Washington consensus solution to development problems, 
trade and financial liberalisation, macro-economic stability and privatisation was 
misguided. He argued that making markets work properly requires more than just low 
inflation and tight budget policy but also financial regulation, competitive policy and 
some state activities that were neglected by the Washington Consensus. He also 
contended that the focus of development should be changed from minimalist 
government action to improved government performance, through making markets 
fulfil their functions better (Fine, 2001: 139; Stiglitz, 1998: 1). 
 Alongside this shift, international development agencies began reformulating 
their position as knowledge-producers by advancing socially progressive new ideas 
about good governance, poverty reduction, human rights-based development, and 
civic empowerment as major foundations of successful development. The new 
paradigm was viewed as qualitatively different from the Washington consensus, 
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which overlooked local demands and grassroots voices in developing countries. This 
shift in knowledge production inside the World Bank, in particular, articulated a new 
consciousness about creating epistemic communities that facilitate links between 
professionals, intellectuals, activists and decision-makers, to make development 
meaningful and of service to local communities, partially on the basis of local 
knowledge. Thus, the World Bank also furthered its interest in promoting proactive 
approaches to deal with the social and environmental cost of economic liberalisation. 
It did this by reframing the role of the state, which would no longer be minimalist, 
and by introducing the ideas of social capital and civic engagement (Bebbington, 
Guggeiheim, Olson and Woolcock 2004)  
 Such an approach,which became known as the Post-Washington Consensus 
(PWC), also came to influence NGOs as well as intellectuals in the developing world. 
This was especially through development agencies’ adoption of civil society 
participation. Even though the idea of participatory development had been known 
from the 1970s, it never became prominent in the discourse of international 
development institutions until the 1990s. Top-down development approaches thus 
appeared to give way, at least partly, to demands for bottom-up development 
initiatives. In reality, however, the kind of participation promoted by development 
agencies is aimed at the development of a citizenry disciplined by the requirements of 
liberal markets (al-Talal, 2004: 16). Experts inside the Bank realised that collaboration 
with civil society is a complex process and could have disastrous implications. 
Therefore, a stronger role was envisaged for World Bank Staff in contextualising 
local conditions. The role of Bank field staff would be seen increasingly in terms of 
supporting government and civil society actors in consultation processes or to engage 
in dialogue with local development stakeholders (Clark, 2000: 3-4). However, this 
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engagement with civil society was to be shaped by technical guidelines provided by 
World Bank staff in Washington. 
 Despite these shifts in strategy and tone, however, the Post-Washington 
Consensus did not manifest a radical rupture with the Washington Consensus. 
According to Carroll (2010: 22-23), the ideas of PWC (especially as articulated by 
Stiglitz) remain firmly within the neo-liberalism mainstream, in fact seeking todeeply 
embed liberal markets into all aspects of social life. The difference between the 
Washington Consensus and the Post-Washington Consensus is the way in which the 
extension of free market into society is to take place. The Stiglitz/PWC focus is on the 
state’s role and on public participation in building supportive institutional 
frameworks, instead of on deregulation and liberalisation. As Carroll (2010: 24) 
suggests, Stiglitz’s ideas also have the effect of depoliticising conflict and struggle 
that typically attend such processes. In addition, they represent an attempt to bypass 
political contestation and social conflict in the name of market transactions based on 
rational choice. This is the case even if the Post-Washington Consensus critiques the 
market dogmatism of the prior Washington Consensus (Jayasuriya & Rosser, 2001: 
388; Fine, 2001: 152-153). 
 The critique of Stiglitz resonates with that levelled at another prominent 
economist, Jeffrey Sachs. The transformation of his role, from championing the 
Washington Consensus and the so-called ‘Shock Doctrine’ in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe to acting as a proponent of poverty reduction programs, does not 
signal a departure from the neo-liberal formula. In the latter, state and public 
intervention in development is conducted to reinforce market society instead of 
challenging it. So the role of the state is to provide the infrastructure and human 
capital required for liberal markets to operate. Health and education are valued to 
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boost labour productivity. Poverty is addressed through voluntary actions by 
corporations rather than as a mandatory obligation of wealth redistribution by the 
state (Wilson, 2014: 142). 
 But both Stiglitz and Sachs avoid the question of social conflict as a driving 
force of social change. The Neo-Institutional approach, as the backbone of good 
governance development agendas, has a tendency to depoliticise development by 
installing technocratic managerial governance to domesticate opposition or significant 
challenges to market facilitating institutions. As a consequence, the ideas of 
participation and citizenship — which are also extolled —are understood in terms of 
incorporating strategic actors’ functions into market society, rather than in terms of 
broad political rights to contest political agendas embedded in development 
programmes (Jayasuriya, 2005; Robison, 2010: 41).This preference for technocratic 
interventions in the design of governance programs has attracted criticism of the 
effect of these interventions on restricting democratic competition. They are seen to 
promote a kind of low-intensity democracy, where public participation does not 
encroach on the fundamentals of running a market economy on the basis of 
technocratically defined objectives (Gills and Rocamora, 1992; Robinson, 2003; 
Robison, 2006). 
 Nevertheless, the actual practices of good governance in developing countries 
work in ways that contrast sharply withneo-institutionalist discursive logic. Empirical 
analysis of the local political context in Indonesia locates the role of intellectuals in 
the practice of governance not as bearers of knowledge who stand above competing 
interests, but as actors embedded in the struggle among predatory elite alliances. 
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Neo-Institutionalism andDecentralisation  
Decentralisation has become a major part of the Neo-Institutionalist project, due to 
the assumption that local and therefore smaller governments can undercut the 
inefficiencies inherent in large national governments. The appeal of decentralisation 
also lies in the fact that it is seen to be compatible with democracy, not just 
development, as envisaged by scholars who study democratisation processes in post-
authoritarian societies. 
 Larry Diamond (1999: 121-126) argues that decentralisation and strengthening 
of local government capacities are the most prominent factors in democratisation 
successes. The creation of local democratic institutions, argues Diamond, would 
reduce the size of territories in which citizens can undertake more direct political 
participation. Hence it would help to encourage democratic values and citizen skills 
and increase government accountability and responsiveness to local aspirations. In 
addition, decentralisation brings political opportunities for minorities and 
marginalised people at the local levelto channel their aspirations through political 
institutions. Local democratic governance also develops checks on power, and 
provides spaces for local civic associations to prevent authoritarian tendencies at the 
national and local levels of politics. Finally, decentralisation is believed to provide 
opportunities for smaller parties to exercise power at the local level, in order to 
balance the power of bigger parties at the national level. In other words, it is assumed 
that progress in democratic institution-building will guarantee the upholding of civil 
and political rights through competitive multiparty elections, as well as a free press 
and vibrant civil society-based associational life. 
 According to neo-institutionalist scholar Grindle (2009: 182-85), the capacity 
of strategic actors to minimise dependence on the central government, while 
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promoting accountability and balancing the relationship between state and civil 
society, would bring improvement to governance processes. However, this requires 
civic engagement, collaboration between state and society and greater accountability 
of local government to the citizenry. Peters and Pierre (2006: 41) have a similar view, 
arguing that the success of governance processes is determined by the capacity of 
strategic development actors to mobilise, organise and enable resources available in 
all segments of society. 
Neo-Institutionalism, Intellectuals and Social Capital 
It is therefore significant that the Neo-Institutionalist approach places much 
importance in the expertise of intellectuals to facilitate these sorts of partnerships and 
collaborations. The legitimacy they possess lies in their position as experts rather than 
as elected officials or civil society representatives. Meanwhile, the interaction 
between international, national and local development agencies brings opportunities 
for technocratic intellectuals from international agencies, as well as from local 
governments, to stake their claims on knowledge. Even though technocratic 
intellectuals’ involvement in governance processes does not derive its legitimacy 
from a democratic basis, their social function is important due to their capacity to 
produce knowledge and policy recommendations in governance practices. At the 
same time, politicians are also seen as crucial in governance practices, because they 
have capacities to set priorities based on their constituencies’ interests, as well as 
authority to make decisions. Therefore, autonomous and interdependent relationships 
exist simultaneously between elected politicians and technocratic intellectuals (Taiclet 
2006: 67-77). 
 The role of intellectuals in civil society is crucial for contributing to and 
expanding the civic knowledge necessary for generating a healthy civil society, given 
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that Neo-Institutionalism promotes collective action. Intellectuals in civil society 
institutions supply the knowledge necessary for productive public participation in 
civil society, as well as motivating people’s participation in local associations. The 
civic knowledge derived from civil society to which intellectuals contribute assists in 
generating collective action (Levine 2010: 362-374: Bevir, 2009: 47-48; Fischer 
2009: 200-94). 
 Hence there is much attention devoted to improving the quality of civil society 
as a pre-requisite for development (e.g. Putnam 2002: 6). Putnam (1993: 2000) was 
arguablythe most instrumental scholar in promoting the idea of social capital as an 
integral part of the Neo-Institutionalist cannon, and as a concept to gauge the quality 
of associational life. Social capital is defined by Putnam (1993: 67) as a feature of 
social organisation — networks, norms and social trust — that facilitate co-ordination 
and co-operation for mutual benefit. The social capital discourse is focused on 
common values such as trust, tolerance, inclusiveness, network connections among 
voluntary associations and mutual co-operation between development actors to create 
vibrant civil society life.  
 Putnam (2000) differentiates between bridging and bonding social capital to 
identify its negative and positive sides. Bonding social capital organisations can be 
found in exclusive groups such as religious communities, fraternal, ethnic or racial 
organisations. Being exclusive in nature, they develop inward-looking characteristics. 
Different from bonding social capital isbridgingsocial capital,which can be found in 
civil rights movements, youth service groups, and ecumenical religious organisations 




 The concept of social capital therefore providesan opportunity to link up 
technocratic know-how, economic development and discursive knowledge in the 
social sciences and to wrap them up together in development assistance projects. The 
World Bank, for example, has promoted civic participation and building trust between 
those who govern and are governed for facilitating democratic institution-building 
and market integration within communities. 
 The concept of social capital, as promoted by the World Bank, is not free from 
criticism. Again, one of the fundamental criticisms is that social capital functions to 
depoliticise the agenda of neo-liberal good governance by normalising trust and co-
operation and relegating conflict to the status of mere ‘aberration’. In connecting the 
state apparatus, community organisations and the market through collaboration to 
develop collective action, what is overlooked is the distribution of power within state, 
market and civil society relationships, which can be unjust and unequal. Hence, the 
utilisation of the concept of social capital tends to implythe acceptance and even 
sustenance and reinforcement of theexisting power structures (Harriss, 2002: 6). In 
short, social capital works as part of an anti-politics machine to persuade all strategic 
actors to obey market facilitating development without challenging class power 
within social orders (Harriss, 2002: 117: Ferguson, 1990). 
 Instead of integrating economics and social theory within good governance 
agendas, the prevalence of the concept of social capital indicates the colonisation of 
political economy by economism. Further, by linking development stakeholders 
through the glue of social capital, these agendas try to improve institutional 
performance through rational choice assumptions based on mutual interest and 
exchange. However, such agendas underestimate the importance of conflictual 
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relationships and political struggles between social forces over power and wealth 
(Fine, 2001: 194), as do the intellectuals that help to implement them. 
 Further, the homogenous characterisation of civil society based on 
Tocquevillean tradition overlooks discrepancies of access to wealth and power that 
are often rooted in class contradictions (Hadiz, 2010: 32). Hence, well-established 
assumptions regarding social capital’s capacity to strengthen democracy ignore the 
fact that, in certain contexts, the bourgeoisie and middle class may be deeply anti-
democratic or anti-free market (Rodan, 1996: 4-5; Hadiz, 2010: 32). It is perhaps 
unsurprising that the promotion of the idea of social capital today ignores the origin of 
this concept in Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) work as part of a critique of the cultural 
aspects of class inequalities and systems of domination (Hadiz, 2010: 32). 
 By overlooking social conflict and tensions embedded in societies, social 
capital agendas ignore the historical fact that democracy, public participation, 
accountability and social and economic rights in Western liberal democratic regimes 
were the result of struggle of social forces and interests (Hadiz, 2010: 33). What is 
forgotten is the possible resilience of the pre-existing political economic structures 
that may maintain predatory power at both the national and local levels. In fact, social 
capital is not particularly useful to explain the development of democracy in 
Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, where the 
ascendancy of local strongmen and predatory power coalitions is a major 
characteristic of the post-authoritarian era (Sidel, 2004; Hadiz, 2010). Referring to 
Indonesia, scholars like Hadiz (2010: 172) argue that the dynamics of local politics 
display the rise of money politics, electoral fraud and rent seeking. 
 In fact the good governance agenda has faced great obstacles in local politics. 
Instead of eliminating corruption and transforming public institutional performance in 
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order to facilitate better functioning liberal markets, the neo-institutional approach 
promoted by technocratic intellectuals has failed to create consensus among 
development actors in accepting transparency, accountability and the operations of the 
free market in practice, eventhough it may commit to these at the discursive level. 
There is a simple reason for this: practicessuch as transparency and accountability 
may be against the fundamental interests of powerful forces dominating local 
institutions. For instance, in the case of North Sumatra and East Java Provinces, 
instead of improving institutional performances, local political practices have 
involved contestation among local political actors to establish local hegemony to 
serve their own economic interests (Hadiz, 2010: 174). While utilising their purported 
role as the producers of civic knowledge to legitimise their engagement with local 
politico-business alliances, intellectuals have rarely had any impact on the direction of 
liberal transformation. On the other hand, the solution ofaddressingdevelopment 
problems through supporting progressive social movements that may participate in 
good governance (Robison, 2010: 18-19) is barely available to intellectuals in 
Indonesia, given the general incoherence of these movements. 
2.3.2. The Neo-Foucauldian Critique: Knowledge and Power 
This section examines the Neo-Foucauldian critique ofthe good governance agenda 
derived from Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between knowledge and power. 
By placing good governance as a dominant knowledge platform for creating an 
international regime of truth, Foucauldians uncover how the idea of civil society 
participation has been constructed as the outcome of technical intellectual 
intervention.The role of intellectualsis thus seen as an instrument for the production 
and reproduction of knowledge that disciplines the population to comply with the 
neo-liberal agenda.On the basis of Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ (Gordon 
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& Miller, 1991: 102-03) – which refers to the cultivation and internationalisation of 
governmental rationality within society –  Foucauldians view good governance 
agendas as the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of a complex form of 
power. 
Foucault pioneered the understanding of governmentality as the contemporary 
form of power — specifically as forms of governing the subject or population beyond 
the role of government. The rationality of governmentality expands the ideas of 
practices of power — which is transformed from mere rule of the people, into how 
governing is more deep-rooted via ways of seeing, thinking and acting. 
Foucaultemphasises the idea of governmentality as more subtle methods of power, 
exercised through a network of institutions, practices, procedures and techniques in 
order to regulate social conduct. The application of governmentality in neo-liberal 
governance is achieved through interrogating both the power operation of global and 
state power, as well as dominant group interest. This is achieved by practising the 
ideas of transparency, accountability and competitiveness as the strategic intervention 
of power, in order to discipline the people under the global order of capitalism 
(Joseph 2012: 11-14). Good governance is hence understood to be a set of political 
technologies and strategic tools deployed to influence the behaviour and activity of a 
state and its population,by which the international regime can govern the latter from a 
distance. 
 The intimate relationship between good governance as a knowledge regime 
and its manifestation as power can be understood by comprehending its goal to 
reinforce, control, monitor, optimise and organise the forces under it, as well as the 
national population. Therefore by introducing democratic institution-building, 
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empowering civil society and promoting capitalist values within communities, the 
good governance agenda has served the international regime, as a consequence of 
maintaining its claim to represent the interests of ‘the other’ — constituted 
bydeveloping countries and their populations(Zanotti, 2005: 464-65). 
 According to Zanotti (2005: 480), by setting good governance agendas as a 
transnational discourse, it is possible for international organisations to assess 
individual governments, compare their performance, and make decisions about 
reward and punishment. Good governance agendas also construct consent among 
strategic development actors at the national and local levels, by translating abstract 
and contentious issues of democracy into a diverse set of technocratic solutions 
embedded in institution-building and reform. Moreover, the operation of 
governmentality is presented by good governance agendas as apolitical 
andtechnocratically soundin ways that are attractive for bureaucrats and political 
elites, as well as for civil society organisations. In other words, governmentality is 
presented as the product of objective and scientific truth uncovered by the work of 
intellectuals and experts. 
 Significantly, Foucauldians also see the good governance agenda as creating 
the logic of binary opposition between orderly, civilised countries and uncivilised and 
unpredictable ones, where scientific truth has yet to take hold.The difference is based 
on transparency out of opacity, accountability out of corruption, effectiveness out of 
aimlessness, rights out of abuses, and rule of law out of unpredictability. This 
hierarchy of norms within development agendas has been created in order to develop 
the local and national arenas in each country as a calculated space, so that it is 
possible to assess the activity of each government and to make decisions about 
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rewards and punishments based upon measurable criteria created by good governance 
agendas (Zanotti, 2005: 480-81). 
 It is in this context that the good governance agenda as a regime of knowledge 
is understood within the Neo-Foucauldian approach (Abrahamsen, 2000: 14). Good 
governance essentially is about the construction of a dominant ‘regime of 
truth’thatdisqualifies and marginalises alternative knowledge (Abrahamsen, 2000; 
Escobar, 1995). As Rita Abrahamsen (2000) shows, the World Bank’s promotion of 
the good governance discourse reaffirmsthe hegemony of the North by incorporating 
cultural awareness and local wisdom toits arsenal of concepts. Regarding the 
implementation of neo-liberal dogma in Africa, Abrahamsen (2000) argues that the 
incorporation of African‘local wisdom’ and indigenous culture into neo-liberalgood 
governance created strong claims for distinction from previous developmentalist 
agendas, generating binary opposition between modern values and local culture. But 
the good governance appropriation of local cultures also helps to frameneo-liberal 
values in African cultural terms. For example, World Bank consultants remind us 
about the ethos of entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa back in the eleventh 
century. This suggests that the values of the free market are embedded in African 
history and could be a source of African social capital (Abrahamsen, 2000: 49-50; 
World Bank Report, 1989: 36). 
 By focusing on empowering civil society, the good governance agenda 
encourages activity within civil society that supports the market and also the creation 
of decentralised democratic institutions that limit the power of the state. In other 
words, this logic of binary opposition promotes the empowering of civil society, in 
order to limit state obstacles to the construction of open market societies. In this way, 
we see how rhetoric that is ‘pro-people’ and ‘pro-indigenous traditions’ can be 
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absorbed into the neo-liberal hegemonic project. Further, intellectuals are seen to be 
the key social agents of the establishment of that regime of truth formation. 
 Through Tania Murray Li’s (2007: 61) researchin Indonesia’s Central 
Sulawesi region, we can see how the binary opposition logic has been applied in 
concrete development programs. By using binary opposition logic to view the lives of 
villagers in Sulawesi, development programs have represented local communities as 
deficient, backward and requiringimprovement. In addition, these development 
programs treat indigenous subsistence activities as being destructive for the 
environment and not productive enough. Li (2007) observesthat the bio-power
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manifestation of development agendas tries to improve populations, local landscape 
and productivity by excluding people from their land and forcing them into intensified 
agricultural production. Li reveals how the application of governmentality in 
development projects has resulted from the failure to address the structural roots of 
problems faced by local communities. This approach realises that the exercise of 
power cannot be absolute but always opens up opportunities to raise alternative 
knowledge from below to resist the dominant regime of knowledge. The resistance of 
local peasants is not carried out through frontal struggle —revolution or massive 
structural change —yet peasants undertake negotiation in a modest way with 
dominant groups and development actors (Li, 2007). 
 As Joseph (2012: 14-15) observes, the strength of the governmentality 
approach lies in its capacity to uncover how dominant groups use subtle methods 
involving new technologies of observation, calculation and administration to 
discipline populations. However the ideaof governmentality, which is promoted by 
Neo-Foucauldians,applies particularly in Western liberal democracies but might be 
                                                 
3
Bio-power means numerous and diverse techniques of power for realising the subjugation of the body 
and management of the population (Foucault, 2010:79-80). 
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less relevant to societies with different levels of development and political 
constellations.Moreover, although Foucault suggests that dominant social 
groupsutilise governmentality strategies to uphold their own interests within social 
struggles,most Neo-Foucauldiansfocus on governmentality as anaspect of a given 
knowledge regime that controls and shapessocieties buttend to downplay the matter of 
dominant class interests.As Joseph (2012:15) contends,the Neo-Foucauldian theory of 
governmentality reflectsa weak theorisation of state power, as well as the social 
context within which struggle between competing interests take place. In short, the 
Neo-Foucauldian approach can be criticised for its inability to connect technologies of 
power to the underlying structure of interests in the broader political economy. With 
respect to Indonesia, the Neo-Foucauldian framework of governmentality fails to 
explain the inability of technocratic experts to domesticate predatory elite alliances. 
This would require uncovering the underlying configuration of economic and political 
interests in Indonesia and how these shape the functioning of good governance 
institutions in practice. 
 At the local level, Neo-Foucauldians similarly overlook the ability of local 
politico-business interests to take control of good governance knowledge regimes. 
They ignore the possibility that local elites can manipulate good governance 
knowledge for their own interests. In fact, resistance to the good governance regime 
of truth does not necessarily come from ‘local’wisdom;itis more likely to derivefrom 
local elite capacities to adapt good governance agendas and use them for their own 
social ascendancy. 
2.3.3. The Neo-Gramscian Critique: A New Imperialist Logic? 
The Neo-Gramscian approach interrogates the good governance agenda from a 
structuralist point of view that emphasises the transnational nature of the social 
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interests that underpins it.This approach employs Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and 
historical bloc to show how political rule under neo-liberalismis based on consent 
rather than coercion. It is manifest through conducive ideas and specific forms of 
production which serve toadvance the interests of the ruling class and to 
accommodate subordinated interests under a specific neo-liberal model of 
globalisation (Worth 2009: 21-24: Overbeek 2000: 175: Cox 1987). In this approach, 
intellectuals play a prominent role in the upholding of neo-liberalism as hegemonic 
knowledge in the public space. Consent to the neo-liberal agenda is constructed 
through the workings of corporations, media, and civil society institutions such as the 
intellectuals inside the university, school, church and professional association. The 
construction of consent for neo-liberal ideology then moves to capture the realm of 
political parties and state power (Harvey, 2005: 40). 
 Further, the transnational capitalist class’ efforts to reproduce consensus on 
neo-liberalism have been enabled not only through the IFIs’ (IMF, World Bank and 
WTO) design of development but also through private international policy groupings 
such as the World Economic Forum, the Trilateral Commission and the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development. They share three critical attributes 
that are pivotal in the construction of global neo-liberal hegemony: Firstly, each 
occupies a space within civil society through which social networks supporting 
business interests and the neo-liberal worldview take shape. Secondly, they act as 
instrument of transnational elite integration, linking the free market agenda with 
political society (political parties and parliament). Thirdly, they translate dominant 
class interests into state action by promoting aset of policies that ensures stability and 
the reproduction of a system shaped by capitalist social relations and transnational 
class interests (Carrol & Carson, 2006: 53-54). Even though the new development 
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agendas designed by technocratic intellectuals working inside international agencies 
are sometimes claimed to be distinct from more dogmatic forms of neo-liberalism, 
they try to bypass political contestation by creating alliances with civil society 
organisations in order to instil free market values among the citizenry. This practice is 
actually closely connected with Hayek’s ideas on spontaneous order, which is based 
on the transmission of free market values into societies and into their cultural fields 
(Boykin, 2010: 19-20). 
 This is why the Neo-Gramscian perspective places much emphasis on the 
function of intellectuals in the construction of neo-liberal regimes in developing 
countries. Petras and Veltmeyer (2000: 130-33) suggest, for example, that 
intellectuals, NGO activists and academics are not only producers of knowledge that 
support neo-liberal governance ideas but that they are organic as well to the interests 
of the transnational capitalist class. Thus we saw, after the fall of dictatorial regimes 
such as that of Soeharto in Indonesia, Pinochet in Chile and Marcos in the 
Philippines, how NGO activists and academics formed the avant-garde of neo-liberal 
development agendas in these countries, largely in conjunction with projects that were 
under the aegis of international development organisations. Secondly, they suggest 
that the strengthening of the neo-liberal impulse takes place in the developing world 
through the absorption by international agencies of intellectuals and NGO activists in 
order to deflect possibly more radical trajectories of political economic change. This 
helps to establish conditions under which the drive for social change is channelled 
toward more moderate reforms, even if intellectuals enlist urban and rural poor 
communities in self-help activities and in local voluntary associations. Thirdly, the 
recruitment of intellectuals is assisted by economic crises stimulated by greater 
integration in the global capitalist economy. 
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 Further, intellectuals, academics,and professionals in developing countries 
often face crises in their own material conditions; and thus, to maintain their middle 
class lifestyle, mayneed to offer their services to development aid programs, and 
collaborate with state and non-state actors. In this way, academics and some NGO 
activists have essentially become the organic intellectuals of transnational interests in 
the Neo-Gramscian view. In short, the function of intellectuals as hegemonic 
instruments of neo-liberal processes in developing countries is fundamental not only 
as knowledge creators but also in their capacity to create consent at the grassroots 
level to neo-liberal reforms, including through the use of pro-people rhetoric (Petras 
& Veltmeyer, 2000). As Panizza observed (2009: 36-38), the implementation of free 
market reform in developing countries requires domestic consensus and the restriction 
of opposition to it. 
 Technocratic intellectuals are, from this point of view, the social agents of the 
ideological apparatus of neo-liberal governance who work in the IFIs’ research 
departments and in national governments as experts in finance ministries and the like. 
Their role is to produce position papers, technical reports and policy documents that 
provide support for neo-liberal reform. International financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund also encourage policy dialogue and 
partnership between their staff and experts from developing countries, thus creating 
an international network of technocratic experts who share the same worldview and 
employ a similar language to decipher the problems of the world and to identify 
solutions to them. The outcome is the marginalisation of other possible worldviews 
and their related approaches to development. This understanding of the role and 
position of intellectualsis inspired by Gramsci’sview of organic intellectuals. They are 
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seen, from this perspective, as the instrument of transnationalist class 
interests,advancing their hegemonic position in theneo-liberal globalisation project.  
 It is significant therefore, that Demmers, Jilberto and Hogenboom (2005: 9-
10) have argued that good governance reform requires democracies that eliminate 
ideologically based political parties that disrupt the operations of the free market. 
Robinson (2006: 101-113) similarly argues that the neo-liberal hegemonic project is 
sustained by identifying democracy with a polyarchic system, where a small group 
actually rules and where mass participation in decision-making is confined to 
choosing leaders in elections that are managed not to challenge the existing order. 
 It is in this regard that the PWC is seen to seek the further extension of the 
market into all areas of social life by depoliticising social conflict. In sum, the 
practice of the Post-Washington Consensus amounts to promoting illiberal politics 
and liberal economics instead of promoting democratic development agendas. The 
World Bank aid program known as the Kecamatan (sub-district) Development 
Program (KDP) in Indonesia has therefore involved the bypassing of democratic 
institutions and domestic policy processes in order to install capitalist social relations 
at the local level. Even though there are many reforms in the development agendas 
instigated by international institutions, such as the World Bank, to accommodate 
progressive ideals such as participation, empowerment and social partnership, the 
evolution of this development agendas is still strongly connected with a neo-liberal 
project that serves transnational capitalist class interests. Transnational capitalist 
interests are served, for example, by the KDP’s delivering of the productive 
infrastructure necessary for creating market-oriented agricultural production. Through 
the absorption of some populist terms such as ‘public participation’ and ‘poverty 
reduction’, the KDP has developed a discourse that builds consensus among political 
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elites and civil society in order to bypass democratic political institutions in 
furtherance of the market (Carroll, 2010: 24). 
 Good governance and democratic institution-building,as promoted by 
technocratic intellectuals,are seen from this perspective as ideological tools reflecting 
the social relations of production of the recent form of global capitalism (Robinson, 
2008: 2003; Peet, 2007: Weller and Singleton, 2006; Carrol and Carson, 2006; 
Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhoffer, 2006; Demmers, Jilberto & Hogenboom, 2005; 
Harvey, 2005 &2003; Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001; Kiely, 1998; Strange, 1996; 
Overbeek &Van Der Pijl, 1993).The assumption of this literature is that a 
transnational capitalist class has emerged that is able to take economic resources away 
from developing countries by penetrating the process of democratic institution-
building at the national and local levels around the world.The Neo-Gramscian 
perspective views the good governance agenda as part of the hegemonic construction 
of neo-liberal ideas, which are supported by knowledge produced by organic 
intellectuals tied to transnational class interests (Overbeek & van der Pijl, 1993: 4-5).  
 The Neo-Gramscian perspective, however, overlooks the capacity of domestic 
politico-business interests in countries such as Indonesia to advance their own 
interests vis-à-vis the interests of global capital. In the case of Indonesia, the Neo-
Gramscian approach tends to ignore the confrontation of political-economic interest 
that might occur between the transnational capitalist class, whichtries to advance the 
market forces and develop neo-liberal order,and the domestic predatory class, 
whichadvancesits social interests under the predatory capitalist structure. 
 As Robison and Hadiz (2004: 5-12) demonstrate for Indonesia, neo-liberal 
agendas advocated by technocratic experts and intellectuals have been challenged 
domestically by an established political-business oligarchy and associated social 
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alliances, which are well embedded in state and society. Further, the political 
configuration in Indonesia shows that the politico-business interests that had 
hegemonic power under Soeharto’s New Order have survived into the post-
authoritarian era and created new alliances in the newer arenas of democratic politics 
to further their interests. However, such political-economic coalitions contradict the 
logic of the neo-liberal model of global capitalism, which encourages detachment of 
business from political forces. This does not mean that the neo-liberal project has no 
influence. Good governance and democratic institution-building have been used 
strategically by coalitions in national and local politics for their own interests. From 
this point of view, the major site of political and economic conflict is not between 
neo-liberal political coalitions and popular class coalitions, but between competing 
national and local predatory coalitions that struggle to acquire power and control over 
resources for their own interests. 
2.3.4. The Embedded Social Conflict Approach 
Finally,there is the embedded social conflict perspective. In this view, the role and 
functions of intellectuals cannot be separated from social struggles over power and 
tangible resources within particular states and societies. Therefore the role of 
intellectuals in governance is determined not only by their knowledge contribution but 
also by the social alliances of which they are a part. In countries such as Indonesia, 
intellectuals are entangled in political contests that require academic knowledge that 
legitimises the activities of political elites and that may contribute topolitical 
strategising. This approach has similiarities with the Neo-Gramscian approach that 
focuses on the pattern of struggle between social forces and the way it affects 
governance processes. However, the embedded social conflict approach differs from 
the Neo-Gramscian approach in terms of the primary object of social analysis. Instead 
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of a focus on a transnational capitalist class that directs and gains the most benefit 
from neoliberalisation processes, this approach focuses on domestic predatory 
alliances that embed themselves in the process of governance institution building and 
inhibit the realisation of the sort of market society imagined by the proponents of neo-
liberal governance agendas. 
 From such an approach, the incapacity of intellectuals to advance good 
governance agendasis related to the absence of social forces that have developed a 
genuine interest in liberal reform agendas. Therefore, the political option for 
intellectuals is mainly to advance their role through alliances that, in spite of the 
development discourse espoused, prevent the realisation of many good governance 
aims. In Indonesia, this problem is related to the structure of a political oligarchy 
embedded in the process of market consolidation and which benefits from it, in part 
by adopting the good governance agenda for its own interests (Robison, 2011; Rodan 
& Jayasuriya, 2007). Although such apossibility is also acknowledged by public 
choice and Neo-Institutionalisttheory, this political economy approach emphasises the 
interests articulated in domestic power contestations that make it difficult to 
accomplish change simply by institutional reform, whether this is to insulate 
technocrats from political elites’ predatory activities or to support civil society 
organszations’ activities, so long as the social relations and structures that support 
these elites’ power remain unbroken (Robison, 2011; Sangmpam, 2007; Hout 2009). 
 As Robison suggests (2010: 25), the problems of the development process are 
not explained in terms of the politics of resistance versus transformation. Rather, the 
site of conflict emerges as a part of the process to shape the rules that define new 
market societies and to establish new forms of political power constellations within 
the new market regime. Therefore the problems of governance are connected to 
48 
 
existing asymmetries in power and social inequality.  This school of thought does not 
see good governance and democratic institution building as detached from national 
and local power constellations. (Hout 2009; Hadiz, 2010& 2006; Robison, 2006; 
Hadiz and Robison, 2005). 
 Rather than emphasising conflict between transnational class interests and 
domestic opponents, this study highlights conflicts arising from competition between 
domestic politico-business alliances to exploit attempts to forge new market regimes. 
In otherwords, even though the direction of global capitalism has demanded national 
and local integration with the world economy, national and local elites can still 
benefit from latching on to the reform agenda promoted by international development 
agencies in creative ways. 
 The chapters that follow demonstrate how neo-liberal reform agendas are 
often unable to stem the rising tide of predatory politics at the national and local 
levels.Rapacious politics at both these levels becomes able to adapt and utilise neo-
liberal reforms to advance local predatory social interests, even when powerful 
international donors representing transnational interests back the reforms.Such donors 
confirm Hout’s (2009) argument that political change is not the result of choices 
being made by rational individualsor technocratic elites within states emptied of 
politics. In the Indonesian case, political change has been related to the rise and 
survival of a complex politico-business oligarchy that has reorganised power through 
successive crises, by colonisingand seizing of control over political and market 
institutions. 
 The embedded social conflict approach provides a powerful critique of The 
Neo-Institutionalism, Neo-Foucauldian, and the Neo-Gramscian approaches. 
Eventhough the Neo-Foucauldian and Neo-Gramscian approaches are different, they 
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still bear similarities in their analyses of good governance in the context of 
globalisation. Their perspectives mostly overlook the importance of local political and 
economic alliances and local power contestations. They both differ as well from the 
neo-liberal perspective that sees the good governance agenda as providing the best 
solution to handle problems in transitional countries, such as poverty, disintegration 
threats, corruption, lack of rule of law and economic development imbalances. 
 However, this research extends the analysis of authors such as Robison and 
Hadiz specifically to reveal the significant role of intellectuals within struggles over 
economic and political reforms. Moreover, this research reveals the contribution 
ofsuch intellectuals within predatory elite coalitions that often hijack neo-liberal 
reform programs, and their collective inability to actively further liberal or more 
progressive agendas due to the nature of the constellation of power and interests they 
confront. By focusing on these intellectuals, we see that the actors involved in the 
market-hijacking process include those commonly viewed as the architects of good 
governance neo-liberal agendas, but whose activities are more likely to be intertwined 
with those of elites whose interests may be threatened by thoroughgoing reforms. 
2.4. Intellectuals and Power Struggles in Comparative Perspective 
The role and functions of intellectuals cannot be separated from the advancement and 
defence of the social intereststo which they organically belong. For Gramsci, the 
results of social struggle are partly determined by the efforts of dominant social forces 
to construct consent to their rule through the mass media, universities, church and 
other civil society arenas. The role of intellectuals is fundamental in this regard. 
Intellectuals play an important role to articulate, organise and justify the social class 
interests through creating commonsense knowledge by which masses would support 
dominant class interests (Harvey, 2005; Gramsci, 1971). 
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 By comparing experiences in Europe and the United States, Latin America 
and South East Asia (especially Indonesia), this section shows that the role of 
intellectuals as the promotersof neo-liberal ideas and political economic reforms is 
determined by the availability of sufficient social bases that support particular kinds 
of struggles and political projects. Therefore, the capacity of intellectuals to construct 
public consent for the agendas ofdominant social forces, or topromote counter 
hegemony by articulating grassroots interest, is influenced by the broader 
constellation of power in their societies. 
2.3.2. Intellectuals and power in United Kingdom and the United States 
The power struggle between the proponents and opponents of neo-liberal ideas in 
European countries and the United States reflects the social power 
configuration,which is characterised by the capacity of the bourgeoisie to dominate 
other social forces. This reality could be traced historicallyto the political economy 
constellation of the Twentieth Century. After World War II, the restructuring of state 
forms and international relations was designed to anticipate threats to capitalismin 
Europe and the United States. Such restructuring was enabled by the balance of power 
between capital and labour that produced acompromise to ensure social stability. The 
great consensus between capital and labour facilitated the advance of social 
democratic politics witnessed in the rise of labour parties and trade unions. This 
compromise, developed after the Second World War,was reflected in the production 
of knowledge that extolled it, as seen in the works of Robert Dahl and Charles 
Lindblom (1953) in the field of political science. A similar trend appeared in 
economics, where the Keynesian school of thought, as represented by scholars such as 
Galbraith (1958) promoted state intervention in the market, in order to facilitatethe 
latter working better for workers (Harvey 2005). 
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 This political-economic regime — famously called ‘embedded liberalism’— 
was characterised by attempts at capital accumulation that would break through the 
limits that had been imposed by political and social constraints and expressed in a 
restrictive regulatory environment. It also aimed to create social conditions under 
which the state can organise industrial strategy in some instances through the state 
ownership in key industrial areas. However, this condition had also made possible a 
redistributive policy and working class trade union integration into the policy-making 
process (Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2007). 
 But criticisms of welfare state regimes had been put forward already by the 
Mount Pelerin Society, established in 1947 by Friedrich von Hayek (Hayek,2006 
(1944)) and supported by Swiss businessman Albert Hunold. Associated scholars 
emphasised market and economic freedoms by creating the discourse of binary 
opposition between free and planned markets, presenting the latter as a threatto 
personal freedom (Plehwe & Walpen, 2006). Yet, this intellectual group did not 
represent mainstream knowledge in the West until much later, when political and 
economic circumstances had changed to allow for it. 
 Such changes began to occur when negotiation between capital and labour 
began to break downin the West in the end of the 1960s. This was followed by the 
crisis of the welfare state andcharacterised by high rates of unemployment and 
inflation.An opportunity was therefore provided for the opponents of welfare state 
regimes to advance their aspirations and interests as tax revenues declined and 
governments began to have trouble paying for their social expenditure. The situation 
effectively created clear divisions between those who advocated maintaining the 
social democratic order and state central planning,and those pushing politico-business 
aspirations to liberate the market from state regulations. 
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 In the United States, this resulted in the liberalisation of regulations governing 
corporate activities, initiated by the administration of President Richard Nixon in 
1971. In a memo to the US Chamber of Commerce, Nixon suggested an assault upon 
institutionssuch as universities, school, the media, publishing, and the courts, in order 
to change how individuals think about private enterprise, the law, culture and 
individual values (Harvey, 2005). This political initiative was followed by the 
expansion of the American Chamber of Commerce from a membership of around 
60,000 firms in 1972 to over a quarter of a million ten years later. Along with this 
consolidation of the bourgeoisie, American corporations at the time spent close to 
US$900 million annually to build think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, 
Hoover Institute and The American Enterprise Institute, in order to produce the 
knowledge to support the neo-liberal policy and the primacy of corporation in social 
arenas. Such investment was no doubt stimulated by a perceived relative lack of 
intellectual support for corporate interests within academia. These think tanks have 
come to mobilise expertise to redefine the terms of debate about policy agendas in 
order to better translate the dominant class interestinto state action (Harvey 2005; 
Steinfels, 1979; Peschek,1989). 
 During the Reagan Presidency, the Republican Party undertook a massive 
effort to enhance its appeal to white working class and rural communitiesby 
accommodating socially conservative and religious values. This took place at the 
same time that it gave increasing support for a regime of knowledge that prominently 
endorsed neo-liberal ideas as promoted by scholars like Milton Friedman 
(monetarism), James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (public choice theory). The result 
was a free market and neo-conservative political discourse focused on the primacy of 
morality and traditional values such as represented by Irving Kristol and Norman 
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Podhoretz, but also individual entrepreneurship. Soon their ideas had been 
mainstreamed into American political culture.The Democratic Party also had to adjust 
its policies away from welfarism, at the expense of those within its traditional bases of 
support, such as working class minorities (Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2007). 
 However, the transition toward neo-liberalism in UK took a different path 
from the  US. Because the political culturehas longbeen more secularised than in the 
United States, an appeal to religious conservatism was not an option. Rather than 
working at any community level,neo-liberal ideas are disseminated more exclusively 
through the long established network of class and privilege that is tied to academia, 
the judiciary and civil service. But a more developed and expansive welfare state 
system was faced in the UK compared to the US, and one that provided space for the 
articulation of working class interests especially through the Labour Party and trade 
unions (Harvey, 2005). 
 Here pro-market intellectuals waged their challenge against the welfare state 
through think tanks such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (established in 1955), 
the Centre for Policy Studies (1974), and the Adam Smith Institute (1976).All of these 
promoted the cause of individual freedoms in the civil society arena. However the 
political moment for neo-liberalisation arrived from a crisis of capital accumulation 
during the 1970s. This opened up room for the UK Conservative Party under 
Margaret Thatcher to diminish the power of trade unions, while reducing welfare 
benefits for the poor and opening up the UKto more foreign competition and 
investment. The Thatcher government deregulated policy frameworks that had placed 
constraints on private capital, privatised state owned enterprises and promoted 
monetarism in fiscal policies. In undertaking these changes, the government was 
much assisted by intellectuals ensconced in policy think tanks. Theirrole was to 
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challenge and discredit the old social democratic consensus and to replace it with one 
that placed much more emphasis on individual enterprise and productivity (Plehwe, 
Walpen & Neunhoffer, 2006; Harvey, 2005& Desai, 1994). 
 It is well known that the UK Labour Partyunder Tony Blair responded by 
articulating the so-called ‘Third Way’, as put forward by the noted sociologist 
Anthony Giddens. The point was to intellectually resolve the requirements of 
economic growth while restructuring, rather than eliminating, thewelfare state. But 
such notions werecriticised by Leftist intellectuals such as Alex Callinicos, who 
asserted that the Third Way did not differ much from the neo-liberal agenda of their 
conservative opponents. The Third Way does not reject Thatcher’s privatisation 
programme, for example, and allowed social economic inequality to grow (Callinicos, 
2001), much as it has in the USA. 
 The neoliberalisation processes in the US and in European countries, 
especially in the UK, show that the role and function of intellectuals are closely 
connectedto broader conflicts over power and the organisation of the economy. The 
role of intellectuals in shaping the terms of debate on social issues toward a new 
consensus – one which is favourable to social interests that have benefitted from 
neoliberalisation – should not be underestimated. However, it should be noted that 
structural crises of capitalism since the 1970s had created the preconditions for the 
success of these efforts. 
2.3.3. Intellectuals and Power Struggles in Latin America 
The role of intellectuals in Latin America cannot be separated from a long history of 
class struggle over the distribution of power and resources and the organizstion of the 
state and the economy. There is also a substantial history of intellectuals 
beingorganically linked to social forces either on the Right-wing or Left-wing of 
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politics. Right-wing intellectuals have promoted and facilitated the interests of the 
bourgeoisie and related social class alliances toward the creation of a pro-business 
hegemonic discourse. Left-wing intellectuals advocate and produce counter 
hegemonic ideas that support far reaching structural change and are concerned with 
policy reforms which they contend are in the interests of the working class and 
marginalised social groups (Panizza, 2009: 170-71). 
 The advent of the neo-liberal agenda in Latin America began via the dramatic 
military coup led by General Pinochet against the social democratic Socialist Party 
government of Salvador Allende in 1973. Similar toSoeharto’s military coup against 
Soekarno in 1960s Indonesia, General Pinochet consolidatedan anti-communist 
alliancethat took harsh political action against a constitutional government based on 
Leftist social forces. However, unlike in Indonesia, a pre-existing strong bourgeois 
class faction backed the military coup in Chile, and so Pinochet did not have to 
undertake a capitalist revolution from scratch.The Pinochet coalition of power 
included military officers, diverse big conglomerates and business associations that 
concentrated their investment in those areas in which Chile had a comparative 
economic advantage, and technocratic intellectuals who were committed to the 
marketeconomy. This coalition came to adopt a neo-liberal agenda that restructured 
social welfare and labour policies, which undermined the position the working class 
had enjoyed under Allende’s social democratic government (Posner,2008; Klein, 
2007). 
 Interestingly, Chilean technocratic intellectuals had trained at the University 
of Chicago under the aegis of Milton Friedmansince the 1950s, as part of an 
American program to counteract Left-wing politics in Latin America. These neo-
liberal technocrats dominated prominent Universities in Chile such as the private 
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Catholic University in Santiago. They built close relationships with the capitalist class 
and military officers before the Pinochet coup, yet their activities did not extend into 
civil society. Tied closely to the Pinochet regime, they advocated policies as 
recommended by the IMF and the World Bank, and helped to create common consent 
to them (Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2007). Similar developments were later to occur 
incountries such as Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, 
whereneo-liberal technocratic intellectuals played a major part in social alliances that 
steered these countries at one time or another in a neo-liberal direction. 
 However, Latin American intellectuals have been organically connected as 
well to labour politics and social movements, and have articulated resistance to neo-
liberal reform. Relatively strong labour movements are structurally embedded in some 
of these Latin American countries, making it possible for Leftist politics to remain 
influential within civil society. Even though harsh and repressive action has been 
directed at the proponents of Left-wing politics, they still have sufficient grassroots 
support to maintain resistance towards neo-liberal transformation, either through 
armed rebellion or via initiatives in the realm of procedural democracy (Panizza, 
2005; Silva, 2009). 
 The Latin American cases show the importance of the presence of organised 
alternatives that intellectuals can latch on to. Many Latin American intellectuals have 
advocated grassroots participatory politics, participatory budget initiatives, food 
sovereignty, small-medium enterprise, co-operative economics networks, and land 
reform redistribution. Meanwhile,the new trend in the resurgence of Leftist politics in 
Latin America show the rising tide of indigenous movements in countries such as 
Bolivia and Venezuela. These indigenous movements are also supported by organic 
intellectuals who have fashioned new discourses to validate the more assertive role 
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indigenous peoples take in national politics (Grugel & Riggirozi, 2009; Baud & 
Rutten, 2005). 
2.3.4. Intellectuals and social struggle in South East Asia 
Indonesian intellectuals,similar to many of their Southeast Asian counterparts (such as 
in the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand), have a close relationship with dominant 
elites in national and local politics partly due to the penetration of the state into 
institutions like universities.More recently, the strange combination of 
commercialization of universities, the power of state bureaucracies, as well as 
oligarchic trends in nation-state leadership, make it difficult to produce large numbers 
of critical intellectuals, as many becomeabsorbed into dominant power alliances 
(Anderson 2010).    
 
The position of intellectuals in South East Asia, specifically in Indonesia, is the 
product of social struggles that have taken a different form than in Europe, the United 
States and Latin America. Indonesian intellectuals are neither closely involved with 
the bourgeoisie nor organically connected with strong labour and other forms of 
grassroots politics. 
 It should be recalled that Indonesia’s capitalist transformation was marked by 
the emergence of a domestic capitalist classdominated by Chinese 
conglomeratesdependent on state political patronage.The development of this class 
took place under a state-led capitalism and through close ties with the state politico-
bureaucracy itself (Robison, 1986; Hadiz & Dhakidae, 2005). With no real interest in 
challenging the state by supporting the liberalisation of politics, this bourgeoisie came 
to develop highly illiberal characteristics. At the same time, intellectuals could not be 
organically involved in Leftist politics since Soeharto had brutally demolished the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1966. This meant that generations of 
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intellectuals committed to societal empowerment issues or progressive Leftist agendas 
have hadalmost no possibility to link up with working class, peasant or urban poor 
interests in political struggle (Hadiz 2010). 
 Dueto Indonesia’s political and economic conditions, neo-liberal technocratic 
intellectuals were not able to obtain sufficient support from the ruling regime to 
translate their liberal economic reform ideas into state policy. The initiative of 
technocratic intellectuals to orientate economic development toward free market 
trajectories was blocked by predatory power alliances using state resources for their 
own interests. In this case, the oil boom of the 1970s and 1980s, due to rising 
international oil prices, was crucial. This condition became more pervasive given the 
absence of politically assertive capitalist and middle classesin Indonesia in the face of 
an authoritarian state on which their fortunes largely depended (Robison, 1996). 
 Subsequently, politico-business alliances nurtured during the Soeharto period 
came to adapt todemocratisation by forging new alliances, such as those represented 
by political parties, to dominate the institutions of democratic politics. Since reformist 
and liberal power alliances cannot change the structural power configuration in the 
post-authoritarian era, liberal intellectuals can connect with transnational class power 
through the International Financial Institutions but cannot reform the political and 
economic situation nationallyor in local arenas. This is because their efforts had been 
blocked by the predatory alliances that dominate the domestic political and economic 
arenas. However, Indonesia’s circumstances are not unique among South East Asian 
countries.The process of institutional reform through decentralisation — regardless of 
whether this was intended to facilitate market rationality or to facilitate institution-
building for the empowering civil society —was undertaken in Thailand and the 
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Philippines and then hijacked by the dominant social forces and interests (Robison & 
Hadiz, 2003; Hadiz, 2010). 
 In the Indonesian post-authoritarian context, intellectuals encounter a dilemma 
that places them in an ambivalent situation. On the one hand, their efforts to initiate 
reformare blocked by powerful predatory and oligarchic alliances, which have 
hijacked state policy and resources for their own interests.On the other hand, 
especially at the local level, the role of intellectuals has been shaped by a prior history 
of domestication and co-optation by the authoritarian state.  
 Meanwhile, intellectuals who are more committed to grassroots social 
movements cannot escape from the New Order’s political and economic legacies. As 
will be elaborated later,deep state intervention and the floating mass strategy created 
by Ali Moertopo (Soeharto’s personal assistant) and the CSIS think tank have 
separated intellectuals and student activists from grassroots-level social bases of 
support (Moertopo 1972). This situation continues to makeit difficult for intellectuals 
to connect with subaltern groups within civil society in spite of democratisation.The 
most obvious choice for intellectuals is therefore to latch onto already existing and 
powerful predatory social alliances; as they have nationally and in the case of East 
Java, which is the particular focus of this dissertation. 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the role of local intellectuals in good governance 
processes is determined less by their contribution as knowledge producers than their 
roles as social actors who are involved in social struggles over power and wealth. It 
has provided a framework to understand how the good governance discourse 
developed and disseminated by local intellectuals in Indonesia tends to facilitate the 
ascendancy of predatory power alliances,instead of producingbarriers to 
60 
 
theirusurpation of political and economic institutionsin Indonesia. On the other hand, 
the capacity of intellectuals to advance governance reforms has been limited by the 
lack of sufficientlypowerful politically liberal social bases that might underpin liberal 
reform agendas. 
 This chapter has explored the existing literature on the relationship between 
intellectuals and good governance practices, identifying four approaches.The Neo-
Institutionalist perspective locates intellectuals as development actors who can 
contribute to development programs through their technical knowledge. This 
approach ignores that the dynamics of local elites contestation and negotiation over 
power and tangible economics resources are embedded in the overarching structures 
of political and economic domination and subordination, and that local elites can 
hijack the institutional reform agenda for their own interests.The Neo-Foucauldian 
and the Neo-Gramscian approaches differ as well from the neo-institutional 
perspective that sees the good governance agenda as unproblematically the best 
solution to handle problems in transitional countries such as poverty, disintegration 
threats, corruption, absence of the rule of law and economic development 
imbalances.Yet, these perspectives ignore the importance of local political and 
economic alliances that can ‘absorb’ intellectuals,and thereby limit the possibility of 
intellectuals actually advancingthe reformist governance agendasthey are meant to 
support. As a result, they underestimate the difficulty of transforming local political 
and economic conditions through institutional reform or through supporting reformist 
civil societies groups (Robison, 2010: 25). In fact, unlike the assertions of Neo-
Foucauldians, the possibility of resisting the good governance regime of truth does 
not necessarily come from alternative local knowledge, but is more likely to come 
61 
 
from local elite capacities to adapt good governance agendas for their own social 
ascendancy. 
 This research relies on a combination of the embedded social conflict 
approach and Gramscian analysis. It suggests that neo-liberal reform agendas 
promoted by intellectuals are often unable to stem the rising tide of predatory politics 
at the national and local levels, even when they are backed by powerful international 
donors representing transnational interests. Hadiz and Robison (2004) have argued 
that the neo-liberalworldview is,in fact,false. Political change is not the result of 
choices being made by rational individuals,or technocratic elites within states emptied 
of politics. In the Indonesian case, political change has been related to the rise and 
survival of a complex politico-business oligarchy, which has reorganised power 
through successive crises, via the colonisationand seizing of control over political and 
market institutions. Thisthesis follows this political economy approach. However it 
adds tothe Hadiz and Robison thesis, by uncovering the position of intellectuals in 
power struggles in local political economies. In this it follows Gramsci’s perspective, 
recognising intellectuals as articulators of social forces involved in power 
struggles.The thesis thus focuses on embedded social conflict in local politics,locating 
intellectuals as part of social coalitions able to facilitate the ascendancy of local 
predatory elite coalitions rather than their eradication through the good governance 
agenda. 
 Specifically, the research herein provides empirical evidence for how contests 
over power and resources among predatory political elites have influenced the actual 
implementation of the good governance agenda in Surabaya and the role of 
intellectuals within this process. Unlike Harvey’s (2007) thesis about the construction 
of consent, thisthesis shows that the collaboration between local political elites, 
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economic actors, civil society groups and technocratic intellectuals actually steers the 
implementation of good governance agendas in the direction of predatory practices 
and away from those based on free market assumptions. It shows that intellectuals 
have very important roles in the process,which go far beyond production and 
dissemination of knowledge, as they develop their own social and material interests. 
 The following chapter will consider the historical context of the relationship 









Historical Context of the Relationship between 
East Javanese Intellectuals and the Political Elite 
 
3.1.Introduction 
This chapter elaborates on the historical context of the relationship between 
intellectuals and political elites, especially during the New Order Era, in East Java and 
at the national level. By tracing the historical roots of the relationship between 
intellectuals and politico-business elite alliances to the period of New Order state 
development and formation, this chapter reinforces the argument that East Java’s 
intellectuals have contributed to post-authoritarian local governance, not only in their 
role as knowledge producers, but also as participants in the struggle over power and 
wealth. 
Deep state intervention into higher education in the Soeharto era not only took 
place through coercive measuresand the internalisation of state ideology,but also 
provided opportunities for intellectuals to advance their social roles through political 
connections with the dominant powers. This was more so because there wasonly 
limited social space available for intellectuals to link up with other social forces 
without consequences for career and material advancement. Thesealliances in which 
intellectuals participated can be traced ultimately to those that were forged to 
overthrow Soekarno and demolish Leftist social forces in the 1960s. 
 The main arguments of this chapter are: firstly, that the consolidation of New 
Order rules involved control over intellectual life through de-politicisation and de-
ideologisation processesthat were part of state strategy to suppress resistance from 
65 
 
below. Secondly, the impact of New Order strategy toward intellectuals created a 
relationship whereby intellectuals became strongly dependent on the state apparatus 
and for the most part, became isolated from other social forces.Thirdly, deep-level 
state intervention in intellectual and social life created a specific process of inclusion 
and exclusion of types of knowledge, which contributed to the production of 
mainstream ideology that served the state interest. Hence from this specific 
knowledge-power mechanism, a particular kind ofacademic authority was created, 
which helped to legitimise New Order rule (Dhakidae, 2003). 
3.2.The Early New Order era (1966-1972) 
It is now both appropriate and necessary to examine state formation in the early New 
Order, and its consequences for the position of intellectuals in civil society. This will 
be done within the context of discussing the formation of the political economy power 
constellation during the New Order, and its relations with students and intellectuals. 
Indeed, the close connection between intellectuals, military officers and the New 
Order state apparatus cannot be separated from their political alliance in the transition 
from the Soekarno to the Soeharto regime, which was geared to annihilate Leftist 
social forces. Their collaboration produced a particular ideology and discourse 
characterised by anti-communism, developmentalism and militarism. These were 
institutionalised through corporatist state institutions and through the work of 
intellectuals who, in the process, became politically domesticated. Although some 
critical liberal and social democratic intellectuals did resist the state strategy to 
depoliticise society, their political resistance was obstructed by the lack of social 
bases to connect them into broader social forces. 
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3.2.1. The Political Economy Constellation of the Transition Period into the 
New Order Era 
Before discussing the origins of the relationship between intelletuals and theSoeharto-
led group of military officers in the early New Order, the context of the transition 
periodbetweenthe Soekarno and Soeharto regimes must be considered. Following this 
transtition period, Indonesia was to enter a period of intensifed capitalist 
development, which would affect the social circumstances within which intellectuals 
operated, including the kinds of social alliances that they were able to forge.  
 Three major conditions prevailed before the phase of intensified capitalist 
development. Firstly, there had been the failure of thedomestic bourgeoisie to secure 
political dominance during the first twenty years of Indonesian Independence (1945-
1965). This condition allowed for the dominance of the state apparatus, which had 
become appropriated byofficials of political parties, the military and the bureaucracy. 
In the struggle for power among these dominant political players,it was the military 
which triumphed. The absence of powerful social classes which could impose 
theirauthority meantthatthe statewas relatively free to play a central role in the process 
of capital accumulationduring the early New Order era(Robison 1986). 
Secondly, the Soekarno state project failed to transformIndonesia’s social 
structure from its basis on a declining colonial agricultural export economy to a state-
led manufacturing economy through import-substitution industrialisation. The latter 
had been attemptedthrough the nationalisation of industry — a strategy pushed by 
diverse social forces such as labour unions, the PKI, and nationalistelements within 
Soekarno’s Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), as well as military officers. There were, 
however, intense conflicts between groups, especially between the PKI and labour 
unions with regard to the issue of military officersoccupying managerial positions in 
the nationionalised companies.Import-substitution industrialisation failed because the 
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Chinese and indigenous Indonesian merchant bourgeoisie were unableto drive the 
process of accumulation necessary for industrialisation. Meanwhile, the military 
beganto misuse its management of state resources to advance its own institutional and 
material interests. The absence of a strong bourgeoisie meant that the Soeharto regime 
instead opted to reconstituteIndonesian capitalism through foreign aid and foreign 
capital (Heryanto & Hadiz, 2005: 254). 
The third major condition which influenced development during this period 
was that Leftist forces, such as the PKI and its affiliated labour and peasant 
unions,failed to generate social revolution during the Soekarno era. The failure of the 
Soekarnoist state to act decisively in the context of intense class conflict meant that 
Leftist forces were frustrated in their efforts to reinforce populist policies,such as land 
reform. This condition also cannot be separated from the ability of conservative class 
alliances,involving military officers and landlords, to block such initiatives. The 
military succeeded inforging political alliances with elements of the borgeoisie, petty 
bourgeoisie and landowning class, in order to anticipate the threat of the Left. 
Therefore, when Soeharto came to power through the demolition of the Leftist forces, 
he did so with the support of a counter-revolutionary class alliance (Robison, 1990: 
38-40; Lane, 2008; Tornquist, 1984). 
 Gramsci (1971) argues that changing social and economic circumstances do 
not, by themselves, create political change. What is crucial for political change in any 
direction is the coherence of organised social forces in combatingthe hegemony of 
others. The political ascendancy of an Indonesian anti-Leftist class coalition led by 
military officers under General Soeharto was not only the result of the workings of 
repressive instruments of the state, but also their control over civil society arenas,such 
as universities, the press and schools. In exerting such control, students and 
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intellectuals were strategic actors who had a fundamental functionto disseminate ideas 
that would facilitate general consent to political domination.Nevertheless, the control 
of political society and civil society by dominant social forces through hegemony was 
combined with coercion when necessary. The production and dissemination of 
ideology through civil society was intended to enable stability, order (ketertiban), 
security (keamanan), and economic development (pembangunan ekonomi). The New 
Order agenda to develop the Indonesian economy in a capitalistic direction and 
stabilise the social order through an authoritarian political system wassupported by 
technocrats and intellectuals as knowledge producers. Their social role was to 
legitimise the New Order regime by arguing for authoritarian rule through the lens of 
academic objectivity, in order to ‘safeguard’ the Indonesian people from political 
ideologies that might hamperthe acceleration of development (Robison, 1988: 60-61; 
Moertopo, 1973: 43-44; Gramsci, 2000: 190; Coutinho, 2012: 81-82; Langenberg, 
1990: 126-27). 
As pointed out, due to the weakeness of the bourgeoisie in the immediate post-
colonial period, the New Order counter-revolution was led by the state bureaucracy 
itself, including its military element. In support were social forces most disadvantaged 
under the Soekarno regime, including domestic and foreign business groups and a 
range of liberal intellectuals and artists, landowners, and Muslim petty bourgeoisie 
who joined the Masyumi (Indonesian Muslim Party) and had felt threatened by the 
political mobilisation of peasants and the working class by the PKI. The political 
collaboration between anti-Leftist military officers, intellectuals and studentshad 
begun inthe early 1960s. Turmoil caused by conflict between, on the one hand, 
communist forces, workers, peasants and pro-Soekarnoists, and on the other hand the 
bourgeoisie, feudal landowners and conservative military officers, had already led to 
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the banning of the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) and Masyumi by 
Soekarno(Chalmers and Hadiz, 1997: 18). 
3.2.2. Hegemony and Repression in the Early New OrderEra 
The establishment of dominant social alliances in the early period of the New Order 
occured in the context of developing particular mechanisms to create consensus and 
order, in the transition from the Soekarno to the Soehartoera. It is therefore now 
necessary to examinethe specific social alliances that were establishedbetween the 
dominant military apparatus, intellectuals and studentswithin the national and East 
Javanese contexts. The dual strategy of ideological hegemony and coercionthat was 
implemented in order to demolish the Leftist social forces that supported 
PresidentSoekarno, andthe dominant Right-wing political coalitionwhich was 
consolidated around Soeharto, resulted in the sort of repressive-developmentalist 
regime that had been described by scholars like Feith (1980: 649-650). Feith 
described the New Order as a regime that rested on an authoritarian political system 
tocontrol and domesticate civil society. The aim was to create the order and stability 
deemed necessary to generate economic growth. 
Before discussing the political rivalry between Left-wing and Right-wing 
intellectuals, the genesis of Right-wing intellectuals at the national and local Surabaya 
levels needs to be elaborated. This aspect is very important for explaining the 
historical background of the relationship between intellectuals and politico-business 
interests at the national and local levels in the present-day. Anhistorical investigation 
of the genesis of Right-wing intellectual networks in Indonesia from the Soekarno era 
onwards is particularly important since Left-wing politics was demolished at the 
advent of the New Order in the context of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. 
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The broader alliances of Right-wing forces which connected some factions of 
army officers, political groups and intellectuals based in student activism took place 
amidst the high tension of political rivalry between communist and Left-wing politics 
who supported Soekarno and the liberal groups who became opposition forces in the 
early 1960s. This political contestation culminated with the marginalisation of the 
opposition, and the banning of prominent parties, whichwere allegedly involved with 
regional rebels (Masyumi and the PSI) against Soekarno. Throughout the early 1960s, 
after having been banned, the supporters of illegal party politics took political 
initiativesin an underground fashion, via the student movement affiliated or closely 
ideologically connected with the opposition parties. The modernist Muslim groups did 
not disappear after the failed rebellion in the late 1950s.
4
Instead, these youthful 
supporters took shelter in the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI — Indonesian 
Students Association). Eventhough HMI as a student organisation was officially 
independent from Masyumi,the association had close ideological affiliations and ties 
of friendship and family with this modernist Muslim party. Realising this close 
political connection, during the 1960s the PKI took thepolitical initiative of targeting 
the HMI, on the grounds that HMI was a counter-revolutionary front for Masyumi 
(Hefner, 2000: 47). TheHMI modernist Muslimsbecame the ultimate base of support 
for Right-wing military forces, through the loose anti-Soekarnostudent alliance KAMI 
(Indonesian Student United Action), of which it was a member. The HMI also 
produced some prominent student leaders who joined the Soeharto regimeat 
                                                 
4
The ‘failed rebellion’ here refers to The PRRI rebellion, one of a series of small rebellions initiated by 
mid-ranking military officers in the late 1950s, which was supported by some national political elites 
from Masyumi (the modernist Islamic party) and PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party). This rebellion began 
when Soekarno was out of the country in 1958. The Masyumi leaders and the PSI leaders who were 
seen to be associated with the PRRI rebellion were regarded as traitors by Soekarno, and the incident 





thenational and local levels. Prominent national politicians included Mar’ie 
Muhammad and Fahmi Idris. In East Java, there emerged figures like Sam Soeharto 
(from the University of Airlangga).
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Another prominent source of support forRight-wing military officers was the 
anti-communist collectionof Catholic intellectuals who were connected to a political 
group based in the Catholic Church called Kasebul (A Month of Seclusion). This 
group, initiated by the Jesuit priest Father Breek, systematically trained militant anti-
communist cadres recruited from the Catholic student association, PMKRI 
(Indonesian Republic Catholic Student Movement), and the Catholic political party, 
Parkindo. This latter group produced some famous leaders who supported Soehartofor 
decadesat the national level, such as Harry Tjan Silalahi and Jusuf Wanandi (Liem 
Bian Kie), who were key associates of Ali Moertopo and founders of the think-tank 
CSIS (Centre of Strategic and International Studies). Also recruited wasBQ,a student 
activist and protégé of Harry Tjan Silalahi, who became one of the key Right-wing 
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 Based on their position and roles as anti-communist activists who supported Soeharto against 
Soekarno, the student leaders of HMI built a close relationship with the New Order regime, benefiting 
politically and economically from the regime’s support. For instance, Fahmi Idris as the head of the 
Arif Rahman Hakim anti-communist student militia, utilised his network in the New Order regime to 
build the Kodel Business Group with other ‘1966 exponents’, including Soegeng Sarjadi, Jan Darmadi, 
Aburizal Bakrie and Ponco Sutowo. Fahmi Idris later joined Golkar (the New Order regime’s dominant 
political party) during the leadership of Sudharmono S. H., and was appointed as the Minister of 
Manpower in Soeharto’s last cabinet (March-May 1998). Mar’ie Mohammad was the head of HMI 
during the turmoil of regime change in 1965-66. He is famously known as a Mr Clean technocrat in the 
Soeharto era, due to his opposition stance towards Soeharto family cronies. However, he could not 
overcome the pervasive power of the Soeharto regime’s predatory alliances. He became the Finance 
Minister in the last Soeharto cabinet. Another example is Sam Soeharto, an academic and politician 
who obtained his honourary professorship in microbiology at the Faculty of Medicine of Airlangga 
University. His career as a political activist started as the Head of Airlangga University's Student 
Council during the turbulent 1965-1966 period. Under his leadership, Airlangga University became the 
centre of the anti-communist student camp in East Java. After the short political honeymoon between 
the Soeharto military regime and student activists, Sam Soeharto distanced himself from the New 
Order, joining an Islamic party, the United Development Party (PPP). He was elected as a Member of 
the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), serving there from 1977 to 1982. During his career in the 
PPP, he became frustrated with the party’s internal politics, and accepted an invitation from key 
government figure Muhammad Said, to enter Golkar in 1983. This invitation was extended because of 
Sam Soeharto’s earlier role in the struggle against the PKI. Since 1983, Sam Soeharto has remained in 
Golkar, being appointed as a member of the People’s Consultative Assembly representing Regional 
Representative Faction. Professor Sam Soeharto has continued to work to strengthen Golkar in the 
post-authoritarian era (Hefner 2000: 90, 204; Hudijono 2015: 41, 122-123, 125-127; Ensiklopedi 
Tokoh Indonesia, 2015). 
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student leaders based at the University of Surabaya (Dhakidae, 2003: 637;).
6
 Besides 
Islamic and Catholic groups, another intellectual youth group that supported Soeharto 
came from the small but influential social democratic stream of politics. The main 
organisation representing this stream was the Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis (Gemsos 
— Socialist Student Movement), which was closely connected to the economics 
ProfessorSoemitroDjojohadikusumo, who had helped to initiate asecessionist and 
anti-Soekarno rebellion in Sumatra in the late 1950s (Hill, 2010: 87;Bourchier, 2015: 
133; Hefner 2000: 68). 
 The cross-stream alliances based on student movementssupportive of the 
underground opposition to the Soekarno regime were protected and trained by the 
same faction of the Army thatfeared the tendency for a close political affiliation 
between Soekarno and the communist forces. This Rightist political alliance 
connected the student group with army intelligence and army officersby means of 
their common anti-communist position. Further, this group agreed to create the united 
anti-communist Front Pancasila (Frontal) on 12 January1966, comprising: Aksi 
Mahasiswa Indonesia (KAMI — Indonesian Student Front; Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar 
Indonesia (KAPI — Indonesian Student Action Front); Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda 
Pelajar Indonesia (KAPPI — Indonesian Student Youth Action Unit), and Kesatuan 
Aksi Sarjana Indonesia (KASI — Indonesia Undergraduate Action Unit)(Hefner 
2000: 68-69: Raillon 1989). 
As a continuation of the political movement at the national level, the local 
Surabaya anti-communist student movement also obtained protection from the army 
intelligence apparatus. According to Sukiadi (1993), the intelligence army officer 
Muhammad Said (famously called ‘Mbah Projo’) was the leader and strategic actor 
                                                 
6Interview with ex-PMKRI activist KT, Jakarta, 15 September 2015 
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who became thefocal point of the various anti-communist streamsthat organised and 
co-ordinated student movement initiatives during the period of political turmoil 
(Dhakidae, 2003: 658; Sukiadi, 1993).
7
 
During the early New Order period, the majority of students and 
intellectualsbacked the conservative military officersin their purported efforts to 
safeguard Indonesia from the communist threat and — as they saw matters — thereby 
advance the modernisation process. The minority of intellectuals who joined 
Leftistorganisations such as Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia (HSI — the Indonesian 
Scholars’ Association) and Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia (CGMI — the 
Indonesian Student Movement Centre) risked torture and death by military officers, 
with support from the Right wing student movement,
8
 particularly after 1965. As 
observed by oneformer leader of the student movement in Surabaya(Soerjadi, 2014: 
32-33),the political battles within the student movement in local areas such as East 
Java’s Surabaya were reflectiveof the wider conflict between communist and anti-
communist social forces. Indeed, the military’s infiltration ofthe student movement in 
East Java, initiated by local military officers, including Pitut Soeharto and 
Muhammad Said,was specificallyintended to thwart the PKI’s influence in the student 
movement. 
The anti-communist forces gathered under Persatuan Pekerja Muslim 
Indonesia (PPMI — The Associations of Indonesian MuslimWorkers), which 
comprised:the Gerakan Mahasiswa Surabaya (GMS — Surabaya Student Movement); 
Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (GMNI — Indonesian National Student 
Movement); Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia (PMKRI — 
                                                 
7
 Interview with Ex-PMKRI Activist KT, Jakarta,  September 15,  2013. 
 
8
Interview with Harsutejo, the former Malang State University lecturer and the member of the 
Indonesian Scholars Association, the intellectual association affiliated with left wing forces in the 
Soekarno era, Jakarta, March 13, 2013. 
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Catholic Union of University Students of The Republic of Indonesia); Gerakan 
Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia(GMKI — Indonesian Christian Student Movement); 
the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI — Indonesian Students Association), and the 
Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis Indonesia (GMSos — Indonesian Socialist Student 
Movement). These groups were pitted against the pro-communist Consentrasi 
Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia (CGMI — the Indonesian Student Movement Centre), 
the Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia (Germindo — Indonesian Student Movement) and 
the Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia (PERHIMI — Indonesian Student 
Association) (Latif, 2008: 300& Sukiadi: 2013).As reported by one of East Java’sex-
1966 student activists,
9
 the collaboration between military officers and certain 
strategic leaders from the student movement was first initiated in the 1960s,to support 
anti-communist student groups in their struggle against communist agitation in 
universities. The military also utilised universitystudent regiments (Resimen 
Mahasiswa) in these struggles. One of the student regiments used by the military was 
the Resimen Mahasiswa Mahasurya Universitas Airlangga, which collaborated with 
the army in an attempt to exterminate communist ideology from universities (Sukiadi 
1993; 149-150;Soeharto 1993; 92: McGregor 2007: 14; Susilowati 2012). 
During the turbulent period after the Gestok (the 1 October Movement) 
events,
10
 some schools and other educational institutions considered to be pro-
                                                 
9
 Interview with Tjuk K. Sukiadi, Surabaya, August 30, 2013. 
 
10
The First of October  Movement (Indonesian: Gerakan 30 September, abbreviated as G30S or Gestok, 
for Gerakan Satu Oktober, First of October Movement) was a political coup initiated by a faction of 
the of Indonesian Armed Forces members which, in the early hours of 1 October 1965, allegedly 
assassinated six Indonesian Army generals. Their actions were blamed on the PKI. Later that morning, 
the soldiers declared that they were in control of the mass media and communication outlets and had 
taken President Soekarno under their protection. By the end of the day, the coup attempt had failed, at 
least in Jakarta. Meanwhile, in Central Java there was an attempt to take control over an army division 
and several cities by their allies and sympathisers. By the time the rebellion was put down, two more 
senior officers were dead. In the days and weeks following this incident; the Right-wing faction in the 
army blamed the PKI as the mastermind of a coup attempt. This moment was utilised by the army to 
demolish its most prominent political rival, the PKI, while also initiating what amounted to a coup 
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Leftistwereclosed by military authorities, or destroyed by anti-communist student 
organisations such as KAMI  and KAPPI . During the turmoil of 1965-66, the army’s 
special forces (RPKAD) in Jakarta, led by Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo,operated 
throughout Java, including East Java, to annihilate Leftist forces and co-ordinate 
military allianceswith students and intellectuals. The military also trained students in 
intelligence,defence and other skills necessary to mobilise the masses, in order to 
fight against Leftist coalitions. Some of thesemilitary-trained student cadres infiltrated 
universities throughout East Java,working to generate acollective consent for the 
Soeharto regime and to extinguish the influence of communist ideology in universities 
in East Java and Surabaya .
11
 
The creation of consent through hegemony was achieved not 
onlythroughideological dissemination, but also through coercion. Hegemony and 
coercion, as the two prongs ofthe New Order’s political strategy, cannot be separated 
and should be seen as complementary. The Peking Review (1965:10)reported that 
between September and October 11 1965, numerous organisations were closed or 
destroyed by military authorities or the Right-wing student movement,for providing 
— or being perceived to provide— direct or indirect support for Soekarno’s 
movement. These organisations included: the Indonesian People’s University; the Ali 
Archam Academy of Social Science;the Bachtarudin Political Science Academy; the 
Anwari Technological Institute; the Dr. Rivai Academy of Journalism; the Multatuli 
                                                                                                                                           
against President Soekarno. Ruth McVey, Frederick Bunell and Benedict R’OG Anderson (1966) 
produced a preliminary analysis of the 1 October events, which stated that either Soekarno or the PKI 
was the victim of political intrigue within the  army itself. Other historians, such as John Roosa (2006), 
suggest that the coup was led by Sjam – a shady political operator with links to the PKI and the 
military – under instructions from the party leader Aidit, without the knowledge of other communist 
leaders. However, Roosa (2006) shows that this ill-considered action became the pretext for Army and 




 Interview with ex-1966 student activist and former East Java MKGR Golkar Wing elite, 
Suryomenggolo SH, Surabaya, January 15, 2012. 
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College of Arts; the Dr Ratulangi Economic Science Academy;the Ronggowarsito 
Academy of History; the People’s University; the Surakarta Kotapraja University;the 
Egom Academy of Agriculture and Peasant Movement in Bogor; and several higher 
educational institutions in East Java,including the Republic University in Surabaya; 
the Soeprapto College of Journalism in Surabaya, and the Sarinah Satria College of 
Journalism and Publicity in Malang.
12
 
This brutal action conducted by the army and Right-wing forces led by 
Soeharto showed that the annihilation of Left-wing forces was not only directed at 
grassrootssupport, but also at the level of intellectual bases of support. This repression 
cannot be separated from the battle conducted between right andleft-wing intellectuals 
during the 1960s. Eventhough the Left-wing forces still had not won dominance over 
educational institutions,the Communist Party deployed party cadres and intellectuals 
in these institutions as articulators of the communist agenda in civil society. 
A1962speech at the VII National Congress of the PKI by one elite cadre, Jusuf 
Adjitorop, proposed that the party recruit intellectualsto gain their support for the 
Indonesian Revolution (Adjitorop 1963).  
The army control of the print media and radio became the most important 
aspect of the anti-communist purgesconducted by Soeharto’s group. In Surabaya, the 
pro-Soekarno and leftist media such as Jalan Rakyat, Java Timur and Trompet 
Masyarakat were banned along with 25 journalists. The military instructed that all 
news items must pass the inspection of Major General Soeharto before going to press 
(Peters 2013: 52). The purges of pro-communist elementswerealso conducted in the 
East Java local government.On 29 October, the East Java governor, Muhamad Wijono 
ordered a purge of all levels of local government within the province. The purge 
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 Interview with Harsutejo, Bekasi, West Java, March 13, 2014. 
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action started with the removal of Leftist pro-communist Surabaya Major 
Murachman, replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Sukotjo. The removal of Murachman 
was the start of the government expulsion of communist and pro-Soekarno elements 
at all levels of the East Java bureaucracy (Peters 2013: 62).    
The intellectual collaboration between the Soeharto-era military apparatus and 
student and intellectual groups created some of the ideological foundations of the 
New Order regime. The process continued with the symposium of The Resurgence of 
66 Spirit: Exploring New Traces, organised by UI in collaboration with KAMI and 
Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia (Indonesian Scholars United Front) on 10-20 
January 1966. This event was an influential part of the process of reinterpreting 
Pancasila— the official philosophical and ideological foundations of the state — in a 
way that justified capitalist development, while excluding Marxism and communism. 
The situation in East Java mirrored the situation at the national level. Many 
universities began to support the new interpretation of the ideology. For example, the 
East Java (Malang)-based IKIP (Educational Science and Teacher Teaching Institute) 
established a‘Pancasila Laboratory’ in 1967, specifically to produce and disseminate a 
new standard discourse about the state’s ideological foundations — one which 




Another historical relationship between military officers and Indonesian 
technocratic intellectuals can be traced toearly co-operative programs between the 
Economics Faculty of the University of Indonesia (FE UI), and the University of 
California, Berkeley. At the end of the 1950s, UI had sent several of their lecturers to 
UC Berkeley to obain higher degrees, thus producing such future technocrats as 
                                                 
13




Muhammad Sadli, Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, Johannes B. Sumarlin and Emil 
Salim. After the fall of the Soekarno regime, these same technocrats served as 
Soeharto’s key economic advisors. When these leaders returned to Indonesia, they 
considered that the country’s economic policy under Soekarno was hostile to 
capitalist development, and further, that existing policies gave the state an overly 
dominant role in managing economic resources. Thetechnocrats began to alter the 
mindsetsof Indonesia’s elite with regard to economics,in particular by developing 
links with the military at the Army Staff College (SESKOAD), starting with a lecture 
by Sadli to the college in 1958 at the invitation of its then-commandant, Colonel 
Suwarto (Irwan, 2005: 42). 
These US-trained economists played a key role thetransformation of the 
Indonesian economyduring the transition from the Soekarno to the Soehartoregime. 
Their recommendations forrehabilitatingthe country’s economyled to the Army’s 
Under-Commander Suwartoorganising the now-famous seminaratBandung’s 
SESKOAD Complex, in August 1966,to build a consensus among army leaders on 
Indonesian political, economic and foreign policies in the coming months. The 
seminar called for tax reform, government austerity, and civic action though 
stabilisation measures,to encourage Indonesia’s economic recovery and initiatethe 
transition to a capitalist economic system. The technocrats realised that the army was 
both part of the solution to Indonesia’s economic issues, and part of theproblem. The 
prominence of military officers as guardians of the anti-Leftist and Soekarno social 
forces meant that any initiative to integrate Indonesiainto the more open capitalist 
global system was dependant on the military’s co-operation. At the same time, 
however, the corruption and incompetenceprevalent within the Army, which 
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effectivelyran state enterprises,was seen as a real obstacle to economic reform 
(Simpson, 2008: 218-20). 
Indeed, after the early period of the New Order,the rise of military officers as 
dominant elites who controlled state resources led to contradictions in economic 
policy. The technocrats’ advice to liberalise Indonesian economic policy and to 
privatise state corporations contradicted the interests ofthe military elites, who 
controlled state enterprises and various sectors of economic activity. Because of these 
opposing interests, the integration of Indonesiainto the capitalist system did not take 
place as the technocrats had imagined. 
Instead, the New Order regime developed the state corporate sector in order to 
accommodate interests within the alliance that had put it in power. The military elite, 
led by Soeharto, incorporated secular modernist intellectuals and activists of student 
organisations fromthe Rightist student organszationsinto the state party, Golkar (The 
Functional Group),after 1967-68. Thus, anti-communist intellectuals and students 
who hadhelped to overcome Leftistforces, together with military officers, were 
accommodated into Soeharto’s regimeas part of its political machine,and absorbed 
into technocratic positions. This was facilitated by the intellectuals’ own relative lack 
ofpower; they had no strong social bases to counterbalance the power of the military 
officers behind the Soeharto regime.As reported by former 1966 student activist 
leaderWanandi, (2012: 106), he and otherformer students leaders who joinedGolkar 
wereorganised by the military into civil defence groups,to deliver messagesto the 
masses that only Golkar could bring stability and development. 
The New Order regime alsotried to co-opt student leaders to its cause by 
ensuringthat military officers cultivated relationships with them. One such military 
intelligence officer from East Java was Muhammad Said,who organised the student 
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groupknown as the Independent Group in 1967to bea strategic partner in building 
Golkar as a political machine (Crouch, 2007: 265). The regime’s focus on 
domesticating and de-politicising society, instead of generating political mobilisation 
in order to increase political support for the regime, had the effect of curtailing a 
potentially significant sourceof political resistance and criticism of the Soeharto 
regime. Althoughsome intellectuals voiced criticism of the New Orderin the mass 
media, such as in a number of commentaries in the newspaper Mahasiswa Indonesia, 
edited by Rahman Tolleng, these were largely within the bounds of tolerance 
exhibited by the New Order in its early years. So while the newspaper published 
articles regarding the regime’s corruption, the close connection that had been forged 
between prominent youth leader and politician Tolleng and some military elites meant 
that, for the time being, these werenot considered a direct source of threat. This is not 
surprising because Rahman Tolleng became a member of Golkar and of both the 
parliament (DPR) and the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1968 (Reeve, 
2013;205; Hefner, 2000: 76, 98-99). 
The recruitment of scholars who could be trusted by the military, and the 
placement of military officers in positions of power in universities (such as in 
rectorships and senate positions), became common political practice in order to 
safeguard stability and control the activities of students and intellectuals in higher 
education. Recruitment was confined to those considered loyal to the dominant Right-
wing faction of officers. The objective to place anti-communist military officersin top 
positions at universities cannot be separated from the strategic aim to demolish Left-
wing support basesthere. This mission was, not surprisingly, carried out on the ground 
by student activists with a close relationship with military officers in East Java. For 
instance, in the University of Airlangga, this task was carried out primarily by Sam 
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Soeharto (one of the student leaders who had strong influence especially within the 
Islamic student group, the HMI). During the anti-Soekarno political riots, due to his 
position as the head of the Airlangga University Student Council (Dewan Mahasiswa 
Universitas Airlangga), Sam Soeharto was able to systematically take control over the 
network of university student councils in East Java and prompted them to declare 
their loyalty to Pancasila. Under Sam Soeharto’s leadership, the student movement 
led attacks against Left-wing and Soekarnoist politicians and their supporters under 
the pretence of supporting the purification of Pancasila. Secondly, the Airlangga 
University Student Council took the harsh unilateral action of temporarily forcing the 
closure of the university. After closing the university, the Right-wing students led by 
Sam Soeharto invited the military officer Brigadier General Soenarjadi, who was the 
PEPELRADA (The Head Executive of the Local Dwikora) to the university, in order 
to keep the Airlangga Universityclosed until the anti-communist faction occupied the 
university (Hudijono 2015: 46-47). Besides inviting military officers to the university, 
the Right-wing students also demanded the purging of Airlangga University’sLeft-
wing staff and the replacement of the rector, Colonel Chasan Duryat S. H., who was 
considered a Soekarno supporter. This demand was fulfilled, through General 
Soeharto’s decision to establish Professor Dr. Eri Soedewo, who also had a military 
background, as the new rector. Similar developments took place in other universities 
across East Java, for example in private universities such as Surabaya University 
(Hudijono 2015: 47). In line with installing the dominant military elites in academic 
institutions in East Java, universities elsewhere, including the Airlangga University 
(Surabaya), Brawijaya University, and private universities such as the Surabaya 
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University (the former Soekarnois Trisakti University), were also infiltrated by the 
military to advance Golkar’s hegemony among the intelligentsia.
14
 
Other social alliances that supported the Soeharto regime were found among 
the Islamic social organisations,whichwere highly discontentedwith the influence of 
Indonesian communism and the cordial relationship between the PKI and the 
Soekarno government. These groups includedtheMasyumi and the Nahdlatul 
Ulama(NU — Awakening of Religious Scholars), which represented the ‘modernist’ 
and ‘traditionalist’ wings of Indonesian Islam respectively.
15
 Such organisations were 
essentially acquiescent and mostly accommodated the New Order in its quest to 
depoliticise civil society. 
In pursuit of this objective, Soehartohad given his blessing to the creation of 
anew Muslim political party, the Parmusi (the Indonesian Muslim Party), which was 
seen as a continuation of the old modernist Masyumi Party that had been banned by 
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 Interview with Suryomenggolo S. H., Surabaya, January 15, 2013. 
 
15
 The typologies of modernist and traditionalist Islam are due to the clasification of three socio-
religious interpretations of Islam that emerged since the eighteenth century. The traditionalist stream 
that can be called customary Islam was socially based in rural areas. The dominant articulator of this 
interpetation comes mostly from the ’Ulama,whose socio-economic position including occupying large 
landholdings (as landlords). This tradition was marked by the mixing of Islamic doctrine with the 
traditional culture embedded in the specific local areas. This Islamic stream was more tolerant of the 
syncretic-mixed process between Islamic doctrine and local culture. The social interactions among the 
traditionalist communities were indicated by hierarchy and social patronage between ’Ulama scholars 
and religious disciples (in Indonesia called ‘Santri’). The relationship between ’Ulama and Santri also 
showed the character of knowledge transfer within these communities. The intellectual development of 
these communities was initiated by K. H. Abdurrahman Wahid and his followers, who created a 
reinterpretation of Islamic traditional scholars’ works, in order to respond to modern and democratic 
values. The modernist stream, which can also be called ‘Liberal Islam’, was mostly based in urban 
areas. These communities were socio-economically driven by the Muslim bourgeoisie in urban areas. 
This Islamic stream tended to a less hierarchical relationship than did the traditionalist groups within its 
community. The modernist stream tried to rearticulate the virtue of Islamic teaching and daily life in 
the Prophet Muhammad’s era and that of his successors, in order to show the compatibility between 
Islam and modernity. Another Islamic stream that is present in Islamic societies and Indonesia is the 
revivalist Islamic interpretation. This Islamic interpretation has the objective of ‘purifying’ Islamic 
doctrine from both local traditions and modern values. This stream has mostly spread in urban areas, 
and is socio-economically based within the Muslim bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs. This Islamic stream 
tends to preach a literal interpetation of Islamic doctrine, based on Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s 
Sunnah (verified accounts of the Prophet’s deeds and statements). Like the modernist tradition, this 
stream tends to find virtue in the Prophet Muhammad’s Islamic era, but it also tries to demonstrate the 




Soekarno for alleged involvement in separatist movements in the 1950s (Effendy, 
2003: 166; Hefner 2000; 47: Thaba 1996: 180). Yet Soehartoforbade such senior 
Masyumi leaders such asMuhammad Roem and Mohammad Natsir from taking up 
roles within the new party (Hefner, 2000: 99-100; Ali & Effendy, 1992: 108). The 
crux of Soeharto’s strategy with regard to Islamic politics was to marginalise those 
who hadstrong grassroots bases of support, and hence represented potential challenges 
to the regime. While effectively barring such individuals from formal politics, 
Soehartowas still able to absorb large numbers of less threatening Muslim 
intellectuals into the regime, including through the student organisation, the HMI, 
which saw opportunies for advancement within the regime.   
3.3.The Heyday of the New Order (1972-1988) 
During the height of its power, the relationship between the New Order regime and 
intellectualswas incorporated into a broader strategy of rule that involved both 
repressing and curtailing dissent from below, and internalisingstate ideology across all 
levels of society. The implementation of this strategy led to deep intervention by 
thestate in higher education and intellectual life, which isolated students and 
intellectuals from the masses as part of the depolitisation project. This resulted inan 
environment that better facilitated intellectuals becoming part of strategic alliances 
among dominant state actors. Thesame environment posed great difficultiesfor 
intellectuals to develop organic links with the lower classes in ways that would allow 
them to effectively articulate their interests. On the one hand, there was the safety and 
even promise of advancement offered by collaboration with the regime; on the other 
hand, the depoliticisation of civil society meant that most avenues to connect with the 
broader masses were closed off to the vast majority of intellectuals. One way that 
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some intellectuals would try to get around the problem was to be active in NGOs, as 
we shall see later. 
3.3.1. The Political Economy Constellation during the Heyday of the New Order 
Era 
The imposition of peak corporatist institutions by the state to ostensibly ‘represent’ 
different sections of society was one way in which the New Order pursued the aim of 
depoliticising civil society.Before discussing these corporatistinstututions however, 
the changing structural context resulting from the New Order’s economic 
development strategy needs to examined. Indeed, many of these corporatist 
institutions were only firmly established at about the same time that a major shift in 
the direction of state dominance was taking place in New Order economic policy. It 
should be noted, in this regard, that the period of dependence on foreign investment 
was ended by the advent of the ‘oil boom’ years beginning in 1973-74. This was a 
moment that marked a shiftin economic policy towards a more nationalist orientation. 
 The resultant resurgence of economic nationalism saw a more aggressive and 
active state role in financing, protecting and subsidising domestic capital. State policy 
began focusingheavily on the national industrial sector, including the creation of 
major resource projects in steel, natural gas, oil refining and aluminium, and on 
developing the import-substitution industrial sector. This policy contradictedthe 
liberal economic policy favoured by the IBRD and IMF, who were represented in 
Indonesia by the group of economic technocrats inside such institutions as 
BAPPENAS and the Ministry of Finance.Increased state intervention made possible 
by windfall oil revenues provided the basis for the rapid growth of major national 
conglomeratesin both the public and private sectors. State-owned corporations such as 
Pertamina and Krakatau Steel, as well as businessmen such as Liem Sioe Liong, 
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William Soerjadjaja and Hasyim Ning, built upon monopoly positions and previleged 
access to licences, supply and credit — all derived from state intervention inthe 
economy (Robison, 1987: 18). 
However, the nationalist economic policy which emerged in the early 1970s 
was based not only on protecting a share of capital ownership for domestic capital.It 
also aimedto form an integrated national industrial economic structure. For the 
nationalist bureaucrats who led this resurgence in economic nationalism,it was clear 
that Indonesia possessed the capacity to generate a national industrial economy, using 
its energy resources either to produce investment capital directly, or as a form of 
collateral to secure loans. Their objective was to involve the state in economic 
initiatives in order to co-ordinate and finance national capital investment, with the 
long term aimof building an industrial base for Indonesia’s economy. Robison (1986: 
147) describes the New Order’s structural condition: 
 
The resurgence of economic nationalism was a complex movement influenced less 
by a declining petty bourgeoisie demanding state protection against the superior 
forces of foreign capital than by emerging political and economic forces demanding 
the removal of political and economic constraints upon their potential for 
development. The type of economic nationalism which emerged in the early 1970s 
aimed not merely to secure a share of capital ownership for domestic capitalists 
within an economic structure determined by the logic of international capital 
accumulation or driven by crises of accumulation in metropolitan investor countries. 
Instead, it envisaged a programme of state-led capitalist development to form an 
integrated national industrial economy which included capital, intermediate and 




The change in policy orientation canbe explained by taking into account the social 
forces inside the New Order regime. As mentioned, given the absence ofa strong and 
independent bourgeoisie, bureaucrats and politicians, especiallymilitary officers, 
became dominant members of an elite withthe power todetermine policy and allocate 
resources. The shift in economic policy referred to earlier reflected competition 
between the liberal technocrats based at FE, UI and BAPPENAS,andthe major, 
military-dominated, politico-bureaucratic factions who wielded control over the 
resources of the state. From the late 1960s onwards, elite military officers who had 
become managers of state-owned enterprises such as Pertamina,along with other 
officials involved in business, beganusing the state’s considerable economic power to 
allocate licences, credits and contracts, mostly to Chinese partners, inorder to build 
large corporate conglomerates that served their financial interests (Robison, 1986: 
140).Among the military officers who dominated the state bureaucracywereGeneral 
Ibnu Sutowo, who led the state oil enterprise, Pertamina, and General Ali Moertopo, 
who led Opsus (Special Operations) and the think-tank CSIS (Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies). While nationalist economic policy was supported through such 
institutions, CSIS in particular was the focal point for an alliance between state 
officials and big Chinese business (the so-called cukong). Pertamina, meanwhile, with 
its diverse business operations and complex contracting and subcontracting 
mechanisms, was attractive to the declining indigenous bourgeoisie and petty 
bourgeoisie, whose interests were threatened by the laissez faire open door policy 
which invited foreign investment into Indonesia. This alliance required ideological 
supportin order to create public consent to a policy framework that advanced the 
material interests of the officials who controlled Pertamina and the complex 
groupings of businesses to which they were allied (Robison 1986; 146). Ideological 
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support for the alliance between state officials and business conglomerates was 
facilitated by the New Order’s state corporatism, which will be examined next. 
3.3.2. The Hegemony and Coercion Strategy during the Heyday of the New 
Order 
This section elaborateson how politico-businees alliances between state officials and 
business conglomerates, under the framework of the New Order’s state 
corporatism,were sustained by coercion strategy andpolitical hegemony. From 1971 
to 1988,the New Order regime was characterised by shifting paradigms of economic 
development — from open-door policies based on foreign investment and economic 
aid, to economic nationalism based on state co-ordination of strategic economic 
sectors in order to encourage economic competitiveness, and then to another phase 
more open to international economic actors. The state corporatism designed by the 
New Order attempted to depoliticisecivil society and absorb intellectuals and student 
activists into the state apparatus. 
The state’s political approach to higher education during the New Order’s 
heyday consisted of several specific strategies.In the first strategy, the state apparatus 
controlled students and intellectuals, in order to dissociate them from their social 
bases in civil society. This amounted to their depoliticisation. The strategy also 
involved disciplining, repressing and silencing any intellectuals critical of the regime. 
The strategy was implementedthrough the placement of military officers in 
universities, and the absorbtion of intellectuals and prominent university-based 
activists into the New Order political system. This approach was succesful in 




As a second strategy to manageintellectuals, the New Order elites turned the 
practice of social science into a bureaucracy which it was able to control, including 
through the use of economists, scholars, organisations such as Ikatan Sarjana 
Ekonomi Indonesia (ISEI— Indonesian Economists’ Association) andHimpunan 
Indonesia untuk Pengembangan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial (HIPIIS — Indonesian Association 
for the Development of Social Science), and through the establishment ofthe think 
tank CSISby trusted players such as Ali Moertopo and ex-1966 anti-communist 
activists Harry Tjan Silalahi and Jusuf Wanandi. This strategy aimed to disseminate 
knowledge thatlegitimisedthe New Order’s economic development and political 
system, while restrictingknowledge that questioned its approach(Laksono 2005: 240-
245; Dhakidae 2003). 
As a third, associated strategy, the New Order propagated Modernisation 
Theory as a knowledge regime and as a truth, through the selection of particular 
information to include in or exclude from the education system, in order to maintain 
the dominance of military elites. This selection processes included adopting particular 
strands of modernisation theory, such as the Huntington thesis on the benefits of 
authoritarian regimes for developing states, in order to create stability and order. In 
addition, the New Order regime also mystified the state ideology of Pancasila,by 
promoting cultural essentialistideas in order to insulate society from critical ideas. 
This ‘regime of truth’ was disseminated through universities, in order to construct 
intellectual perspectives compatible with the state paradigm of authoritarian 
modernisation (Heryanto, 2005: Hadiz & Dhakidae, 2005). 
Theestablishmentof the think tank CSISby prominent New Order military 
officers including Benny Moerdani, Soedjono Humardhani and Ali Moertopo, with 
the blessing of Soeharto and substantial funding from ethnic Chinese businessmen, 
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was part of the effortto cement the state’s intervention in the economy and advance 
nationalisteconomic policy. CSIS’s first generation of economists, such as 
Panglaykim, promoted nationalist economics and the policy of a strongstate, which 
protected and co-ordinated the national concentration of capital. In addition,CSIS 
produced the political blueprint of the New Order,based on a state corporatist political 
design,
16
in order to support the so-called ‘acceleration of 25 years’ modernisation’ in 
Indonesia. This political blueprint adopted the ‘anti-communist’, linear and 
teleological view of stagesof economic growth made famous by W.W. Rostow. 
Theblueprint aimed to turn Indonesian society into a so-called‘floating mass’ (massa 
mengambang),
17
 based on the de-politicisation and centralisation of many elements of 
society under state control. Under this design, the existing political parties, which 
potentially counter-balancedGolkar,were restricted fromeasy access to the masses, all 
the way down to the village level. The  New Order’s political and social blueprint 
thereforeaimedto modernise the Indonesian state in reactionary ways; shunninga 
liberal or social democratic style of modernisation in favour of one based on the 
domestication of social forces (Mas’oed 1989). 
This model provided many opportunities for rent-seeking and other predatory 
behaviour, based on the fusion of corporate and military-bureaucratic power. While 
the oil boom of 1974-82 helped to advance the conceptof developing a 
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 This concept refers to the specific political mechanism created by the New Order elite apparatus to 
depoliticise society by creating a so-called ‘floating mass’, comprising the majority of the Indonesian 
people. This would be achieved by preventing political parties from building bases of support at the 
sub-district level. This political strategy was also created to anticipate political opposition toward the 
regime from political parties. This political mechanism is also widely credited to the initiative of Ali 
Moertopo and his associates. 
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nationallyintegrated economy based on import-substitution industries, the oil boom 
also stimulated predatory activities such as the grabbing ofstate resources for private 
capital accumulation. These activities were exemplified by the corruption case of 
Pertamina under General Ibnu Sutowo’s leadership, in which the company defaulted 
on a US$10.5 billion loan as a result ofineffectiveness, corruption and incompetence 
(Irwan, 2005: 44). In this context, many technocrats and intellectuals became more 
organically linked to predatory coalitions of power (Hadiz and Dhakidae. 2005: 13-
14). 
To assisttheinitiative of the military elite to develop intellectual institutions 
that would legitimise the New Order’s economic development and political systems, 
Ali Moertopoutilised Operasi Khusus (Opsus— Special Operations), which had been 
established in 1962. Opsus’s initial primary function was to ensure that West Papua 
was brought under Indonesian rule (Kingsbury, 2004: 16). However, Opsus came to 
play an important role in controlling and co-opting universities and student 
organisations through the work of cadres at the local level. The work of Opsus 
became especially important as protest movements against the New Order began to 
emerge among students in spite of the regime’s concerted efforts to control and 
domesticate politics on university campuses. 
The early 1970s werecharacterised by anti-New Order activitiesconducted by 
a number of student groupings in response to prominentcorruption cases, such as 
those associated with the development of TMII (the Beautiful Indonesia Miniature 
Garden) (Boudreau, 2004),which implicated no less than the President’s wife, Tien 
Soeharto. Students also protested against what they saw as excessive foreign control 
of the national economy. They famously held majorprotests during the visit to 
Indonesia of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in 1974. These protests were co-
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ordinated by University of Indonesia students, led by Hariman Siregar, who called for 
a rejection of foreign investment and loans, especially from Japan(Schwarz, 2000: 34; 
Winters, 1996: 109-11). 
The student protests were not, however, articulations of grassroots rebellion; 
rather, they were associated with competition among military elites. General 
Soemitro, the Commander of Indonesia’smost powerful security organisation, 
KOPKAMTIB,held intensivetalkswith the student protestors, and supported their 
aspiration that the state should take a new direction. The aspirations of the student 
movement during the 1974 Malari incident raised political tensions between the New 
Order regime and student activists,due to the rapacious predatory operation of state-
owned Oil and Gas enterprises under the leadership of Ibnu Sutowo, and the politico-
business collusion between the Tionghoa bourgeoisie and the dominant elites. A 
related critical stance of the student movement related to the state’s policy of 
openingthe Indonesian economy to foreign investment, which concerned the 
marginalised domestic capitalists. The student movement demanded that the state take 
a different policy direction on this matter. Meanwhile General 
Soemitro’srival,Soeharto’s personal assistant Ali Moertopo, became a primary target 
of student protests —which brought together other student groups to counter-balance 
the student leaders that Soemitro had cultivated for their support.Ali 
Moertopoestablished an organisation called KNPI (Indonesian Youth National 
Commitee), which became part of the broader statestrategy to co-opt and absorb 
students into the regime. In addition,KNPIbecame a site for New Order elite 
caderisation. The student protests of 1974 — known by the acronym 
Malari(MalapetakaLima Belas Januari) (15 January Disaster) — ended with 
Soeharto choosing to support Moertopo; and with the student protest leaders being 
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brought to court, while General Soemitro was forced to stepdown from power 
(Hefner, 2000: 78: Southwood & Flanagan, 2013: 246-47). 
In the East Javanese context, the Opsus operations utilised New Order core 
supporters who fought against communism in the early period, such asformer 1966 
student leader BQ (a follower of CSIS co-founder and former PMKRI activist Hary 
Tjan Silalahi).BQbecame the person to whom the military entrusted the task of co-
ordinating Surabaya’s intellectual elites in the interest of the regime (in co-ordination 
with local military elite officers such as Mohammad Said).BQ was one of the elite 
student leaders from Surabaya University, formerly known as Trisakti University 
Surabaya (aLeftistand Soekarnoist university affiliated with the Left-wing Indonesian 
Chinese association,Baperki)(Greif, 1988: 9-10).He embarked on a career as a scholar 
after graduating from Surabaya University in 1974.From this position, BQ contributed 
greatly to theNew Order’smission to control the student movement in East Java. 
Because of his achievements, he was promotedto becomea member of East Java’s 
local parliament in the late 1970s.
18
 
Opsus and its instruments in East Java worked actively to support the New 
Order in local politics. Firstly, it co-ordinated a network of student activists 
throughout East Java, in order to express loyalty to the New Order’s development 
programmes.
19
Secondly, it co-ordinated and recruited potential leaderswho would be 
capable of garnering support for the state electoral vehicle, Golkar — in order to help 
provide legitimacy for New Order power. In this regard, BQ’s academic position 
became a strategic socio-political investment, helping the formerto recruit and co-
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ordinate hissocial network in East Java,which in turn facilitated therecruitment of 
intellectual cadres for the New Order regime’s own purposes. He andTT, 
theaforementioned Islamic student activist based in Airlangga University, probably 
played the most important role among East Java intellectuals in purging academia in 
the province of Communist influences, and establishing New Order control over the 
local intelligentsia. 
Anothermission conducted by military officers and their instruments in East 
Java was aimed atsilencing student criticism of the Sidang Umum Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (SUMPR — General Session of the 1978 People’s 
Consultative Assembly). Student activists, including in Jakarta, had made demands 
that the General Session refrain from re-electing Soeharto as President, as was the 
mechanism at the time for attainment of the highest office in the country. Military 
officerscreated a wing of Golkar called the Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia 
(AMPI —Indonesian Renewal Youth Forces) throughout Indonesia,andestablishedthe 
Angkatan Muda Brawijaya (AMUBRA — Brawijaya Youth Forces), an embryonic 
youth organisation based in East Java in 1978. By creating this group, they were also 
asserting that their political machine was thesole legitimate channel for the aspirations 
of youths; and that youth supported the New Order program of development. 
AMUBRAwas specifically given the task of spying and reporting on student 
opposition activity (Priyatno, 1993; 28, 32).
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In addition, Golkar elites built the Wijaya Kusuma Surabaya University in 
1980. This university,dubbed ‘Golkar University’, was established by three top-level 
East Java Golkar elite figures:H. Soenandar Prijo Soedarmo (Chair of the Advisory of 
the Regional Board Council,East Java Golkar); Blegoh Soemarto (Member of the 
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advisory of the Regional Board Council, East JavaGolkar), and H. Mochamad Said 




It is clear, therefore, that through their alliance with the military, intellectuals 
and student activists obtained political opportunities to connect their strategic interests 
with the New Order state. More specifically, most of the Surabaya intellectuals who 
were absorbed into the New Order advanced their political careersin Golkar as local 
political elite figures. Under the highly centralised New Order regime, the conditions 
under which civil society operated at both the national and East Java levels (in 
particular the state’s intervention in higher education and intellectual public life), 
offered only limited kinds of social roles for intellectuals that could be pursued 
independently of the state.Opportunities for advancement were available mainly for 
those with strong, demonstrated loyalty to the political regime. 
 The state’s intervention in higher education became deeper after 1978, when a 
decree was announced on ‘Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi 
Kemahasiswaan’ (‘Campus Life Normalisation/Student Co-ordinating Board’). This 
decree’s objective,as set by then Education Minister Daoed Joesoef,wasto make 
student activism on campus virtually impossible, by imposing stringent rules on 
university student bodies. Althoughthere were immediate anti-NKK/BKK student 
protests in 1978-80, the decree succeeded in ensuring that it became very difficult for 
students to organise anti-regime activities openly on campus(Aspinall, 2005: 120). 
Another systematic effort to maintain state hegemony over public consciousness was 
undertaken through the imposition of the New Order version ofIndonesia’s 
ideological foundations,Pancasila. The hegemonic status of this version was assured 
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through the Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (P4 — ‘Guide for the 
Internalisation and Implementation of Pancasila’)(Langenberg, 1996: 236), which 
involved mass indoctrination through heavily regimented Pancasila courses. Not only 
were all newly enrolled university students forced into such indoctrination courses,all 
school children were exposed to it as P4 became a core subject at school. Pancasila 
indoctrination courses were also made mandatory for government employees and 
imposed on people at the level of communities.An institution called BP7 ( Board for 
Developing Education and the Implementation of Guidelines for Instilling and 
Applying Pancasila)was tasked with disseminating Pancasila at all levels of society. 
At the same time, Pancasila itself was made the sole philosophical basis of political 
parties and socio-political organisations after 1984 (Latif, 2003: 338), which was no 
less than an exercise in curtailing ideological alternatives and securing ideological 
conformity across all spheres of life.  
The situation experienced by East Java’s academics was similar to that 
experienced elsewhere in Indonesia under the New Order regime. Everywhere, state 
authorities attemptedto prevent intellectuals from connecting with other social 
groups,using a combination of oppression on the one hand, while on the other,actively 
facilitating the internalisation of the conceptsof developmentalism and militarism in 
academic communities. The social control mechanisms in higher education were put 
in place by the militaryand by civilian academicswith close connectionstothe New 
Order state apparatus— in particular by those positioned strategically as university 
rectors and other senior academics. The New Order also intimidated scholars through 
screening processes, which were aimed to identify whether academics or their 
familieswere involved with thePKI. Screening processeswere also conducted when 
academics intended to travel abroad, with the purpose of preventing any academics 
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fromcriticising the Indonesian government from overseas. Many intellectuals who 
criticised the state were summoned by the military, and in some conditions, could be 
sent to prison without clear legal process. The New Order state apparatus also 
implemented measures to divide the student movement into extra- and intra-university 
organisations, and to infiltrate them with New Order agents (Oetomo, 2007: 178-79; 
Aspinall, 2005: 120-21). 
The heyday of the Soeharto regime wascharacterised not only by the 
intervention of the state to control and co-opt students’ and intellectuals’ public life. It 
was also distinguished bystate-facilitateddisseminationof academic social science 
perspectivesthat supported and promotedthe repressive developmentalism style of the 
New Order. Becausestudents and intellectuals, despite efforts to prevent them, had 
became increasingly vocal during the 1970son issues of social justice,the New Order 
regimeattemptedto manipulate the production of social science theory which 
supported itsrule,through a mechanism of knowledge inclusion and exclusion. This 
involved prioritising versions of modernisation theory in political and social 
discoursewhichwere compatible with the state’s political strategy and the interests of 
thedominant elites. 
Conservative American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington was a major 
figure in Modernisation Theory in political science. His workon Political Order in 
Changing Socities (1968) became one of the most influential books in mainstream 
social and political science teaching in Indonesia. Huntington suggested in this book 
that economic development may not produce a stable democracy, because rapid social 
change and political demands from below may not be handled effectively by the state. 
According to this view, authoritarian rule can be excusedas a way of controlling 
political demands and creating stability and order in developing countries. From the 
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viewpoint of mainstream political modernisation theory, the authoritarian state was 
therefore not only understandable, but also useful politically, to suppress grassroots 
political demands that could otherwise result in anarchy and chaos (Huntington, 
(2006) (1968): 4-5, 7-8, 23 & 373). Such a scholarly viewpoint was quite attractive to 
New Order elites who were aiming at societal depoliticisation for the sake of securing 
economic development. 
Excludingmore critical academic perspectives, the New Order created a 
hierarchy of social science theories, based only on closeness of fit to the state’s 
ideology.The sociological theory known as structural functionalism, developed by 
Talcott Parsons (1975),became part of mainsteam social science in Indonesia, because 
of its emphasis on adaptation, stability and equilibrium. Modernisation theorywas also 
of value to the New Order because, in its manifestation in economics, it supported the 
concept of economic development based on trickle-down effects, whichlegitimised 
the state’s policy of prioritising growth over equitable social distribution of its results. 
Modernisation Theory became a core component of the curriculum in the 
Social Science Faculties in all universities in Indonesia. The universities in East Java, 
including Airlangga University, were no exception. 
At the same time, more critical social science perspectives were not 
encouraged. Though Marxist social theory was taught in a limited fashion, university 
lecturers had to take pains to make clear that they were not teaching communism. One 
of the upshots of such developments was that Indonesian social science tended to lag 
behind much of the rest of the world. For example, dependency theory was only 
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introduced in Indonesian universities in the 1980s, two decades after it gained 
prominence in Latin America and in other parts of the world (Hadiz  2013: 43).
22
 
The absorption of intellectuals into state power, in order to act as hegemonic 
instruments,wasalso conducted through the bureaucratisation of academic institutions. 
During the New Order, the authority of Indonesia’s academics was measured not 
necessarily by the quality of their publications and reports, but through their loyalty 
and their roles as instruments for state power. This is exemplified by the 
rolesundertaken by some academic associations,such as ISEI and HIIPIIS, in support 
of the regime. ISEI leaders, for instance,at President Soeharto’s request, drew up a 
blueprint for economic democracy that was consistent with the New Order’s 
interpretation of Pancasila. 
Although the New Orderwas able tocontrol and depoliticise most elements of 
civil society effectively, some NGOs, such as LP3ES (The Institute of Economic and 
Social Research, Education and Information)remained critical of the regime, even if 
only mildly in most instances. LP3ES was founded by a section of the 1966 student 
movementthat had close relationships with older intellectuals from the modernist 
Muslim partyMasyumi,as well as with social democratic intellectuals and political 
activistslinked to the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI). This research institute 
undertook social and research initiatives which attempted to counter-balance the 
regime’s top-down development approach with a grassroots, bottom-up strategic 
development approach, focusing onpesantren (Islamic boarding schools) and small 
                                                 
22
 Another example of the efforts to anticipate critical aspirations from the lower social classes, and to 
ensure that all radical jargon was driven away from the public space, was the state initiative to replace 
slogans such as buruh (labourer), karyawan (employee),and pekerja (worker). Meanwhile, in order to 
sustain minority identity in the social order hierarchy, the state also replaced the term Tionghoa 
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entrepreneurship activities. It produced intellectual publications such as critical books 
on development issues and the intellectual journal Prisma. Staff members also 
generated high-quality research that became an alternative to the mainstream 
knowledge controlled and propagated by the regime. Despite its role asan alternative 
research institution able to develop critical ideas, LP3ES could not, however,freely 
resist the regime, as it depended on state ministriesfor collaborativeprojectsand funds 
(Eldridge, 1995: 86-87). This was the caseespecially after its main source of funding, 
Germany’s Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, ceased to provide institutional support in the 
early 1980s. 
3.4.The Fall of Soeharto and the Birth of the Post-Authoritarian Era 
This section elaborates on the critical moment in the New Order era which markedthe 
rise of political resistance byopposition social forces, and the associated conflict 
between dominant elites inside the regime. It also covers the risein civil society of 
alternative discourses,presentedby intellectuals in order to challenge the dominant 
New Order propaganda. It is important to note, however, that the social resistancedid 
not extend to actuallyoverthrowing the regime,because the opposition forces were too 
closelyconnected with the New Order’s elite factions. This meant that even after the 
fall of the Soeharto regime, and despite the institutional reforms initiated during the 
post-authoritarian era,the New Order’s mode of relationships between intellectuals 
and political elites has been replicated in modified forms. The New Order elitesimply 
adapted to the new institutional configurations, and formed new political ties, in 




3.4.1. Intellectualsand social struggle in the lateSoeharto era 
Before discussing the consequences of the relationship between intellectuals 
andpolitical elites during the political strugglesof the late Soeharto era, this section 
discusses the political economic situation and associated social context that 
underlined the political roles of intellectuals. The 1980swas characterised by the 
collapse of oil prices, beginning in1981-82, with a catastrophicfall in 1986. These 
events influenced the power configuration of the New Order. The economic 
falloutcaused a reversal away from nationalist economic policies. Apolitical struggle 
intensified between proponents of liberal economic policies— such as international 
corporate capital and financial institutions, and liberal technocratic elements—and 
bureacratic and corporate forces whose interests were connected to nationalist and 
protectionist industrial strategy (Robison, 1987: 16). 
The late Soeharto era was also characterised by factional conflicts between 
politico-business alliances inside the regime. Factions arose as conflict developed 
between sections of the military leadership, and members of the Soeharto family who 
had developedvast private business empires.The rise of the Soeharto family coincided 
with the gradual decline of the influence of the military over the New Order regime as 
a whole (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 86-87). 
The political tension between dominant elites became more intense in the 
early 1990s,after the power of the Indonesian military had begun to wane, in favour of 
political nepotism characterised by the domination of the President and the families of 
leading politico-bureaucrats in the state apparatus. This shift in power was considered 
by the military to be an unacceptabledeviation away from the doctrine of dwifungsi or 
‘dual-function’ previously espoused by the New Order — a doctrine that the military-
dominated government had used to justify the military’s increased influence in 
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government, including in the running of state enterprises. The power shift led to 
strong protests by the military elite, such as General L.Benny Moerdani,overthe 
favouritism now being shown to Soeharto’s familyand a small circle of selected 
entrepreneurs in business dealings. Behind the intense tension among the elite lay a 
political struggle, with each group keen to maintain and strengthenits own interests. 
This struggle between the dominant social forces inside the New Order occurred 
predominantly between the military-politico elites, who had become the main pillar of 
the early New Order,andpolitico-bureaucratic and business families, which included 
Soeharto, who had come to dominate the regime in its subsequent development 
(Eklof, 1999: 17-18). 
This political tension between Soeharto’s family and itscronies, and 
Soeharto’sformer core political allies—especiallyin the military apparatus— led to the 
lattergroup dissociating itself publicly fromSoeharto.Soeharto saw this as political 
resistance, andattempted to create new political alliances by accomodating Islamic 
political forces in the early 1990s. This includedworking with Islamic political 
groupshitherto considered extremistand which previously suffered from political 
repression, especially when Islam was viewed as a potentially strong source of 
resistance to the New Order’s depoliticisation project. Making such a shift politically 
possible was the growth of a new Islamic middle class in Indonesia during the 1980s 
as a product of New Order era economic growth. The accommodation of political 
Islam in the late New Order era took place through two strategies: first, Soeharto 
marginalised any military officers who had close relationships with General Benny 
Moerdani (a Catholic who had protested publicly against Soeharto) and promoted 
moremilitary officerswith obviousIslamic family backgrounds. Second, 
Soehartoattempted to gain support from Islamic activists and intellectuals who 
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hadpreviouslyopposed the regime, primarily through the establishment of ICMI 
(Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association), led by his trusted aide, B. J. Habibie 
(Hefner, 2002: 129-131; Eklof, 1999: 17). 
As the main institutionforMuslim politico-bureaucrats, activists and 
intellectuals, ICMI’s members included a variety ofpolitical actors, not all of 
whomwere easily swayed to supportSoeharto’s political interests and Habibie’s 
political ambitions. There wereseveral factions in ICMI. First, there were the Muslim 
bureaucrats,such as BJ Habibie, Soeharto's last Vice President, and Wardiman 
Djojonegoro,a Habibie supporter from Agency for the Assessment and Application of 
Technology (BPPT). This group became the most powerful faction within ICMIdue to 
their closeness to the Soeharto regime. This state bureaucrat group became the core of 
ICMI,and supported Habibie’s political initiatives to increase his own power within 
the regime. Second, there were scholars and intellectuals, who tended to oppose what 
they perceived to be the crude politicisation of ICMI, and who includedNurcholish 
Madjid, the founder of the inclusive and democratically-inclined Muslim foundation, 
Paramadina. This group criticised the crude politicisation of Islam, whether in the 
service of Habibie’s ambition or for Islamist statist orientation. Eventhough this group 
was not dominant in ICMI, it was not wholly marginalised. Third, there were 
independent activists who had formerly belonged to the opposition, and who tried to 
use ICMI to change the policies of the New Order regime from within. This group 
was led by Adi Sasono, the Muslim activist who advocated dependency theory and 
who criticised the accumulation of foreign capital in Indonesia, and M. Dawam 
Rahardjo, the founder of LP3ES, a major NGO and think-tank. Other Muslim activists 
in this group who attempted to utilise ICMI for their political ascendancy within the 
regime were M. Amien Rais, the head of the Islamic social organisation 
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Muhammadiyah; and M. Din Sjamsuddin, the leader of youth wing of 
Muhammadiyah. Members of these various groupswere spread from Jakarta to 
regional areas, and included Muslim intellectuals in East Javawho were based in 
prominent universities such as Airlangga University and Brawijaya University (these 
included Professor Sam Soeharto, Latif Burhan, Muhammad Asfar and Dr. Fasichul 
Lisan). Many of these intellectuals had HMI (Islamic Student Association) 
backgrounds, and had been strong supporters of the New Order regime in the early 
period (Hefner 2000: 138-150).
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However, the diverse composition of ICMI meant that the organisation could 
not advance grassroots-level political demands. In fact, it was perhaps ill-equipped to 
do so given that it was so elite-focussed. This is despite Soeharto’s political designs, 
which involved targeting ICMI as part of his state corporatist strategy, with the clear 
political objective of bringing Muslim intellectuals and activists more directly into the 
regime and providing a path of advancement within the apparatus of the state (Hefner, 
2000: 139). 
The view that ICMI was co-opted by the dominant alliance as a political 
strategy to domesticate and absorb the Muslim intellectuals and middle class, and 
thereby to strengthen Soeharto’s power, has been criticised by some scholars. Latif 
(2008: 428-29)uses social movement theory,based on the concept of political 
opportunity structures proposed by Donatella Porta and Mario Diani (1999: 9-10), in 
order to explain the possibility of social change through the availability of political 
access, the existence of political alliances inside and outside regimes, and processes 
of political conflict and negotiation within regimes. Latif (2008) proposes thatICMI 
should be consideredas a social movement which took advantage of apolitical 
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opportunity to interact with dominant elites, in order to challenge the political 
structure. Inhis view, Soeharto’s support for ICMI can be viewed as signalling the 
availability of a political opportunity structurefor Indonesia’s Muslim intelligentsia to 
promote their own political agendas and to advance their own positions within the 
regime. However, this propositionoverlooksconficts within the dominant social 
forces, which arguablylimited the opportunity for Muslim intellectuals to advance 
their political objectives. The aims of Muslim intellectualsin utilising ICMI as a 
political vehicle wereeither to facilitate the resurgence of Islamic forces initiated by 
revivalist Muslim groups, or to foster political reforms.Such Islamic reformist groups’ 
obsessionshadbeen blocked by the logic of power in Soeharto’s New Order, which 
createdICMI in order to subjugate the Islamic forces and sustain Soeharto’s political 
dominance within the Indonesian political system. More specifically, 
Soeharto’smotives in approving the establishment of ICMI were related to 
hisoligarchic wish to expand his political interests outside the bureaucracy, the 
military and their families, and Golkar. Given such a background, ICMI became 
absorbedinto existing predatory power alliances focussed on Soeharto,instead of 
becoming a force for political reform inside the New Order regime (Robison and 
Hadiz  2004: 61, 115). 
Latif defends the Muslim intellectuals who forged closer ties withSoeharto, by 
observing that power struggles necessarily have to take place within existing 
configurations of power. However as Marx famously stated: 
 
men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, 




According to this thesis, ICMI as a representation of Muslim middle-class social 
forces could not advance its political objectives as it pleased. Anypolitical 
manoeuvres by members of ICMI to develop their political aims would be influenced 
strongly by the social struggles already taking place within the New Order’s political 
and economic structures. ICMI’s intellectuals and activists, with aspirations to 
empower the Muslim grassroots and petty bourgeoisie by forging ties with Soeharto, 
would likely be thwarted in these aspirations by the dominant Soeharto family and its 
politico-business cronies. The latter were interested only in obtaining Islamic political 
support for Soeharto, particularly in relation to his brewing conflict with sections of 
the military leadership. 
As Hefner (2000: 164) noted, ICMI managed to survive only because it 
continued to offer additional legitimacy for Soeharto, and served as a vehicle for 
Habibie’s political aspirations. It should be noted that Habibie had ambitions to 
develop capital-intensive and high technology projects, which led him to secretly 
‘borrow’ $US300 million from afund the government had allocated for the purpose of 
reforestation. This had already caused consternation among some of the more 
independent members of ICMI. However,Soeharto’sbacking for the organisation 
meant that this issuedid not end up beinga source of dissent within the organisation 
directed against Habibie’s leadership.This showed that Muslim intellectuals, even 
those who were relatively critical, were domesticated and absorbed into the regime 
through ICMI. After years on the margins — as  a result of early New Order fears 
about the political potential of Islamic dissent — incorporation into the regime must 
have appealed to a great many such intellectuals, who could now imagine enjoying 
benefits of which they couldnot dream before. 
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In addition to Soeharto’s political manoeuvres to gain the support of Islamic 
groups, his relatives, including son-in-law Liutenant General Prabowo Subianto, and 
several military officers with close relationships toSubianto, including General Feisal 
Tanjung, Lieutenant General R. Hartono and Lieutenant General Syarwan Hamid,
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also establishedstrategic alliances with conservative Islamic groups and intellectuals. 
One such major grouping was the the Komite Indonesia untuk SolidaritasDunia Islam 
(KISDI— Indonesian Muslim Committee of the Islamic World) – which had been 
formed initially to garner Indonesian support for the plight of Muslims in the Bosnian 
War. General Prabowo Subianto and others were alsoin an alliance with the most 
powerful and politically active of the Soeharto children — Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana 
and Bambang Trihatmojo. Together they created the thinktankIPS (Institute for Policy 
Studies). Asreported by Hefner (2000), this institution distributed propaganda 
pamphlets among Muslim activists, claiming that political activities against Soeharto 
in the 1990s were part of an international conspiracy backed by Jews, 
Jesuits,Americans and Chinese interests. IPS sought to create further conflict by 
portrayingMuslims as engaged in a struggle in which theywere supported by Soeharto 
against the Chinese bourgeoisie and Catholic and secular forces. 
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Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto and his military allies comprised a faction within the military 
elites who supported closer collaboration between the Soeharto regime, the military and the faction of 
political Islam that joined ICMI. In 1994, President Soeharto replaced some military elites who 
criticised the Soeharto manoeuvre to co-opt the Islamic social forces. Soeharto forced into retirement 
his military loyalist General Benny Moerdhani, who rejected the regime’s collaboration from his 
position as Defence Minister. The head of the armed forces’ powerful Bureau for Social and Political 
Affairs (SOSPOL), Lietenant General Harsudiyono Hartas, a strong ICMI critic, was replaced by 
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officers who criticised ICMI, and the strong support from Soeharto for another camp who supported his 
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military elites. This tension inside the military is known as the tension between the Red-White Army 




This political manoeuvring by the regime led to strong criticism from K.H. 
Abdurrahman Wahid, the democratic NU Muslim leader and also the head of Forum 
Demokrasi (the liberal and social democratic opposition group of the late Soeharto 
era), that it was engaging in sectarianism.According to Wahid, ICMI was set up to 
serve the bureacratic and intellectual ambitions of Muslim intellectuals within and 
outside Soeharto’s bureaucracy, and to ensure that Soeharto received their support. He 
criticised ICMI for its ‘exclusive nature’, which he argued would marginalise non-
Muslims and nominal Muslims (Barton 2002: Robison and Hadiz 2004: 115). This 
criticism in turn triggered friction within the Soeharto regime. One group within the 
regime that was opposed to the new strategies included a number of retired military 
officers, Golkar politicians, and secular intellectuals, scholars and activists whohad 
formed close relationships with each other through CSIS and Golkar itself. This group 
was often denigrated as ‘barisan sakit hati’ (the ranksof the resentful), in an attempt 
to suggest that their oppostion was rooted in personal frustation,rather than the 
motivation to serve the public good. Many of these individuals were part of the 
YKPK (Yayasan Kerukunan PersaudaraanKebangsaan/Foundation for National 
Harmony and Brotherhood) (Aspinall, 2005: 50-51). 
YKPK had strong support in East Java. The core of the organisation’s 
membership came from the strategic political elite-intellectual coalitionsthat had 
earlier enjoyed a close political relationship with the New Order’s military apparatus, 
including scholars such as Anton Priyatno and Martono from Surabaya University, 
and Priyatmoko and Haryadi fromAirlangga University. YKPK also became a point 
of intersection for the interestsofformer Soehartoallieswho felt increasingly excluded 
as the New Order evolved,and moderate activists and scholars who criticised the 
sectarian tendency of the late Soeharto period. Meanwhile, some social scientists were 
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also involved in the East Java branch of Asosiasi Ilmu Politik Indonesia (AIPI — 
Indonesian Political Science Association), which heldregular discussions at various 
East Java private universities withmembers of the New Order state apparatus andthe 
main political machine, Golkar. These meetings debated such matters as political 
modernisation, developmentalism and Pancasila.
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Along with calling for a more inclusive nationalism, YKPK also endorsed the 
ideas of democracy and political restructuring which werenow being voiced by the 
broader, yet still ineffective, opposition to Soeharto. But YKPK did not set out to 
break completely with Soeharto’s regime. Some of YKPK’s supporters and members 
were still part of the New Order’s elite apparatus. As oneGolkar veteran who joined 
YKPK, Median Sirait, stated, this group attempted to show Soeharto that Islamic 
forces and ICMI were not the only groups with the potential to be effective allies to 
the regime;secular nationalist politicians who joined YKPK had similar 
potential(Aspinall, 2005: 83). 
The second opposition groupthat undertook moderate resistance against the 
New Order was led by the outspoken K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid. Although Wahid is 
known widely as a supporter of democracy and pluralism, his views about Indonesian 
democratisation, especially demilitarisation at the time, were unclear. He believed that 
democratisation required peaceful accommodation of the military, and that 
collaboration between moderate Muslimsand the military wouldbring a brighter future 
for Indonesia. Significantly, Wahid had cultivated strong relationships with senior 
military leaderssuch as General L. B.Moerdani (Hefner, 2000: 157; Aspinall, 2005: 
76-77). 
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The third source of opposition to the Soeharto regime was the radical student 
activists. This group focused on attempting to connect with the working class and 
peasants. The group was represented by the Partai Rakyat Demokratik(PRD — 
Democratic People’s Party),and was particularly influenced by the Marxist ideas then 
circulating among student groups. The PRD, led by Budiman Sudjatmiko, called for 
democratisation in Indonesia’s political, economic and cultural fields, and demanded 
free political parties, abolition of the military’spolitical role, full restitution of the 
rights of former political prisoners, and peaceful democratic resolution of the East 
Timor problem. As a background, before becoming established as Partai Rakyat 
Demokratik, the PRD has been founded in May 1994 as the Persatuan Rakyat 
Demokratik (Democratic People’s United Group), chaired by Sugeng Bahagijo. The 
following year, internal tensions developed and the organisation split,due to 
differences of opinion over its aims and after the leadership has been taken over by 
Budiman Sudjatmiko (Dijk 2001: 17). The group’s main political objective was the 
organisation and consolidation of its social bases among industrial workers in the 
cities and the peasantry in rural areas. This ‘political party’recruited from among 
student activists, especially in Jakarta, Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java. 
Former East Java head of the PRD, Dandik Katjasungkana
26
),recalls that lecturers at 
Airlangga University,including Dede Oetomo and Eddy Herry Prihantono, inspired 
the students through lectures which outlined the militarisation of the New Order, 
capitalist exploitation and the rent-seeking activities of Soeharto and his cronies. 
The PRD’s close political ally in theresistance against the Soeharto regime 
was the faction of the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) led by Megawati 
Soekarnoputri. The PRD’s strong support for Megawati’s faction of the PDI came 
                                                 
26Interview with former East Java head of the PRD Dandik Katjasungkana in Surabaya, December 
27, 2012.  
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about because of political moves by the Soeharto regimeto manipulate the internal 
party election process and prevent Megawati Soekarnoputri from emerging as party 
leader. The Soeharto regimesupported Surjadi, a pliant PDI politician. The 
PRD’sefforts to challenge the New Order regime through the Megawati-led faction of 
the PDI were contrained, however, by alliances that the faction had forged with 
military officers like General Theo Sjafei and General Edi Sudradjat. 
The political mapping of opposition forces in Indonesia during the late New 
Order era showsthat political resistance againstSoeharto could not escapeconnections 
with the New Order state apparatus andSoeharto’s political allies. This situation could 
not be separated from, and was indeed a result of, the political formation of the New 
Order, in whichthe state deliberately limited the political space formiddle-class and 
grassroots political activity, in order to develop a rigidand centralised authoritarian 
system.Because this authoritarianism preventedintellectuals and activists from 
latching onto social bases, opposition towards Soehartowas only possible through 
connections with eliteswith some sort of access to Soeharto or his allies. With these 
connections in place,the dominant opposition forces during the late Soeharto erachose 
to focuson criticising Soeharto’salliance with Islamic forces, rather than criticising the 
dominant politico-business relationships established by Soeharto’sfamily. For 
instance, the prominent opposition leader K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid criticised 
Soeharto’s support for ICMI,which he saw as being captured by militant Muslim 
activists. However, at the same timeWahid offered to negotiate with Soeharto, with 
the aim of creating a new national consensus that would allow room for his own 
organisation. Wahid, therefore, prioritised his constituencies’ own political interests 
overthe broader national struggle for democratisation (Aspinall, 2005: 1998-99). 
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The late period of the Soeharto era was characterised by the rise of public 
discourse of openness and political reform, and the weakening of dominant 
hegemonic ideas. Triggered by the increasing integration of the Indonesian economy 
into global capitalism, and its greater dependence on foreign credit and investment, 
the regime became vulnerable to the demands of international investors to reform 
political economy instutions based on transparency and accountability. These 
pressures during the late New Order era generated half-hearted political reforms such 
as opening-up space for public debate and criticism of the state — even though the 
concepts of opposition and representative politics were still officially rejected in the 
official state ideology in Indonesia. 
This condition also cannot be separated from the power struggle between 
former Soeharto military loyalists and the politico-business oligarchy that crystallised 
around Soeharto. Due to international pressure and internal friction within the regime 
that potentially threatened to narrowthe regime’s political base, political patronage 
was accorded to particular groups representing political Islam and thepribumi 
bourgeoisie —who attained access to the state, especially from Soeharto family 
oligarchy businesses and the layer of military officers around General Prabowo 
Subianto and General Feisal Tanjung, who were opposed to General Benny Moerdani. 
From the early 1990s on, this political situation stimulated growing grassroots 
resistance, involving collaboration between grassroots activists and former Soeharto 
allies, including some military officers. However the emergence of grassroots 
resistance and pro-democracy activism, as well as some factionalism within the 
regime, did not produce coherent civil society forces capable of building democratic 
reforms. These opposition groups remained severly constrained by their inability to 
develop effective organisational vehicles outside the authoritarian system in order to 
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challenge the New Order regime. This weakness was due to the state’s abiding 
capacity to control the agenda of reform and dominate state-society relations under 
the existing authoritarian political system. Therefore, Soeharto’s fall — precipated by 
the Asian economic crisis of 1997/98(which led to the collapse of financial and 
corporate institutions)— did not open-up political reform based on ideals of liberal 
democracy and the market. The absence, outside the regime, of coherent liberal 
democratic forces able to initiate the structural change away from primitive 
accumulation based on state authority, meant that a shift towards transparency and 
accountable institutions indicated by the separation of economic and political 
institutions was hampered (Robison and Hadiz, 2004: 121-123, 133:  Robison, 1996: 
97: Hefner, 2000: 193-95). 
The political contestation in the late Soeharto era showed that the emergence 
of resistance to the authoritarian regime of Soeharto cannot be separated from 
factionalisation within the regime itself, which produced more intersections between 
disgruntled elites and opposition forces. Because of ongoinglinks with elites who 
remained sympathetic to Soeharto, an attack on the political and economic 
relationships that lay at the heart of the New Order was not possible. Therefore, the 
focus of opposition politics was to attack Soeharto’s more recent support of 
conservative Islam groups. More radical opposition, such as that which emanated 
from the PRD, was too poorly equipped and organised to mount an effective attack on 
the New Order’s political economic policies. 
3.5.Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the destruction of the Leftist movement in 1966 by military 
elites and students who supported General Soeharto (some of whom became 
prominent intellectuals in East Java’s universities), whichfacilitated the domestication 
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of civil society in Indonesia. This meant the absence of any organised social forces 
with which intellectuals could forge links in order to resist the authoritarian regime 
that developed in the aftermath. While some students and intellectuals tried to 
challenge the New Order regime from time to time, the ‘floating mass’ policy 
implementedby the New Order helped toensure that suchresistance was easily tamed. 
However, most of Indonesia’s intellectuals (especially the academics),were absorbed 
into the predatory politico-business coalitions under the authoritarian system of the 
New Order,becoming theregime’s ideological apparatus.(Robison and Hadiz, 2004: 
43). 
Indonesia’s transition to industrial capitalism, and the emergence of a 
bourgeoisie during the New Order, reinforced— rather than transformed— this 
organisation of economic and political power. The accumulation of capital had been 
derived largely from oil taxes and foreign loans channelled into Indonesia through the 
state. Consequently, state managers, and those who politically controlled 
policymaking,had the power to distribute resources and decide the priorities of 
development. Hence the middle class and domestic bourgeoisie continued to be 
dependent upon the state as the engine of employment and investment. The lack of 
accountability adopted by the state apparatus was legitimised in state ideology, which 
stressed the organic nature of society and the role of officialsin pursuing the ‘common 
good’ and ‘national interest’ above particular interests. This specific ideology of 
‘common good’as constructed by the New Order was mixed with ideas of 
developmentalism and stability (Robison, 1996: 82). 
During the Soeharto period, the liberal technocratic intellectuals based at 
prominent universities and known as the ‘Berkeley Mafia’often filled the majority of 
the economic positions in the New Order cabinet. Despite this,their agenda to 
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liberalise the state was often blocked by the predatory power and patronage politics 
centredonSoeharto. The capacity of Soeharto’salliances to appropriate public 
resources for their own interests isolated the liberal technocrat intellectuals and 
constrained their ability to introducefree market logic into New Order policies 
(Robison 2006: 11). Although the liberal technocrats were able to maintain close 
connections with liberal supporters in the international community,theydid not have 
the capacity to enlarge their social alliances outside Jakarta, since The New Order’s 
political strategy limited intellectuals from engaging in political practice. This 
condition could be considered as the historical context thatexplains why Indonesia, in 
the  post-authoritarian era,has not yet freed itself from the pattern of political and 
economic power established by the New Order. 
In contrast with the claims of Modernisation Theory,whichasserts that the 
development of capitalism would stimulate the conditions for democracy and civil 
society, the development of capitalism during New Order era did not support the 
growth of liberal democracy. Middle class and bourgeois social forces in Indonesia 
were heavily dependent on the state for jobs, careers, contracts and monopolies, and 
more broadly as the engine of economic growth. Even though some liberal 
intellectuals and Indonesian activists did create NGOs and political associations, 
which focused on issues such asthe rule of law, human rights, accountability of 
officials and freedom of expression, their political effectiveness was very limited. 
In the same vein, Marxist and social democratic ideologies were rarely an 
option for New Order era intellectuals. This constraint was the direct result of the 
New Order’s annihilation of the alliances that had previously connected the working 
class andthe peasants, for example through thePKI, and via the loose popular political 
alliances that had supported Soekarno in 1966. The destruction of Leftist social forces 
115 
 
in Indonesia was conducted not only through extraordinary violence which mobilised 
civilians, but also by the New Order’s efforts to internalise anti-communist ideologyin 
the public sphere,including in school and universities. This ideological attack on 
Leftist social forces in Indonesia led to the pervasiveness of anti-communist ideas, 
along with the modernisation discourse which rejected the idea of class in mainstream 
Indonesian social sciences, and the policy of the ‘floating mass’,whichdomesticated 
the whole of civil society. 
The Indonesian situation differed greatly from that of Latin America. There, 
despite the authoritarian and neo-liberal onslaught, Leftist ideas and forces retained a 
strong presence. The victory of Hugo Chavez, for example,was made possible by 
Leftist social forces in Venezuela; a winthat that was influenced by endorsement 
fromCausa R, a union-based political party that emerged fromthe industrial town of 
Ciudad Guayana in the 1970s. This political force contributed tothe forging of broader 
social forces whichsupported Chavez. Even though Venezuela was a Latin American 
country dominated for a long time by neo-liberal stalwarts, the presence of working 
class, peasant and other marginalised groups as significant social forces contributed to 
the eventual triumph of Leftist social forces (Burbach, Fox & Fuentes, 2013: 21). 
In Indonesia, the New Order’s domestication of intellectuals and activists went 
hand in hand with the domestication of civil society, after the wholesale destruction of 
the Left. Therefore, opposition politics were often characterised by collaboration with 
elements within the regime. Intellectuals were trapped in political jostling to gain 
favour from Soeharto. There was little opposition in which they could engage that 
challenged the basic structure of the political economy established by the 
Soehartoregime. The strategy of collaboration and engagement with dominant elites 
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was to be continued — though under different circumstances — in the post-
authoritarian period. 
 The absence of strong social basesin civil society became a legacy of the New 
Order regime,whichcontinues to make it difficult for public intellectuals to advance 
the agenda of democratisation and liberal reform.Meanwhile, the fall of Soehartohas 
not meant the destruction of power structures that were established by his regime. 
Therefore, under democratic institution-building, social interests nurtured under the 
New Order have been able to adapt to the new political environment and create new 
coalitions in order to survive and thrive.     
The next chapter will consider the role of Surabaya political consultants in 
political practices consolidating and sustaining predatory elite power through local 
election activities.The chapter will investigate how local networks in Surabaya and 
East Java, connecting academics and political elites, are activated to defend 
entrenched dominant social interests in the democratic era.The roles of consultants 
and academics in predatory alliances and in the manipulation of the democratic 
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3.1.Introduction 
This chapter discusses the role of Surabaya political consultants — drawn from 
academia and the intelligentsia more generally — in political practices that sustain 
entrenched predatory elites through local election activitiesin East Java and Surabaya. 
The previous chapter showed that there have been connections linking many Surabaya 
academics to local political elites since the inception of the New Order era. The 
question that must be answered now is how local networks in Surabaya and East Java, 
which connect academics and political elites, are activated to defend dominant social 
interests in the democratic era. In answering this question, the chapter explains the 
role of consultants and academics in predatory alliances, as well as in the 
manipulation of local democratic processes. To provide a broader context, the chapter 
also compares Surabaya and East Java electoral practices with some national level 
experiences, and examines the role played by the intelligentsia in these practices.  
 Because local elections are an essential part of the democratic process, they 
are an important focus for uncovering the actual practices of local governance in 
present-day Indonesia, especially as they provide the mechanism by which the local 
citizenry notionally participates in decision-making (Choi, 2011: 3). Further, elections 
provide the mechanisms by which local political elites are reproduced.  
 In this chapter, it is argued that the role of academics as strategic actors in 
electoral processes is very important in maintaining the dominance of predatory local 
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elites in Surabaya and East Java more generally. This role is undertaken through their 
involvement in money politics and electoral manoeuvring, as well as through the use 
of academic knowledge to legitimise the position of such elites in the public sphere. 
The reasons why many academics in East Java (especially in Surabaya), particularly 
in the social sciences, have been drawn into these predatory political activities are 
also identified. The incorporation of Surabaya intellectuals in the operations of 
predatory power through local elections cannot be separated from historical processes 
that are traceable to the New Order. 
 As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the political design of the New Order 
regime domesticated intellectuals through co-optation and state surveillance —
effectively preventing them from developing organic social bases. This was part and 
parcel of the New Order’s success in disorganising civil society for 32 years. As a 
result, intellectuals’ only option for advancing their interests and activities in the 
public sphere was through connection with the political and economic apparatus of 
the New Order regime. Since the post-authoritarian era demonstrates the capacity of 
the social interests underpinning the old regime to adapt to the new institutional 
environment, so too has the relationship between these interests and intellectuals been 
modified according to new requirements. 
 As Hadiz (2010: 74) suggests, while technocratic reformist groups are 
certainly represented in the hallways of power, their position owes much to support 
from the international community of technocrats as represented by the World Bank, 
IMF and other prominent international development institutions. However, their 
influence does not reach far from the capital city of Jakarta, due to the absence of 
effective social agents in the regions. In any case, both Jakarta and local technocratic 
experts are hindered in advancing the agenda of neo-liberal governance because of the 
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absence of strong social bases of support within the domestic political arena for this 
sort of agenda. 
 This chapter is devoted firstly tomapping out the social alliances that bring 
intellectuals, especially academics — but also social activists and journalists — 
together with local predatory elites in the processes of local electoral competition in 
the post-authoritarian era. In the process, it shows how these social alliances are 
connected to their predecessors in the New Order era.The chapter also examines how 
predatory elites recruit partners from within the intellectual community, to help 
protect their wealth and power through the workings of local democratic political 
institutions, as well ashow the latter relates to the rise of political consultants as part 
of the elections industry in post-authoritarian Indonesia. 
 Second, the chapter focuses on the role of money politics and the utilisation of 
public authority in protecting and advancing the interests of local predatory 
elites.More specifically, it shows the role of intellectuals in the workings of money 
politics in local elections. In the process, the chapter also elaborates on the patronage 
relationships that have been forged between politico-bureaucrats and a range of 
academics, journalists and ostensibly reformist social activists. Finally, the role of 
intellectuals in supporting local predatory alliances through the provision of expertise 
(such as surveys) and propaganda material,as well as of ‘scientific legitimacy’through 
neo-institutionalist knowledge, is discussed. 
3.2.Academics, Power and Networks 
The fall of the Soeharto authoritarian regime marked the beginning of a new era, 
characterised by democratic institution-building. This opened up political competition 
at both the national and local levels, especially through electoral politics. Aslocal 
politics has become far more significant following decentralisation than during the 
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authoritarian era, parties and parliaments at the local level have become a primary site 
for contestation over power and resources. However, democratisation has not simply 
created an all-inclusive political space, to which intellectuals can freely contribute. 
Three decades of successful and systematic domestication of intellectuals and the 
disorganisation of civil society continues to ensure that such is the case long after the 
demise of the New Order and its highly centralised and vast system of patronage. 
What decentralised democracy, including in East Java, has meant is that those who 
formerly occupied the middle and lower rungs of that system of patronage — 
especially those that functioned as the regime’s operators, entrepreneurs and 
bureaucrats at the local level — have  benefited most from the democratisation 
process (Hadiz 2010:59-62).This section inserts intellectuals, such as 
academics,political activists,and journalists, into thispicture.It provides a social map 
of intellectual groupings and their place in predatory alliances as seen in local 
electoral competitions. 
 Significantly, intellectuals have been active politically through networks and 
factions that can be identified as having originated during the authoritarian era. As 
was discussed in the previous chapter, a historical sociology of East Java’s elite 
formation during the New Order shows that there have been strong networks 
connecting university lecturers, top bureaucrats, student activists and political party 
elites in the province. These close connections were created as a result of deep state 
intervention into higher education during Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. It is notable 
that the 2008 gubernatorial election was the first direct provincial-wide election in 
East Java that presented a significant political opportunity for these networks to be 
activated for new purposes in post-authoritarian electoral politics. 
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 There are five prominent groupings of intellectuals in East Java today, which 
have been influential through their successful use of specialised knowledge, 
educational credentials and social position as sources of social and cultural capital. 
The following distinct networks of intellectuals can be distinguished.Although 
members of different networks might co-operate with each other when required for a 
specific political situation, they might also compete when facing a different set of 
circumstances. In other words, the politics of these networks are fluid, reflecting the 
easily shifting nature of predatory alliances at the local level in post-authoritarian 
Indonesia. 
 Firstly, there is the secular nationalist intellectual faction, which centres on 
Airlangga Universitylecturers as well as prominent academics at the University of 
Surabaya, and some private universities such as UNTAG (the Seventeenth of August 
University). These have become strategic actors for the Golkar Party chapters in 
Surabaya and East Java. This intellectual faction also maintained a close relationship 
with the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party), before the reform era and the faction’s 
diversification into various political parties.These intellectuals also have social 
backgrounds as nationalist student activists in GMNI, which was traditionally linked 
with the Indonesian National Party (PNI). Some of the faction’s leading figures 
include Anton Priyatno (public law lecturer, former Ubaya Rector and Golkar 
politician during the New Order) and Martono S. H. (public law lecturer, Ubaya 
lecturer, former member of the Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (KOMNAS 
HAM — National Human Rights Committee) and recently head of the East Java 
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branch of Golkar). This group also established a vehicle known as the Forum 
Intelektual Surabaya (FIS — Surabaya Intellectual Forum)
27
. 
 This group is also represented by a cohort of Airlangga University lecturers, 
most of them alumni of GMNI, who share a similar nationalist ideology with the 
Ubaya group. Some members are alumni of Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta, 
from which secular nationalist ideas of social justice and ideas of economic populism 
based on Pancasila have emerged within Indonesian public intellectual debates 
(Heryanto 2005: 75). Leading members include such intellectuals as Anton Priyatno, 
Professor Dr. Hotman Siahaan, Sentot Soeatmadji, Priyatmoko Dirdjosuseno M. A., 
Sritomo Wignjosoebroto, Haryadi Anwari M. A., Emmanuel Sudjatmoko S.H., M. A., 
Subagyo S.E., Dr.Harjono S. H. M. C. L, Daniel Sparingga PhD, Wisnu Pramutanto 
M. A., Suko Widodo M.A., and the renowned East Java lawyer Trimoelya D. Soerjadi 
(Soerjadi 2014: 177; Wahyudi 2012: 90-92). Also included are high-ranking East Java 
Provincial bureaucrats, most prominently Dr Soekarwo (a former regional secretary 
who was chosen by this group to run in the 2008 East Java gubernatorial race). This 
group has close connections with the New Order elite through interactions with CSIS 




 A second network is centred on politically and culturally more Islamic 
intellectuals based in the University of Airlangga, ITS and some private universities 
in Surabaya, as well as prominent East Java NGOs such as Lembaga Bantuan Hukum 
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 Interview with Martono S. H., the former head of East Java Golkar Party and also a lecturer in 
Constitutional Law, the University of Surabaya, November 21, 2012; Interview with Anton Priyatno, a 
former elite member of the Golkar Party in the New Order era and also a former rector of the 
University of Surabaya, December 1, 2012. 
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 Interview with KT, a former activist of PMKRI (Indonesian Republic Catholic Student Movement) 
and also a part of Special Operation (Opsus) who had the task of infiltrating PDI, 13 October 2014. 




Surabaya (LBH Surabaya — Surabaya Legal Aid). Most of these intellectuals have 
social backgrounds as modernist Muslim student activists who joined HMI. Their 
affiliation with the New Order elite goes back to their connections with the group of 
young leaders dubbed ‘Angkatan 66’ (Generation of 66), who hadadvocated new 
forms of political and development thinking after the fall of Soekarno and backed the 
New Order as a fresh start for Indonesia. One of the New Order’s intellectual 
supporters, Professor Sam Soeharto
29
, had recruited Angkatan 66 Islamic activists at 
the Airlangga Universityto support the new regime. Meanwhile, through ICMI, 
Islamic intelligentsia also attempted to incorporate their own intellectual-political 
networks into the ruling political elite in the New Order era.
30
 By exploiting their 
close Islamic affiliations among particular Golkar elites and ICMI, some members of 
this intellectual group advanced their positionsvia connections with 
Islamicallyoriented local military officers such as General R. Hartono (Commander of 




 Thirdly, there is the radical nationalist intellectual faction. This group is made 
up of strong loyalists of PDIP leader Megawati Soekarnoputri (Indonesian President 
from 2001 to 2004). Their connections to her were reinforced when she emerged as 
the major symbol of dissent to New Order rule in the mid-1990s. Ir Sutjipto, a 
prominent elite functionary of the PDIP who is closely allied to Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, is effectively the leader of this grouping. In business as a real estate 
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 For the role and position of Sam Soeharto as a proponent of President Soeharto during the early 
period and the heyday of the New Order, see Chapter 3. 
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Interview with Muhammad Zaidun, the Dean of the Law Faculty, University of Airlangga, and a 
former HMI activist, July 2, 2013. 
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developer, he maintained good relationships with his alma mater at ITS (the Tenth 
November Technology Institute). Meanwhile, through Sutjipto’s protégé in Surabaya 
politics — Bambang D. H. (a former mayor of the city) — this group has developed a 
close relationship with the radical student activists who had established the Leftist 
PRD, which was suppressed by the New Order, as well as with the radical faction of 
the GMNI. This latter group also has close connections with some young progressive 
lecturers in the Social and Political Sciences Faculty of the University of Airlangga, 
such as Eddy Heri.
32
 
 Fourthly, there are intellectuals affiliated with the traditionalist Muslim social 
organisation, the Nahdlatul Ulama. This group of intellectuals has political patronage 
ties to K. H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Indonesian President, 1999-2001), who served as 
the NU’s leader for many years and was also a major intellectual figure in the New 
Order, as a moderate dissident. Choirul Anam, a close associate of Abdurrahman 
Wahid, initially led this group. He subsequently became the General Secretary of the 
PKB (National Awakening Party) led by Wahid, who passed away in 2009. This 
group then fell into prolonged political rivalry with two local elite NU cadres — 
Khofifah Indar Parawansa (candidate for East Java Governor in 2008 and 2013) and 
Saifullah Yusuf (Vice-Governor of East Java). Most of the intellectuals in this group 




 Finally, there is a group of intellectuals who identify with social democratic 
ideals, and who are affiliated with Kelompok Belajar Sosialis (Socialism Study 
Group). This group recruited members from among the student movement in East 
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Java, especially activists of the student press. The same group also created the Student 
Communication Movement in various East Java cities, which is affiliated to FAMI 
(the Indonesian Student Activist Forum). Even though this group has solid bases of 
support among sections of the student movement, its role in the elite political 
constellation is marginal.  Nevertheless, the group has forged loose alliances with the 
dominant secular nationalist intellectual group (FIS), which had ties with remnants of 
the Opsus apparatus such as Sofyan Wanandi and Hary Tjan Silalahi from CSIS, 
especially in the early period of the reform era.
34
 
 While intellectual networks typically operate today as a kind of semi-
clandestine forum, their emergence as suggested above relates to the way the New 
Order intelligence services had become active in local politics in East Java, especially 
as represented by the manoeuvres of Opsus and the secular nationalist faction of 
Golkar.
35
 Because of Soeharto’s political strategy of embracing Islamic political 
groupings through ICMI in the early 1990s, some of the prominent elites of Golkar 
Party felt that they were beginning to be marginalised. In response, some intellectuals 
joined anunderground forum in partnership with with a social democratic group that 
conducted student activist recruitment into Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa (FKM — 
Student Communication Forum), throughout East Java’s cities. They worked with 
actors linked to the traditionalist Islamic intellectual group associated with NU, 
bringing together academics and activists in Surabaya in an underground movement 
ostensibly aiming to overthrow Soeharto.
36
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 During the resistance period, in the final days of the Soeharto era, University 
of Surabaya lecturers who were connected to the forum took roles as promoters of 
ideas of liberal democracy, the free market, pluralism and human rights, facilitated by 
former Golkar Party leaders who had strong positions in the most prestigious private 
university in Surabaya — the University of Surabaya. They established a study centre 
at the University of Surabaya concerned with human rights, known as Pusat Studi 
Hak Asasi Manusia (PUSHAM UBAYA — Centre for Human Rights Studies of the 
University of Surabaya). In the process, however, they developed elite-level 
connections within the bureaucratic apparatus of the New Order itself, including with 
such individuals as the aforementioned Soekarwo. Significantly, Soekarwo’s career as 
a key Golkar cadre and bureaucrat in the role of Kadispenda (head of the regional 
income bureau) hadenabled him to provide material support for this group, facilitating 
the political advancement of individual members in the late New Order era.
37
 
 The influence of groups of intelligentsia in East Java politics had already 
grown as they developed stronger connections with New Order leaders and 
intellectuals in Jakarta, for example through BQ and his trusted protégé NW.
38
BQ 
was widely known as a cadre of Golkar during the New Order era, and a follower of 
strongman General Ali Moertopo, who was the leader of the Opsus group that had 
been a major instrument of coercion in the early years of Soeharto’s rule.
39
 He also 
became an associate of Harry Tjan Silalahi, co-founder of the New Order’s prominent 
think-tank CSIS. It is suggested here that as a former political ally of Soeharto, CSIS 
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took a critical position towards Soeharto before his fall, thereby creating widespread 
social opposition that connected pro-democracy activists and some of the Soeharto 
regime’s former allies. In addition, Harry Tjan Silalahi was a trusted associate of 
Muhammad Said (head of the East Java Golkar branch under the New Order), with 




 East Java’s post-authoritarian political constellation is characterised by the 
repositioning of social alliances involving these intellectual groupings. From 1999 to 
2008, many of them developed close connections with the East Java Governor Imam 
Oetomo, making use of links to local elite military officers. By utilising their concern 
for regional development and institutional reform, Oetomo approached these 
groups— but especially those affiliated with secular nationalist groups and modernist 




 Similar developments would occur following the end of the Imam Oetomo 
period. Soekarwo’s candidacy in the 2008 East Java gubernatorial election was 
bolstered when he broadened his alliance to include a key faction of the intelligentsia 
— in this case associated with HMI alumni, who had previously supported another 
candidate, Sunaryo, the outgoing Vice-Governor. This group included Muhammad 
Asfar, Professor Kacung Maridjan, and Aribowo M.A. (all Airlangga University 
lecturers). The HMI-aligned group’s decision to shift its support to Soekarwo was 
based on the fact that the latter had developed strong connections with the then 
incumbent governor, the powerful Imam Oetomo. It was calculated that Imam 
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Oetomos’s support for Soekarwo would considerably enhance his chances of winning 
the election. Such support was expected, in turn, because Soekarwo had served as 
Oetomo’s top bureaucrat (in the role of Regional Secretary or Sekretaris Daerah).
42
 
Moreover, this group had also developed close relationships with strategic political 
actors such as members of the East Java Election Commission (KPU). Some of the 
leading members of the Commission, such as Wahyudi Purnomo, Didik Prasetiyono, 
Arief Budiman and Aribowo, have a long history with the intellectuals supporting 
Soekarwo, which goes back to shared political activities during the New Order.
43
 
 However, the group affiliated with the traditionalist Muslim NU came to be 
divided into two camps. These were loyal to Saifullah Yusuf and Khofifah Indar 
Parawansa respectively. Saifullah Yusuf joined the Soekarwo camp, becoming the 
latter’s candidate as Vice-Governor. However, Khofifah Indar Parawansa made her 
own bid for the East Java governorship. Even though Khofifah’s camp had strong 
support among Muslim traditionalist santri, it had difficulty in recruiting prominent 
intellectuals with strong credentials, since most East Javanese intellectuals joined the 
Soekarwo and Sunaryo camps.Both of these candidates had strong bureaucratic 
support bases, and thus recruited most of the prominent intellectuals in East Java with 
promises of access to local state resources.
44
 The radical nationalist group supported 
yet another candidate, Ir Sutjipto, the PDIP Secretary-General, who was the leading 
figure within the group. But their efforts were not successful as they were not able to 
compete effectively, particularlyagainst Soekarwo and Sunaryo. 
 As we shall see, intellectuals would be rewarded tangibly for their 
participation in the political process, and for their incorporation into competing 
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patronage networks that have their origins within the New Order’s East Java 
apparatus. Indeed, these intellectuals have hardly utilised their access to substantive 
reform agendas, certainly not in the neo-instutionalist mould, because their own 
interests have become increasingly embedded within such patronage networks.  
3.3.The Political Economy Context of Local Elections 
In this section, local elections are discussed from a political economy perspective, in 
order to show the capacity of predatory alliances to coopt public authority and 
democratic institutions for their private interests. As also shown by Hadiz (2004; 
2006: 90-91), decentralisation in Indonesia has reinforced a system of power 
dominated by local corrupt business and political alliances, instead of being 
conducive to the implementation of ‘good governance’ based on free markets and 
enhanced citizens’ participation at the local level. Vote buying, bribery, fraud and the 
gathering of financial resources through irregular means have featured prominently in 
local electoral contests since Indonesia democratised and decentralised. 
 This section explains how the electoral arena is marked by the misuse of 
public budgets and state institutions to serve the interests of competing predatory 
alliances. The section is divided into two sub-sections. The first explains the gathering 
of financial resources through irregular means, including the utilisation of public 
authority and local budgetsto support a number of activities that include vote buying. 
Other activities include interventions into the workings of such key institutions as the 
local branch of the Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU — Election Commission). It is 
shown that intellectuals, especially academics, have played a major role in this regard 
beyond that of producing ideas, sometimes taking up roles as veritable political fixers. 
The second sub-section elaborates on the patterns of political patronage that connect 
predatory alliances in East Java with intellectuals who are social activists and 
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journalists.These have become important in maintaining public acceptance of 
electoral processes marred by frequently blatant acts of manipulation. Taken together, 
the section depicts how local elections present ample opportunities for local predatory 
alliances to absorb academics, social activits and journalists into their ranks. 
3.3.1. Money Politics in East Java Local Elections 
After Soeharto’s fall from power in 1998, political parties have greatly facilitated the 
reorganisation of predatory alliances based on politico-bureaucratic and business 
relationships. In the new political constellation, parliaments and (the now numerous) 
political parties have quickly become the main vehicles through which predatory 
elites capture the institutions of the state and their authority and resources. This 
situation contrasts starkly with the Soeharto era, which was characterised by the 
centralisation of power within the confines of the president's inner political circle, and 
where political parties and parliament were mere ornaments of a rigidly authoritarian 
regime. Today, the fusion of politico-bureaucratic and business interests is found in 
all the major political parties (Hadiz 2005, 42), to which a range of New Order-era 
political figures, bureaucrats, retired military officers, entrepreneurs and thugs had 
quickly migrated with the advent of democratisation. 
 Formally, ordinary citizens now have the opportunity to vote for their leaders 
and articulate their interests and aspirations through more direct means. Yet this 
institutional reform did not erode the dominance of established local predatory 
interests based on networks that connect state bureaucrats, party elites, local 
entrepreneurs and intellectuals. Such networks typically also include local gangsters 
and perhaps NGO or student activists who have latched onto local patronage networks 
(Hadiz, 2010; Stokke & Tornquist, 2013). It should be noted that the high cost of 
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direct local elections actually means the expansion of money politics and greater 
imperatives to misuse public budgets as a political resources during election time.
45
 
 The dynamics of competition are played out within institutional reforms of 
local elections that were facilitated by Regulations No. 22/1999 and 32/2004 on direct 
local elections. What essentially transpired from these regulations was a change from 
an electoral system whereby local parliaments elected mayors, district heads and 
governors to one where such officials are directly elected by the public. But money 
politics and abuse of power have taken place under both systems, although the form in 
which they can be seen has changed. Prior to the implementation of direct local 
elections in 2005, the practice of money politics in local elections had been more or 
less confined to local parliamentary bodies whose tasks included electing local 
executives. The Medan mayoral election of 2000 demonstrates how both money and 
physical intimidation were used to influence local legislators (Hadiz, 2006: 93). North 
Maluku’s 2002 gubernatorial elections (won by Soeharto-era cabinet minister Abdul 
Gafur
46
) and prominent New Order-era businessman Fadel Muhammad
47
 in Gorontalo 
                                                 
45
 To be more specific, while money politics has accompanied political decentralisation in post-
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province in 2001 provide other notable examples (Hadiz, 2006: 93). Likewise, local 
elections in East Java in the early post-authoritarian era also demonstrated the 
capacity of New Order political elites to sustain their power through practices of 
money politics focused on local legislative bodies and political party elites. For 
instance, Aribowo (2008; 107-08) states that competition among political parties 
within the East Java provincial legislature during the gubernatorial election of 2003 
reflected the power of established New Order elites, who placed Imam Oetomo 
andSunaryo as East Java Governor and Vice Governor respectively. Imam Oetomo 
was the incumbent governor who had a military background as the Commander of 
Brawijaya Military Command in East Java. Sunaryo was the Secretary of East Java’s 
Provincial Bureaucracy. This pairing was supported by the PDIP, Golkar and Fraksi 
Gabungan or Joint Faction (PAN, PPP) against the pairing of Muhammad Kahfi and 
Ridwan Hisyam. Kahfi was a local entrepreneur with close connections to politicians, 
while Hisyam was the leader of Golkar Party in East Java. Showing the flexibility of 
political alliances, this pairing was however promoted by the Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa (PKB — National Awakening Party) as well as by a faction within Golkar. 
 There are indications too that money politics continues to occur well after 
elections are held. This typically takesone of the following three forms: frequently, 
parliamentarians seek payment from mayors, district heads and governors in order to 
support their obligatory annual accountability reports. Local legislators often criticise 
such accountability reports if adequate compensation has not been received. 
Secondly, these legislators may request funding from local executives to finance 
political party events, then skim from the costs. Finally, legislators may request the 
right to manage development projects and negotiate concessions from the local 
                                                                                                                                           
47
 Fadel Muhammad is a domestic businessman who had a close relationship with the Soeharto and 
Habibie politico-business alliances during the New Order. 
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bureaucracy apparatus for the benefit of their own businesses. Such political practices 
are seen by many observers to be extensive (Masduki & Fadjar, 2003; Aribowo, 
2008). Aribowo’s as well as Masduki and Fadjar’s findings are supported by Hisjam’s 
admission that the amount of money involved in the effort to obtain the vote of local 
parliamentarians was huge. Hisjam has stated that political contests not only required 
the capacity to defend political interests but also the material resources necessary to 
make a deal with local politicians, either in local elections voted by parliaments or 
direct local elections voted by the people.
48
 
 Since 2005,direct local elections have been conducted under new regulations 
that have actually strengthened the practice of money politics within political parties. 
Instead of channelling the various interests and aspirations of society through political 
parties, the parties elitesutilise their position to seek material rewards and to develop 
their own alliances. They do so by offering assistance to candidates running for local 
office. In reality, each candidate must pay for the support of the political party that 
acts as his/her vehicle. This situation forces most candidates in local elections to 
accumulate substantial funds by accepting large donations from business actors in 
amounts that violate existing regulations — as stated by a former candidate of local 
offices,LQ. According to LQ,
49
 party elites offer the price of Rp. 500 million ($US 
45,000) to Rp. 1 billion ($US 90,900) to each candidate for their support, which 
serves as a political barrier for candidates who do not have access to material 
resources in gubernatorial elections. A Puskapol(Centre of Political Studies based on 
University of Indonesia, October 9, 2014) release reinforces this statement,by 
presenting data that political parties are paid fees of Rp. 60 billion (approximately 
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$US 5.5 million) to Rp. 100 billion ($US 9 million) to support specific candidates 
incertain gubernatorial elections throughout Indonesia.
50
 
 Nordholt (2013: 236) suggests that after the change to direct local elections in 
most regions in Indonesia,party elites utilised local elections as a means to earn 
money from their own candidates. Fukuoka (2012: 80-97) asserts that the clientelist 
nature of the political economy inherited from the Soeharto era still exists. However, 
if during the Soeharto era these relationships blended into a centralised architecture of 
power, in the post-authoritarian era they are found in varied and competing centres of 
power, including within political parties and the national legislature, and within local 
executive bodies and parliaments. 
 The political reality of East Java follows the pattern found elsewhere in 
Indonesia. According to East Java prominent political consultant NB, the East Java 
Gubernatorial Election in 2008 was a critical political moment for strengthening the 
political-business alliance around the Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf (Karsa) pairing, and 
also for cementing the role of intellectuals in guaranteeing their political victory.The 
rise of the so-called Karsa duo in the 2008 Gubernatorial Election was supported by 
the circle of East Java intellectuals around Soekarwo, which haddeveloped a strong 
social network since the advent of the New Order. Under the leadership of NW 
(auniversity lecturer and member ofthe Karsa campaign team) and FT (a prominent 
East Java businessman), the alliance was successful in collecting large amounts of 
funds, including from a range of major business figures. Muhammad Asfar also 
suggests that siseable financial contributions for the Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf 
winning team were collected by the team leader Martono S.H. from the business 
community. These include donations from BN (one of the largest business entities in 
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East Java), amounting to Rp. 5 billion, and fromEJ (owner of another large East Java 
business conglomerate), to the amount of about Rp. 3 billion. In addition, an 
extravagant donation from TC, a major national political figure, to the amount of Rp. 
70 billion was allegedly provided. In return, ST,a major figure in an Islamic party, 
reportedly promised to campaign for a different party to ensure support from the 
extensive Nahdlatul Ulama organisation in East Java. Importantly, according to the 
stipulations contained in Regulation number 22 in 2004 on Local Government, all of 
these donations would have been illegal. The regulation limits individual 
contributions to Rp. 50 million (US$5,000), while enterprises can provide candidates 
with up to Rp. 350 million in donations.
51
 
 The role of consultants in sustaining the dominance of predatory elite 
networks through electoral politics was also prevalent in the case of the Surabaya 
mayoral elections of 2010. Prominent in the Tri Rismaharini-Bambang D.H. winning 
team were ES and KI, consultants who are believed by local political actors, which 
had long been actively involved as consultants for the Surabaya City Government. 
They are believed by local political actors to have been instrumental in collecting 
funds from local and national business actors. These included businesses that maybe 
involved insuch illegal activities such as gambling.
52
 
 However, allegations about the involvement of academics in the irregular use 
of funds not only pertain to those who acted as political consultants for candidates, 
but also to those serving in the regional electoral commission in East Java. Such was 
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the case apparently during the tenure of Wahyudi Purnomo, a professor of 
International Relations at Airlangga University, as Chairman of the Election 
Commission, which coincided with the 2008 gubernatorial election. There were 
allegations at that time, which remain unproven, of manipulation in the tendering for 
voting cards for the local elections. Some observers believe that this case was related 
to voting irregularities that helped to make possible the victory of the Karsa ticket. A 
statement at a press conference by Police Commissioner Herman Surjadi Wiradiredja, 
the former East Java police chief, reinforces the allegations of involvement of East 
Java academics in cases of electoral manipulation. Interestingly, Wiradiredja resigned 
his position after the East Java gubernatorial election in 2008 took place. While police 
chief, he was accused by East Java KPU (Electoral Commission) Chairman Wahyudi 
Purnomo of helping to manipulate the contents of the electoral roll that was in place at 
the time. According to Wiradiredja, there were as many as 345,000 errors in the data 
contained in the registry of voters for the districts of Sampang and Bangkalan,where 
there was a combined total of 1,244,619 eligible voters. However, Wiradiredja retired 
his post before an investigation into the matter had been concluded, and the case 
remains unresolved (Rasi, SahrasadandMulki; 2009; Kompas, March 17, 2009). 
 There are indications that the Election Commission (KPU) was also not free 
from illicit activities during the 2010 Surabaya Elections. According to businessman 
KI, a member who worked for the eventually successful pairing of Tri Rismaharini 
and Bambang D.H., the team provided funds amounting to Rp. 1 billion to influence 
some officers of the Surabaya Election Commission. If true, it goes without saying 
that such allegations would have profound ramifications for the entire electoral 
process. Interestingly, the explanation was that this amount of money was needed to 
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ensure that voting results were not manipulated, as was allegedly the case in the 2008 
East Java gubernatorial elections.
53
 
 All the foregoing shows that academics and consultants also appear to be 
deeply implicated in efforts to bring together business and political elites in activities 
to appropriate the local government budget for the purpose of winning elections. 
Moreover, based on my findings, incumbents have the advantage of being able to 
appropriate local budgets for their campaigns, although rival candidates can certainly 
utilise other means to illicitly mobilise funds to support their campaigns.Such actions 
are made necessary by the objective conditions faced by each candidate in the field. 
As already mentioned, to progress in the electoral arena, each candidate must pay a 
political party to nominate him/her and for a team of political consultants.
54
 
 The advent of direct local elections in East Java also showed the extent of the 
local bureaucracy’s politicisation. In the Soeharto era, the local bureaucracy was a 
tool of a highly centralised authoritarian regime backed by, among other things, the 
coercive powers of the military. But in the context of decentralisation and democracy, 
public resources and the bureaucracy were utilised as political instruments in 
competition among different predatory alliances for control of local offices. This was 
seen clearly in the race between Soekarwo and Vice-Governor Sunaryo, during the 
contest for the East Java governorship in 2008. During this campaign, the East Java 
bureaucracy became effectively divided into competing pro-Soekarwo and Pro-
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Sunaryo camps. In general, however, the bureaucracy was inclined to support 
Soekarwo, because the then incumbent Governor Imam Oetomo had favoured him. 
 Thus, Millah Ahmad Hasan (2010:94-95) claims that the Head of the East 
Java Education Office, Rasiyo, had openly campaigned for the Karsa ticket in several 
official events, in contravention of the electoral regulations governing civil servants. 
At an educational event in Jember in front of an audience of teachers, Rasiyo stated 
that Soekarwo had showed his commitment to progress in East Java education. Not 
surprisingly, Soekarwo later increased the part of the education budget allocated to 
the discretionary program, Bantuan Operational Sekolah (BOS — School Operational 
Assistance), when he became Governor. The financial prowess of the Karsa alliance, 
however, did not just depend on support from the business community. Thus the KPK 
(Corruption Eradication Commission) alleges that there was misuse of public budgets 
through the manipulation of grants and social assistance programs that were used on 
behalf of the winning pair of candidates. Specifically, the KPK suspected that social 
welfare grants through the provincial budget, worth Rp. 850 billion, were used to pay 
off constituents for their support. A similar development seems to have occurred in 
the case of the Surabaya Mayoral Elections of 2010. According to the tabloid 
Sapujagad, the Chairman of the provincial Parliament — who also became Chairman 
of the Surabaya PDIP branch, Wishnu Shaktibuana — gathered bureaucrats and the 
heads of Surabaya districts in Mutiara Restaurant Surabaya, in order to ensure the 
victory of the ‘Risma-Bambang’ pairing (of Tri Rismaharini, a career local 
bureaucrat, and Bambang D. H., a PDIP politician and the incumbent mayor).
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 Indications of the dubious use of funds from the local budget were also 
rampant in the 2010 mayoral election in Surabaya. The matter was divulged in 
parliamentary debates, during which the Budget Committee questioned the mode of 
allocation of social welfare grants amounting to Rp. 36 billion. It was reported that 
Surabaya city government officials could not explain in detail which organisations 
and institutions actually received these funds. It is widely believed that these funds 
were used for electoral campaign purposes.
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 In fact, a Constitutional Court ruling in 2008 (number 41/PHPU.D-VI/2008) 
(Rasi, Sahrasad& Mulki, 2009) found that systemic, structured and massive violations 
occurred in that year’s gubernatorial election in East Java — especially in the districts 
of Sampang, Bangkalan and Pamekasan. It is notable that intellectuals and academics 
played an important role in that particular blatantly money politics-driven electoral 
contest. Moreover, they would play a similar role in the Surabaya mayoral election of 
2010. As we shall see, the networks connecting members of academia and predatory 
political and economic elites appear to have been active in numerous murky cases of 
electoral manipulation and vote buying — while simultaneously publicly purveying 
ideas of good governance reforms in the Neo-Institutionalist vein 
 The utilisation of local state institutions to support competition among rival 
politico-business alliances indicates the failure of the neo-liberal governance program 
to influence East Java provincial governance. Political processes remain dominated by 
predatory alliances that appropriate public institutions and resources. This 
iscontradictory both to the objectives of good governance that intellectuals have 
promoted as they insert themselves into these processes,and tofree market logic—
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which would dictate transparency of public institutions and separation between 
business and political activities. 
3.3.2. Elections and Political Co-Optation 
The reality that East Java’s post-authoritarian political configuration reflects the 
continuation of New Order relations of power means that the civil society arena has 
become the extension of struggles among different predatory alliances at the local 
level. The legacy of the New Order’s systematic disorganisation of civil society 
prevents it from becoming an open public sphere which can provide opportunities for 
various groups to participate meaningfully in the processes of local politics. 
Therefore, the civil society arena in East Java may be characterised as illiberal in its 
character, displaying the capacity of predatory power alliances to create political 
patronage by co-opting strategic social agents within civil society — including social 
activists and journalists. This section elaborates on the co-optation of groups of 
intellectuals, social activists and journalists into elite struggle in local elections. This 
section also explaines how the participation of social activists and journalists in 
predatory power affiliations facilitates the efforts of academics and political 
consultants to advocate on behalf of predatory power interests. 
The Subjugation of Social Activists  
East Java’s post-authoritarian circumstances also provided political opportunities 
either for reformist student organisations or for established student organisations,from 
which the New Order recruited their apparatus and produced new cohorts of 
Indonesian intellectuals to link up their interest into the dominant power 
interest.Instances of suchstudent organisations include organisations like HMI, 
GMNI, PMKRI and Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII — Indonesian 
Islamic Student Movement). At the same time, social activists who pursue careers 
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with pro-democracy NGOs at the local level have also gained access to powerful 
political positions, without necessarily being able toeffect reform. Some social 
activists who perceived that they can fight for their constituent aspirations through 
parliamentary politics have joined prominent political parties in East Java. However, 
the incorporation of activists into the political parties has tended to strengthen 
predatory power alliances instead of advancing democratic agendas at local levels. 
The dominant predatory elites who control the political parties have utilised the social 




 Political conditions in East Java indicate a similar tendency, where youth and 
student organisations have become the social basis for political recruitment and also a 
political machine to accomplish specific political and economic objectives. Local 
political competition, especially as seen in East Java’s direct local elections (pilkada 
langsung), showsthe ambiguity of political demarcations between predatory alliances 
and nominally pro-democracy agents working in NGOs. In reality, some members of 
predatoryalliances have been recruited from NGOs based on youth and student 
groups, such as JERIT (the Oppressed People’s Network, based on PMII activists), as 
part of the effort to establish political consent among the masses. Soekarwo’s 
apparatus, for example, utilised JERIT activists to create political support among the 
grassroots and within the student movement.
58
 The political manoeuvring carried out 
by dominant groups during the Surabaya local election also involved former radical 
elements of the student political movement, such as the PRD (the People’s 
Democratic Party). This was possibly because of the historical affiliation between the 
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incumbent Bambang D.H. (based in the PDIP) and PRD activists in the 1998 reform 
movement. Bambang D.H. recruited ex-PRD activists to create a successful 
organisation, Jare BDH (Voluntary Network for Bambang D.H.’s candidacy), which 
operated from urban poor and grassroots bases. In addition, some of Jare BDH’s 
actors, such as Dandik Katjasungkana and Sardiyoko, the former head of the NGO 
Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI — the Indonesian Forum for the 
Environment), were also members of pro-democracy vehicles such as Ikatan Keluarga 
Orang Hilang Indonesia (IKOHI — Indonesian Association of Families of the 
Disappeared). Political manoeuvres of this kind also occurred in other alliances.
59
 
According to Jagad Hariseno (the campaign manager for Tri Rismaharini and 
Bambang D.H.), the campaign team also provided money to political activists as 
incentives and to cover operational costs in the field.
60
 
 Other instances of utilisation of student groups and social activists by 
predatory power alliances were seen in their recruitment for various political 
operations ranging from surveys funded by political candidates in the 2008 and 2013 
gubernatorial elections and the 2010 Surabaya local elections, tovote buying in these 
elections.
61
 This reveals that political reform in East Java is very susceptible to 
colonisation by predatory interests. On the one hand, these exampleshave clearly 
demonstrated the ability to spawn overarching networks, and to construct cross-class 
alliances that connect the political elite, business actors and social activists at local 
levels. On the other hand, the social context of post-authoritarian East Java depicts 
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how many prominent intellectuals involved in electoral processes as consultants have 
become increasingly circumscribed by exising political circumstances. 
Domesticating Journalists and Academics 
The illiberal democracy conditions in East Java are also reflected in the absorption of 
local journalists and mass media institutions into predatory power alliances during 
local elections. This sub-section explains the triumph of such alliances in 
incorporating local intellecuals, activists, journalists and mass media institutions into 
their patronage networks. 
 The political co-optation of journalists into the dominant predatory power 
alliances shows the contradiction between the reality of the East Java post-
authoritarian situation and the optimistic predictions of liberal academics, who believe 
that Neo-Institutionalism induces democratisation processes. Liberal political theory 
suggests, for example, that the mass media plays an important role in the proper 
implementation of democracy. As a civil society institution, the mass media has the 
function of contributing towards freedom of expression, providing a platform for a 
plurality of viewpoints, giving voice to different kinds of political interests and 
aspirations, and maintaining the accountability and responsiveness of government to 
the citizenry (Sen, 1999). John Keane (2009) also emphasises the contribution of the 
mass media to the strengthening of democratisation; through his concept of monitory 
democracy, which he sees as a recent evolution in the democratic process. By using 
the term ‘monitory democracy’, Keane highlights the role of civil society as a 
strategic agent that performs the function of scrutinising the mechanisms of 
representative democracy. The role of mass media in particular is seen to be important 
in enabling civil society to monitor the political elite’s tendency to abuse power and 
capture the political processes (Keane, 2009: 686-95). 
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 However, the role of local media in Surabaya in local elections shows that 
there is a huge contrast between reality and the expectations of liberal political theory. 
Instead of facilitating liberal reformist intellectuals to control the democratisation 
process, the local mass media has also served predatory interests;as academics who 
are entangled in the predatory alliances are enabled to produce opinion pieces and 
commentariesthat support their alliances. 
 The background to this situation is found in thepolitico-business relationships 
between the top local political elite and the owners of big mass media institutions. For 
instance, The Jawa Pos Group is the largest mass media corporation in East Java. The 
owner of the Jawa PosGroup is Dahlan Iskan, who was closely linked to the New 
Order and its electoral vehicle, Golkar. As an entrepreneur, Iskanobtained advantages 
from his relationship with the East Java government — especially when the Governor 
was Imam Oetomo, from 1998 to 2008 (Ida, 2011: 18). Moreover, the processes of 
decentralisation and democratisation have placed Iskan in an increasingly strategic 
position. Not only is he a key civil society actor, who can perform the role of 
monitoring power-holders through his ownership of a huge media conglomerate; he is 
also a major player in new and more localised predatory alliances in East Java. Again 
his wealth and ownership of various media outlets make him a major player almost by 
default. This was demonstrated when Iskan plunged directly into a key electoral 
contest by supporting one of his own chief editors, Arif Affandi, as the running mate 
to Bambang D.H., when the latter ran for mayor of Surabaya in 2005 on the PDIP 
ticket (Ida, 2011: 18-21). 
 The relationship between the owner of Jawa Pos and local predatory elites can 
be traced to the New Order period, when Dahlan Iskan and Soekarwowere both on the 
board of directors of Panca Wira Usaha, a local state-owned enterprise. Between1999 
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and 2009, Dahlan Iskan served as the president director of Panca Wira Usaha. The 
appointment of Iskan cannot be separated from the recommendation of Governor 
Soekarwo. Interestingly, local anti-corruption activists accused both Soekarwo and 
Iskan of engaging in corruption via the depreciation of corporate assets without clear 
accountability, as well as viathe contracting out of state-owned land controlled by the 
company to the private sector at a low price.
62
However, the East Java media did not 
focus intensively on this case, which may not be surprising given the stature and 
influence of the Jawa Pos Group’s publications in the province. 
 Significantly, the Jawa Pos newspaper also emerged as a major player in the 
most recent gubernatorial contest in East Java, which took place in 2013; and in 
which Soekarwo and Saifullah Yusuf were again the leading pair of candidates, 
supported by the most powerful established interests in the province. As the largest 
mass media outlet in East Java, Jawa Poswas of course well placed again to provide 
space for leading intellectuals to support Soekarwo and Saifullah by generating 
political commentary and analyses favourable to them. Jawa Pos is also particularly 
well positioned to pick and choose the reporting of news and issues supportive of the 
incumbent Governor and Vice-Governor, and to attack the positions of their rivals.For 
instance, II,a political science lecturer from a prominent East Java University,stated in 
Radar Jatim.com (July 14, 2013) that the circulation of money during the 2013 East 
Java general election was very considerable. But he dismissed the problem of money 
politics by arguing that it was normal for candidates to spend money to get elected.
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Another case worth mentioning regards the Jawa Pos decision to publish an article by 
one of the East Java Election Commission (KPUD) deputiesabout the selection of the 
2013 gubernatorial candidates, before the institution formally decided to eliminate the 
Khofifah-Herman duo. However, the East Java Election Commision’s decision was 
subsequently disallowed by the Honorary Election Council (DKPP) and the deputy 
was sanctionedby this council.
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 Finally, Jawa Pos and its array of news media appeared to play a leading role 
in depicting the Governor and Vice-Governor as politicians who are popular with the 
people, for example by reporting on particular opinion pollsfrequently conducted by 
consulting agencies that also have a stake in the local game of money politics. 
 Of course, media corporations always develop their own interests; and can be 
politically well connected anywhere in the world. From this point of view, the roles 
played by Jawa Posand the cluster of intellectuals and political consultants that it 
promoted for the sake of the Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf campaign, is not unique. 
However, the way in which Jawa Posappears to be increasingly embroiled in the local 
money politics-driven electoral democracy of East Java is quite striking. It has been 
suggested, for example, that some Jawa Pos journalists, along with other mass media 
journalists,wereinvolved directly in the Soekarwo and Saifullah Yusuf team, albeit 
informally. Some journalists created a team called LEKRA (Laskar Media Karsa). 
This group worked on media propaganda, and also framed the news during the 
political campaign in ways that tended to support the Karsa political image
65
. Postings 
that appear in the Soekarwo-Saifullah mailing list show that prominent local 
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intellectuals, again especially those connected to the prestigious Airlangga University, 
are often hired to help highlight particular issues or events that are favourable to the 
incumbents, including through Jawa Pos publications. 
 The network of journalists who supported Karsa also employed the strategy of  
using academics from prominent universitiesto support the Soekarwo-Saifullah 
pairing and strengthen the team’spolitical image. For instance, when the East Java 
election commission annulled the rival candidacy of Khofifah Indar Parawansa-
Herman Sumawiredja, the Jawa Pos News Network reported the event by printing the 
opinion of II, lecturer in Political Science from a prominent East Java University. 
According to II, the East Java election commission’s decision in the 2013 
gubernatorial election were merely technical; relating tothe fact that the technical 
requirements for candidacy were not fulfilled by the Khofifah-Herman pair.The lack 
of backing from political parties was due to the ‘double support’ given by some 
parties towards competing pairs of candidates. (In this manoeuvre, the Chairmen of 
East Java parties give theirsupport to the Khofifah-Herman pair, but party General 
Secretariesrecommendedthe incumbent).II also stated that the failure of the Khofifah-
Herman candidacy was related to a lack of strategy regarding how to compete with 
the incumbent pair (Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf).
66
 It should also be noted that Jawa 
Pos, as well as some other prominent newspapers in East Java,gave very littlespace to 
assertions by the head of the East Java branch of the Partai Matahari Bangkit, 
Syafrudin Budiman, that the East Java bureaucratic apparatus attempted to buy his 
party’s support for Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf. 
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 Prominent East Java newspapers also did not mention the critical analysis by 
thepolitical economy expert Rizal Ramli, regarding similar indications of bribery 
involving political parties in the 2013 East Java gubernatorial election.
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 Therefore, as shown in the case of Jawa Pos and other newspapers, the 
activities of the local mass media in East Javahave diverged greatly from the role 
envisaged in the liberal political theory advocated by scholars such as Keane. Rather 
than enhancingpolitical accountability to the citizenry, and improve the ability of the 
electorate to monitor the behaviour of power-holders, the mass media seems to have 
further enabled the hijacking of the institutions of local democracy by key local 
predatory elites. For the purposes of this study, what is particularly significant is that 
Jawa Pos provides valuable avenues for local intellectuals to continue to stake claims 
for a role in the hurly-burly of local electoral contests that rely so much on the 
mechanics of money politics. Through the media, itself seemingly more closely 
integrated than ever with dominant predatory alliances, such intellectuals are able to 
carry out the task of providing academic legitimacy to practices that, in actuality, 
diverge greatly from the ideals of good governance that are supposed to be shared as a 
matter of consensus after Reformasi in 1998. 
 The experience of the East Java post-authoritarian local elections, wherein 
intellectuals comprising academics, social activists and journalistsplay key roles, 
indicates that politics has become largely an arena where contestation and negotiation 
take place between predatory alliances who maintain their social position through 
local elections and by using local public resources and authority. The result is the 
development of fluid networks of political patronage that are sustained through the 
                                                 
67
 See ‘Khofifah Bersimbol Perlawanan, Bambang DH Janji Jujur’ (Khofifah as Rebellion Symbol, 
Bambang D. H.  Promised to be Fair), Surabaya Pagi, May 21, 2013. 
150 
 
very workings of the democratic process, and which encompass political elites as well 
as a range of mass media and social organisations. 
 It is thus suggested here that the perspective promoted by scholars such as 
O’Donnel and Schmitter (1986), Linz and Stepan (1996) and Diamond (1994) — 
adherents of the democratic transitions approach — is inappropriate for the East Java 
case. According to such scholars, democracy can be developed through negotiation 
processes between political elites, and encouraged by internationally-promoted policy 
interventions in support of good governance. However, contrary to what transition 
approach scholars imagine, East Javanese local politics cannot be read simply as a 
political map within which there is a clear-cut separation between, on the one hand, 
reformers from former authoritarian regimes, and,on the other hand, moderate dissent 
by pro-democracy activists who negotiate in the political arena to advance 
democracy. In contrast, the political constellation in East Java, as seen in local 
election processes, displays the consolidation of the apparatus of the old regime 
through adaptation to new institutional rules and by developing new alliances, 
including with those that are frequently held to be reformers. 
 Further, the advance of democratisation merely through various democratic 
actors’ political will and capacity to promote and use democratic institutions 
appropriately, as Stokke and Tornquist (2013: 4-5) suggest, appears implausible in the 
East Java context. This is because the commitment of actors, even some of those that 
are commonly believed to adhere to a progressive political orientation, can be eroded 
by the way organisations such asNGOs and labour unions are co-opted and absorbed 
into predatory power alliances. Other research, conducted by Burrage (2008: 39-41), 
indicates that countries which practice representative democracy, such as the UK, 
France and the US, can be identified by the capacity of their political parties and civil 
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society institutions (such as schools, universities, professional associations and trade 
unions) to act as potential agents both of class formation and class dissolution. 
However, political parties and civil society institutions in East Java have become a 
haven for the exercise of predatory power; and thus assist in the maintenance of the 
power relationships that characterised the New Order but that now operate in a 
democratic setting. Such is the political constellation within which local intellectuals 
have to manoeuvre. The espousal by many of them of technocratic and institutional 
reform agendas is not adequate to overcome such a political constellation, in spite of 
any ideas about a vanguard role that educated, rational intellectuals might take in 
political reform processes. 
 Social scientists who use a structuralist approach, such as Lavalette and 
Mooney (2000), Rueschmeyer et al. (1992), Hadiz (2005), see that political change — 
especially political action to advance democratisation processes — was historically 
more possible where strong working class movements were a significant social force. 
This approach sees democracy in societies such as in Western Europe to be the result 
of political compromise and contestation between state, labour and capital. As 
Berman (2006) suggests, compromise between competing interests created the social 
democratic model, which spread across Europe after World War II, safeguarded by 
strong labour unions and pro-working class political parties. However, there is 
nothing remotely comparable in post-authoritarian East Java, where the working class 
cannot mount a challenge to a local political system dominated by predatory alliances. 
Even though the working class can organise large demonstrations to put forward 
(mainly wage-related) demands, local elites are able to handle these without great 
difficulty, including by recruiting local labour union leaders and thereby 





The strong political tendency to repress the labour movement in East 
Javais also explained by Hadiz (2010: 156). Hadiz quotesLutfilah Masduki, the Head 
of the PKBsatgas (party task force), who expressed concern about the radicalisation 
and politicisation of labour movements in East Java. According to Masduki, labour 
demonstrations would createbroader social and political controversies which could 
encourage the emergence of leftist political forces in Indonesia. 
 The effect of local political patronage networks is to subjugate journalists and 
social activists,and weaken the capacity of civil society to constrain predatory power. 
According to Nordholt (2013: 240),such patronage networksdiminish the possibilty of 
a strong and relatively autonomous civil society; and produce unequal dependent 
relationships,such as between patrons and clients. 
3.4. Academics, Fraudulent Strategy and Utilisation of the Neo-Institutional 
Discourse 
As mentioned in the previous section, East Java local elections are characterised by 
questionable activities including vote buying, illegal donations, misuse of public 
resources and authority, and the dominance of predatory power alliances whichcontrol 
and subjugate various social agents of civil society,including journalists and social 
activists. This provides the context for the contributing influence of intellectuals on 
local elections. The present section now elaborates on the various kinds of 
contributionsthat intellectuals make; many of which help to legitimise practices 
strongly deviating from the ideals of good governance that the intellectuals are keen 
to underline in their own discourse. It is shown that intellectuals are also frequently 
involved in practices that facilitate vote buying,and other activities that are 
particularly dubious from the point of view of good governance reform. 
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 There are many prominent East Java intellectuals who participate in the 
production of widespreadconsent to local election processes. They have argued in 
favour of the advantage of direct local election processes to advance democratisation; 
and tend to ignore unsavoury practices, especially with regard to money politics. 
Academic Priyatmoko Didjosuseno (2007: 118-19), for example,argues that direct 
local elections could be a medium for collective political education — both for 
politicians and for citizens, which might enhance the capacities of both to adapt to 
democratic reform. Among such lessons to be learned are those pertaining to the 
supremacy of law. Having learned such lessons, Didjosuseno suggests that political 
elites would come to respect the rule of law and refrain from abuse of power and 
position; and would learn to upgrade their skills and social knowledge, in order to 
advance their political capacities. Additionally, citizens would also benefit from civic 
education, which would contribute to the creation ofa more democratic political 
culture. 
 Similarattempts to legitimiseand highlight the benefits of local elections – as 
they are currentlyheld – have been made by other East Java-based authors writing on 
local elections and good governance. Bagong Suyanto, a lecturer in the Sociology 
Department at the University of Airlangga, points out that direct local elections can 
stimulate constructive processes for the implementation of good governance 
(Suyantoet al, 2007: 18-19). Suyanto et al.(2007) also state that the 
institutionalisation of direct local elections would fit with four key orientations or 
aims of good governance. The first of these are the procedural aims related to the rule 
of law. Second are the managerial aims; related to the capacities of both politicians 
and the local elections apparatus to optimise results effectively. Third are the market 
competition aims; related to the capacities of politicians to compete with each other in 
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the processes of local democracy. Fourth are the social networks created to negotiate  
various interests among social actors toward the common good. However, it should be 
noted that although these arguments were produced before the 2008 gubernatorial 
election, they comprise part of the intellectuals’ contributionsto the advance of 
predatory power alliances, and can be framed as such.In a nutshell, these arguments 
emphasise the promise of good governance reform while ignoring barriers to its 
realisation;arguably as part of the strategy of these same intellectuals to participate in 
the maintenance of the predatory alliances through neo-institutional discourse. 
 The intellectuals’ use of Neo-Institutionalist discourse has involved 
interpreting in a positive light the political leaders’ communicationswith social 
activists, journalists andthe bureaucratic apparatus;including promotingthese efforts 
as examples of participatory democracy, and responsive leadership,aimed 
ataddressing the aspirations of the grassroots in East Java province. For instance, Dr. 
Hary Wahyudi (2012: 104-20)responded to public rumours regarding the political co-
optation of the bureaucracy to facilitate vote buying during the 2008 local election, by 
arguing that the Soekarwo team promoted the practice of participatory democracy in 
order to win the hearts and minds of people. As a part of the East Java elite 
bureaucracy, Soekarwo realised that the relationship between the local elites and 
people could not be maintained through the old-style non-participatory approach, 
whichhas tended to produce a lack of responsiveness from the bureaucracy to 
people’s needs. Therefore Soekarwo, as East Java regional secretary, created a new 
participatory approach,which included establishing relationships with academics 
(such as FIS and the intellectual group called Pelo Pendem, in order to back up his 
candidacy during the gubernatorial election);and relationshiops with social activists, 
by creating a group called Volunteers for Countering Poverty (Relawan Peduli 
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Kemiskinan). He also developed good relationships with East Java village 
government officials, and created the Alliance of Village Chiefs (Aliansi Kepala 
Desa). 
 For Wahyudi (2012: 72), therefore, good relations between Soekarwo and 
various elements of civil society and state apparatus were part of an effort to develop 
bureaucratic responsiveness to the demands of the people. Wahyudiinterpreted 
Soekarwo’s initiatives,including his attemptsto build good relationships and social 
institutions in collaboration withgroups of activists,the bureaucratic apparatusand 
academics,within the terms of the good governance discourse. 
 Wahyudi’s adoption of a neo-institutionalist interpretation and 
argument,whichconfers on Soekarwo bothparticipatory democracy and responsive 
leadership,was reproduced by Aribowo, a politics lecturer at Airlannga University, in 
order to legitimise the victory of the Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf pair in the 2013 East 
Java local election. As Aribowo (2013)himself states, the success of Soekarwo and 
Saifullah Yusuf in the 2013 gubernatorial election was the result of their 
innovativeuse of the participatory approach in East Java governance processes. 
Besides achieving economic growth rates of 7.3%, Soekarwodisplayedgood political 
communication, according to Aribowo, by conducting a deliberative-processes 




 Wahyudi’s and Aribowo’s interpretations of Soekarwo’s initiatives accord 
with the concept of Neo-Institutionalism as discussed by Graham Smith (2003) and 
Russel Dalton (2004) These theorists explainthe importance of institutional 
mechanisms such as consultative innovation, co-governance innovation and societal 
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Wins Again in East Java Election), Tempo.co. August 30, 2013. 
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institution innovation,to articulate the demands of the public within the process of 
governance. Someof Soekarwo’s political initiatives as they are elaborated can be 
interpreted as effortsby himto address the public discontent in formal political 
processes. 
 However, these analyses of Soekarwo’s policies and practices by 
Dirdjosoesoeno (2007), Suyatno (2007), Wahyudi (2012) and Aribowo (2013) all 
tend to ignore the co-optation process based on material incentives, as well as the 
utilisation of bureaucratic resources and authority as part of a concerted effort to 
strengthen existing predatory alliances. Instead of innovative experiments based on 
the ideas of good governance, Soekarwo’s initiatives to develop support from within 
civil society rely on the utilisation of state resources and authority. 
 At this time, the production of academic knowledge in order to serve the 
interests of predatory alliances in local elections was also taking place through the 
creation of legal academic opinions. Oddly, some of the legal arguments produced to 
legitimise electoral manipulation were not created by legal scholars but by sociology 
and political experts. Most prominent among these were LN and EP,II,andIFT —all 
of whom are prominent social scientistsin major East Java universities and legal 
experts. Their task at the time was to undermine the accusations of electoral fraud 
which were being levelled by the rival pair of candidates running againstSoekarwo 
and his running partner, Saifullah Yusuf. It should be mentioned here that Soekarwo 
had been declared the winner of the 2008 gubernatorial election, but that the 
Constitutional Court had jeopardised this victory by ruling in favour of a request by 
the rival pair, Khofifah Indar Parawansa and Mudjiono, for a repeat election, due to 
widespread indications of electoral irregularities. 
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 One of the political science academics who voiced an opinion was II, who 
argued that the Constitutional Court’s decision to grant Khofifah-Mudjiono’s demand 
for a repeat election (in districts where results had been particularly controversial)was 
a negative development for Indonesian democracy. He argued that the Constitutional 
Court’s granting ofa request for a repeat election set a bad precedent.II raised 
concerns that similar requests might be made following the then-forthcoming 2009 
Presidential Election. II also claimed that the Constitutional Court’s decision to 
declare a repeat election in Madura could be interpreted as an insult to the Madura 
people, because the court ignored their aspirations.
70
This view was reinforced by 
political sociologist ET (2008), who stated that the Constitutional Court committed a 
dangerous error by effectively applying the practice of Common Law to Civil Law. In 
Civil Law, said ET, judges only assess problems on the basis of existing legislation — 
‘Justice will only confirm the existing law’ – while in Common Law, judges use their 
own judgement to create legal precedent beyond existing laws. Such legal precedent 
was effectively created by the Court when it granted the request for a partial repeat 
election; and, so the argument went, one day this could dramatically affect the make-
up of the Indonesian legal system.
71
 After repeat elections were held in the districts of 
Bangkalan and Sampang and the vote recounted in Pamekasan, however, the result 
still showed the Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf team winning by a very slight margin 
(Hasan, 2010: 161).  
 The legal arguments put forward by academics to legitimise the position and 
power of the Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf team during the 2008 local election, as 
described above, were reproduced in the 2013 East Java gubernatorial local election. 
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2008. 
 
71 See IDDaily.net, ‘ Kasus Pilkada Jawa Timur Adalah Preseden Buruk di Pilpres 2009’ (The East 
Jawa Local Election is The Bad Precendent for 2009 Presidential Election), December 12, 2008.   
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When the East Java Electoral Commission decided to annul the Khofifah-Herman 
gubernatorial bid in 2013, citing concerns over the pair’s fulfilment of formal 
candidacy requirements, the Honorary Election Council (Dewan Kehormatan 
Penyelenggaraan Pemilu) investigated and decided to annul this termination. In 
response, one intellectual and Soekarwo ally, Martono S. H. (lecturer inConstitutional 
Law, University of Surabaya), claimed that the Council’s decision violated formal 
legal procedure. According to Martono, the Council did not have the authority to 
intervene in the Commision’s decision, and the Commission has acted properly in 
their decision to annul the Khofifah-Herman pair.
72
 
 The utilisation of legal arguments by East Java academics creates the 
impression of rule of law, if not an electoral system governed by regularised practices 
and institutions. However, the problem is that these arguments tend to ignore the 
widespread practices of money politics and misuse of the state bureaucracy for the 
sake of winning elections. A furtherproblem is that intellectuals have themselves 
become increasingly involved in such practices. 
 Based on evidence from local elections in East Java, intellectuals acting as 
political consultants and opinion makershave also clearly entered the vortex of large-
scale money politics, by designing and implementing unsavoury electoral strategies 
for their respective candidates. Further, the 2008 East Java elections and 2010 
Surabaya elections show that political consultants, drawn from the local community 
of intellectuals and academics, have taken part in predatory political activities by 
designing and implementing political strategies that include such extreme measures as 
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BG, an experienced local researcher, recounts that political consultants 
hired by the KarSa pair, such as NB, a renowned consultant, have admitted that 
money obtained from TC was used to manipulate the Election Commission’s vote 
count at the village level in various East Java districts. As mentioned earlier, BG was 
also the key figure who made the deal with TC possible in the first place. 
 Some political consulting agencies appear to have been more directly involved 
than others in implementing dubious electoral campaign practices, including 
organising vote-buying activities in the 2008 East Java gubernatorial election. For 
example, BG  is known to have advised the KarSa pair to disseminate the idea that 
Muslims were prohibited by religious doctrine from electing a female leader.
74
 The 
strategy recommended by him was to distribute pamphlets in which one pair of 
candidates (Khofifah-Mujiono) is shown standing below a picture of Jesus Christ. 
Since East Java is primarily Muslim, this strategy was clearly aimed at reducing 
Muslim support for the Khofifah-Mujiono team. Even more concerningly, he is also 
alleged to have designed a vote-buying strategy that involved a survey to determine 
the susceptibility of the local electorate to bribery. Having established certain levels 
of susceptibility, the consulting agency then allegedly organised a number of 
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 Interview with BG Surabaya, May 4, 2013). 
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Interview with BG Surabaya May 4, 2013). When confirmation was sought from NB, he did not 
refute the possibility of using such strategies, confirming that when all conventional political strategies 
had been implemented and the supported candidates still risked election loss, then the only way was to 
use a strategy of money politics as the solution. The interview with NB took place in Surabaya, 




 There were also indications that the East Java academics who joined the 
Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf winning team were involved in controversial campaign 
activities to influence voting results on the island of Madura; where repeat elections 
took place on the order of the Constitutional Court. In one or example, after the 
decision of the Constitutional Court was announced, a pro-KarSa team led by senior 
academic IT arranged a meeting at the Shangri-la Hotel in Surabaya with a number of 
Madurese village heads and religious scholars, in order to prepare for the anticipated 
second round of voting. These meetings are reported to have produced an agreement 
that any village headwho supported the KarSa pair would get livestock, such as goats 
or cattle, depending on the decisiveness of the victory in each village. Soekarwo’s 
team is also rumoured to have offered Rp. 2 to 5 million to village religious preachers, 
depending on their perceived influence on the masses.
76
 
 The involvement of local intellectuals in such dubious electoral activities was 
demonstrated particularly clearly in the role played by  IT— a leading figure inthe 
Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf team of political consultants. In this role, IT coined the 
term and practice of ‘upgrading’ and ‘downgrading’ the vote tally in specific electoral 
districts. In places where the Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf pair did not do well, he 
allegedly advised the KarSa team to strike a deal with the local election apparatus and 
election monitoring institution (Bawaslu) to ‘upgrade’ the KarSa vote. He was also 
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Interviews with ZX, April 14, 2013. IT denied he did this; although, according to NB (Surabaya, 
October 12, 2012), another political consultant for the KarSa pair, the candidates’ team would do 




 That academics would play so direct a role in controversies surrounding the 
results of an election is not surprising, given that their roles in Indonesian democracy 
go well beyond political analysis and commentating. In the course of the evolution of 
local electoral politics in post-authoritarian Indonesia, many academics have come to 
serve as members of semi-official ‘success teams’ for those running for public office. 
These teams are responsible for a range of tasks, from charting strategy, to brokering 
deals and influencing public opinion by making statements in the media. 
 It is notable that the involvement of intellectuals in the East Java and Surabaya 
local elections, and their strategic employment of good governance discourse, have 
had a legitimising effect for the predatory alliances that have captured Indonesia’s 
institutions of democracy through questionable practices. One of the major roles of 
intellectuals in this context has been to deflect public attention from the quite 
fundamental issue of systemic electoral fraud and manipulation, to matters of strictly 
legal and procedural concern. But, as we have seen, this is not their only contribution 
to the continuing ascendancy of predatory alliances in Indonesian local politics, 
including in East Java. 
 It may be said that the role of intellectuals in local electoral politics in 
Indonesia today is reminiscent of Antonio Gramsci’s thesis regarding organic 
intellectuals, as presented in his Prison Notebooks. Gramsci (1971) famously argued 
that intellectuals are not free from the key social struggles that define their societies. 
Indonesia’s intellectuals operate in the context of a money politics-driven democracy, 
in which different coalitions of predatory elites contend with each other for control 
over public institutions and resources. The case of East Java has not been exceptional 
in this sense, although the economic stakes are relatively high here, given the size and 
economic importance of the province. The East Java caseshows strong ongoing links 
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between the activities of key groups of intelligentsia and dominant predatory 
alliances. Of course, the collaboration between intellectuals and local predatory 
politico-business alliances also takes place at the national political level. Thus, 
Sukardi Rinakit, a senior researcher at the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate and himself a 
well-known political consultant, suggests that there has been a strong tendency for 
Indonesian intellectuals to be ever more absorbed into the predatory logic of capital 




Important conclusions can be gathered from the above examination of the role of 
intellectuals in the East Java and Surabaya local elections. Their absorption into 
predatory local alliances activities is rooted in historical connections that were 
established during the authoritarian New Order regime. These connections have been 
a tool for the reproduction of predatory elite domination in the political as well as 
bureaucratic arenas, specifically through the utilisation of opportunities presented by 
local elections. Instead of providing institutional support for the process of political 
reform in Indonesia, as might be expected on the basis of the literature on social 
capital by Putnam and followers in the World Bank (Putnam with Leanardi & Nanetti, 
1993; Pugno & Verme, 2012), the interconnectedness of political consultants, 
academics, political elites, bureaucratic and business actors — and even the media — 
has become a barrier to the sort of reform agenda that such authors would support. 
 In fact, the role of intellectuals within predatory elite networks — as political 
consultants and sometimes as officials of the electoral apparatus itself — is very 
strategic. This role exceeds the functions mentioned by Qodari (2010) of serving as 
mere surveyors and media advisers. However, their activities have less to do with 
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liberal political reform than with the continuing domination of established elites. 
Meanwhile, the primary reason that local intellectuals connect with predatory political 
alliances can also be traced to the political economy constellation in post-authoritarian 
East Java. The social context shows that predatory power alliances have occupied 
public resources and financed their operations through illegal donations based on 
money politics.Predatory power alliances have been facilitated by local political 
elites, gangsters — and by local entrepreneurs whose business activities depend upon 
state access. Just as significant, it seems, is the establishement of links between 
intellectuals and both the mass media anda range of NGOs; both of which are also to 
be found within competing local predatory alliances. This overall state of affairs has 
hardly generated conditions for intellectuals to advance their roles as critical agents, 
since there are no strong social bases to support their activities as social reformers. 
 The absorption of East Java intellectuals into local predatory alliances reminds 
us of Richard Robison’s (1996: 84-85) analysis of the character of the middle class 
and bourgeoisie during the late period of the Indonesian New Order. Robison argues 
that the concern of most of the Indonesian middle class (including intellectuals) was 
not freedom of speech, democracy, human rights and social justice but support for 
regimes that can protect and sustain their prosperity. The dependence of today’s 
intellectuals on material benefits from elites with access to the bureaucracy and 
political and business activities makes them supporters of money politics and dubious 
electoral processes. The difference between the former era and the present is that in 
the post-authoritarian period the connection between intellectuals and political elites 
was more dispersed,while many intellectuals today would tend to gravitate toward the 
most dominant alliances, as shown in the case of East Java. 
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 The next chapter discusses the relationship between these academics and 
experts and the actual practice of governance at the local level. It is demonstrated that 
intellectuals have provided other kinds of support for dominant local politico-business 
interests, outside of the electoral process per se, ironically in the name of pursuing 











Intellectuals and Predatory Power 
in Local Governance Processes 
 
5.1.Introduction 
The present chapter discusses the relationship between East Java and Surabaya 
intellectuals and the actual practice of local governance, and effectively, the 
distribution of its spoils.
79
 It explains how the contribution of intellectuals as social 
agents in the concrete implementation of ‘good governance’ agendas in East Java and 
Surabaya in the post-authoritarian era has again tended to reinforce the social position 
of dominant local politico-business interests. The chapter builds on the prior 
elaboration on the role of consultants and academics in local politics, as social agents 
who possess authority on the basis of claims to scientific knowledge and impartiality. 
However, the focus now shifts from local elections to the part they play in local 
governance, including through programs that borrow heavily in their 
conceptualisation from the stated objectives and terminology of good governance 
reform. 
 It should be recalled that despite the collapse of Soeharto’s authoritarian rule, 
as shown by Hadiz (2004; 2007) the processes of democratic reform and decentralised 
institution building appear to have reproduced the same system of politico-business 
alliances in contemporary Indonesia, albeit more diffuse and decentralised. However, 
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the research by Hadiz and others has not elaborated on the role of intellectuals in 
extending the reach of dominant predatory alliances into the civil society arena, which 
was alluded to in the previous chapter. This aspect of the problem is especially 
overlooked in the Neo-Institutionalist approach towards local governance reform as 
advanced by technocratic intellectuals; an approach which omits the question of 
continual plunder of tangible resources — albeit often through the good governance 
reforms that are supposed to impede these same practices. In fact, Neo-Institutionalist 
solutions promoted by technocratic intellectuals tend to help legitimise the continuing 
dominance of predatory interests, by providing the appearance of governance on the 
basis of rational scientific knowledge. As in electoral processes, moreover, 
technocratic intellectuals often have roles beyond providing advice to political elites, 
since they are also involved in the process of private accumulation through control 
over public resources well beyond the phase of electoral politics. 
 As underlined in earlier chapters, the problems of social reform in post-
authoritarian Indonesia are in fact related to the lack of sufficient social bases to 
forcefully advance good governance agendas. Such circumstances force intellectuals 
to engage in political collaboration with the dominant predatory alliances, in order to 
secure their own social and material conditions and interests. This chapter shows that 
many of East Java’s intellectuals undertaking such collaboration have tried to 
reconcile the extension of the market into all spheres of social life with progressive 
policy agendas — such as support for participatory democracy — as a way to 
empower citizenries with solutions to overcome the problem of structural poverty. 
Such reform agendas are based on ideas of partnership between government, business, 
unions and civil society organisations, to face the dual challenge of market extension 
and maintaining social solidarity (Nelson and Zadek, 2000; Davies, 2011). However, 
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the overarching collaboration between the state, the private sector and civil society 
has resulted in the expropriation of public resources, rather than accomplishing the 
aims of governance agendas centred on transparency, public accountability and public 
participation. 
 In short, the social networks that connect intellectuals to bureaucrats, political 
elites, business actors and civil society organisations create knowledge that supports 
governance on the basis of predatory politics, rather than on the neo-liberal ideal. In 
spite of this, contestation over the spoils of governance does take place with some 
academics and intellectuals supporting non-elite reformist interests. Nevertheless, 
such reformist aspirations, especially in the East Java and Surabaya context, continue 
to be sidelined within the existing framework of power. 
 In other words, intellectuals that attain social mobility tend to be those with 
more direct access to power and tangible resources. As such, this chapter provides 
examples of predatory power operations supported by intellectuals — especially 
through the development programs of local governments in East Java. These include: 
the manipulation of social assistance for very poor households; a project  enhancing 
agricultural markets; and the mismanagement of local budgets in order to maximise 
rent-seeking opportunities. 
 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that intellectuals continue to enjoy a significant 
degree of public respect. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, there is the New 
Order-rooted tradition of exalting the role of the technocratic experts, as supposedly 
being ‘above’ particularistic interests (Hadiz and  Dhakidae, 2005: 9-10). Secondly, 
there is a more general but well-ingrained idea that education is the ticket to social 
advancement, thereby ensuring public respect for intellectuals and experts who are 
highly educated. Because of such respect accorded to them, academics are well 
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positioned to provide intellectual legitimacy for practices that are presented as being 
for the ‘common good’ or for ‘society at large’, but which actually form part of elite 
strategies to maintain their social ascendancy.  
 The following section discusses the role of East Java academics in developing 
pro-poor, accountable and participatory development policies. It shows that there is a 
big gap between the stated ideals of these pro-poor and participatory development 
governance agendas and the reality of their appropriation by predatory interests.  
Secondly, and more specifically, the section elaborates on collaboration between 
intellectuals and predatory power alliances that appropriate social assistance programs 
for the sake of local power struggles. Thirdly, it reveals how local development 
programs, in which intellectuals participate in the design or implementation, have 
actually contributed to sustaining the existing local political order rather than 
reforming it. Fourthly, it covers the interconnection between intellectuals’ material 
incentives and the local development program, on behalf of the political elite’s 
ambitions. 
5.2.The Role of Intellectuals: Producing Consent without Coercion 
Collaboration between intellectuals and local elites produces consequences that are 
intended for local governance in East Java and Surabaya from the point of view of 
good governance literature. This collaboration sustains interests that are 
fundamentally opposed to good governance — instead of advancing the necessary 
regulatory framework with the potential to blend societal interests into market 
processes. Such a contradiction reminds us of David Harvey’s (2005) point that, in 
most cases, there is a big gap between the ideology of neo-liberalism and the political 
project of the same name. The more pertinent related point, however, is that this gap 
does allow some distortion which is nonetheless consistent with expressions of neo-
170 
 
liberal ideology. There is enough room, therefore, for Indonesian academics to 
promote neo-liberal reform while assisting in the practice of local governance but 
actually being engaged in predatory politics. 
 Soeharto utilised coercive power in the New Order era to achieve the political 
submission of civil society. For instance, communist stigmatisation was used by the 
East Java Governor Muhammad Noer (1967-76), to intimidate people who did not 
contribute toward the mobilisation effort driven by the state for the purpose of 
development (Siahaan & Purnomo, 1997: 71-72). However, the more recent 
democratisation and decentralisation era has created a new and greater need for 
governing political elites to attain a degree of public legitimacy independent of the 
coercive capacities of the state. 
 The consolidation of the power of local political elites in the democratisation 
era demands support, not just during elections, but also in the form of local 
parliamentary approval for local government policies. From this point of view, 
mobilising local academics and experts is useful to provide local governments with 
the aura of technocratic competence, seemingly above the fray of regular 
parliamentary skirmishes. It is true that such intellectuals were already co-opted into 
working with powerful groups at the local level during the New Order. Yet, while 
technocrats in the Soeharto era were insulated from public scrutiny by coercive 
power, they now have to participate in governments that win and maintain power 
through electoral processes and disbursing local parliamentary favour. In short, the 
collapse of the authoritarian state has transformed and widened the scope of functions 
carried out by intellectuals in local governance. Many have become directly involved 




 The manner in which East Java’s intellectuals have been utilised by 
established politico-business networks is exemplified by the case of the Social Aid 
Program that formed part of Governor Soekarwo’s 2009-14 Regional Plan and was 
dubbed ‘Jalin Kesra’ (Towards People’s Prosperity). After Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf 
took power through the 2008 East Java gubernatorial election, the province’s 
intellectuals helped to design the 2009-2014 East Java Middle Phase Development 
Plan (RPJMD 2009-2013). In order to garner strong academic legitimacy for the local 
development program, the Regional Research Council (DRD) was created by 
Governor Soekarwo to facilitate collaboration with academics. This institution was 
led by a sociology professor from the University of Airlangga, Hotman Siahaan.
80
 
Siahaan was only one among many prominenent East Java academics invited by 
Soekarwo as development consultants to assist his development program, as the DRD 
effectively institutionalised collaboration between intellectuals and the provincial 
bureaucracy. The Governor also appointed his political consultant, Professor Dr Nur 
Sjam, to the DRD.
81
 
 During his first term, Governor Soekarwo’s team of scholars produced a 
‘development vision’, which latched onto ideas of depoliticised governance and 
technocratic policy. At the same time, they focused on poverty reduction, based on 
the ideal of people’s rights and the implementation of technologies that are useful for 
improving living conditions. The development program was even dubbed 
‘Karwonomics’. What it represented was essentially a localised implementation of the 
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concern of the Post-Washington Consensus, to reconcile the free market imperative 
and public participation in regional development. Firstly, it put forward a government 
incentive policy to accelerate economic growth and investment through facilitating 
licencing, and guarantees on security and property rights, as well as the availability of 
electric power and a conducive labour market. Secondly, it put forward the idea that 
the state had a central role in providing infrastructure for development. Thirdly, it 
suggested that the state would contribute to the extension of the market into social 
life, by facilitating people’s access to credit. Fourthly, it declared that the state would 
produce strong institutions to govern market development in East Java (Wahyudi, 
2012: 150-51). 
 According to Siahaan (2012: 124), the plan was based on the ideals of people-
centered development and participatory development. He argued that it was focused 
on poverty reduction, job provision and pro-environment and pro-gender equality 
policies. The attraction of ‘people-centred development’ has a long history; at first it 
was a benign label to indicate dissatisfaction with New Order economic policies, 
which NGO activists often considered to be ‘top-down’. The label thus meant the 
promotion of control over resources by communities to use for their own needs — an 
idea that is closely related to notions of sustainable development (Korten&Klauss 
1984:  341-52).  
 The Council’s main role was to conduct social research that was supportive of 
the provincial government's programs. For this purpose, the DRD created the main 
research themes that became priorities in East Java’s development. These were: 1) 
poverty reduction; 2) agricultural revitalisation; 3) social infrastructure; 4) 
environment; 5) co-operative and small and middle entreprise; 6) investment, non-oil 
and gas export and tourism; 7) bureaucratic and public services reform; 8) social 
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harmony, and (9) social and economic effects of the Lapindo mudflow disaster. 
Regarding poverty reduction, the DRD focussed specifically on such issues as free 
education for poor citizens, the development of anti-corruption values, and the 
promotion of Islamic as well as of nationalist values. Further, the DRD contributed to 
promoting Jalin Kesra by creating a Regional Research Agenda (ARD) (East Java 
Regional Research Council, 2011: 4-5). However, collaboration between the local 
state apparatus and academics which was institutionalised through ARD (2011-14) 
became embedded in predatory alliances, dominated by political and business groups 
that had supported Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf in the 2008 East Java gubernatorial 
election. 
 This governance program reflected the new development agenda — ostensibly 
characterised by people-centredness, participatory democracy and sustainable 
development. As noted by Siahaan (2012), the practice of governance should be based 
on the democratic principle that places people as active subjects in the development 
process. The role of government is to become facilitator, mediator, co-ordinator, 
educator and provider of a supporting sytem that embraces civil society actors as 
partners in development. Thus, the role of NGOs is held to be crucial, especially in 
facilitating connections with the poor (Siahaan, 2012: 128-29). 
 According to Siahaan (2012: 125), furthermore, the East Java Government 
undertook three actions to address the problem of poverty. Firstly, the short-term 
action was to rescue very poor households from the impact of fuel subsidy 
adjustments. This rescue action was conducted through the Program Aksi Mengatasi 
Dampak Kenaikan BBM dan Kemiskinan (PAM-DKB — Action Program to 
Overcome the Effects of Fuel Price Increases). Secondly, the East Java Government 
undertook recovery action as a long term program, in order to reduce poverty 
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problems. This program was conducted through institution building and by 
empowering the village economic infrastructure. It was directed through such 
initiatives as the Integrated Movement Towards Poverty Alleviation (Gerdu-Taskin), 
and the Program of Regional Economics Development.
82
 Thirdly, the establishment 
of the Poverty Alleviation Program was meant to empower people by strengthening 
social capital through a micro-credit program. 
 According to the East Java Society Empowerment Agency (Bapemas), the 
number of poor households in the province was 3,079,822 (2011), consisting of 
493,004 (sixteen per cent) very poor households, 1,256,122 (forty-one per cent) poor 
households, and 1,330,696 ‘near poor’ households. Nevertheless, up to 2008, East 
Java’s very poor households were not yet the specific targets of the poverty reduction 
program. Rather, the program ignored differences in levels of poverty. The result was 
that poverty was treated without accounting for the very different needs of households 
on different rungs of the poverty ladder. Realising this problem, a poverty alleviation 




 Meanwhile, both the poverty alleviation program and extension of the market 
economy into the social sphere were core parts of the vision of Soekarwo’s East Java 
administration. These were meant to be realised through the implementation of good 
governance agendas, according to an academic who has worked as an East Java 
development consultant, Airlangga University lecturer Dirdjosuseno (2007: 120-21). 
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This expert suggests that the ideas of good governance provide the best model to 
reconcile the competing tendencies of free markets versus economic planning, and 
private versus public good. In his view, the good governance agenda offers an anti-
political formula that can transcend these contradictory tendencies. However, 
academics such as Dirdjosuseno overlook the constraints imposed by the specific 
power constellation in East Java. Actual practice shows that these good governance 
ideas can be utilised to manipulate local budgets and development programs for 
powerful private interests. 
 To reiterate, the actual practice of good governance in East Java facilitates 
rather than prevents the expropriation of public resources by local politico-business 
network alliances. Thus, we elaborate on the capacity of local businessman La Nyalla 
Mattaliti, the head of the famous gangster/youth organisation, Pemuda Pancasila, and 
simultaneously the Head of the East Java Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(KADIN), to control both local development as well as local authorities in East Java. 
 Mattaliti’s close connection with Soekarwo provided him with greater control 
of local governance, such that he was able to influence East Java business activities 
and the distribution of the local budget. This was seen in the Soekarwo policy that all 
East Java businesses should register and pay financial contributions to the local 
branch of KADIN.
84
 The implementation of this local regulation provided La Nyalla 
Mattalitti with the opportunity to collect rent from East Java entrepreneurs, and to 
exercise authority over them due to his position in the business association. The great 
authority obtained from the Governor undoubtedly provided opportunities to advance 
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his own diverse business interests.
85
 Mattalitti even had influence over the East Java 





 obtaining Mattalitti’s approval remains necessary for many 
businesses that intend to be involved in these projects. Not surprisingly, Mattalitti has 
inisted that the implementation of this KADIN regulation brings benefits to local 
business actors because it allows for co-ordination among East Java businesses. 
 The strong influence of Mattalitti in the distribution of the local budget can be 
seen in Governor Soekarwo’s policy of granting twenty billion rupiah (US$ 2 million) 
to KADIN from the regional budget’s allocation for social aid in the 2012-2013. As 
mentioned above, this part of the budget is meant for distribution to poor people, 
rather than to East Java’s local entrepreneurs (Suara Surabaya, September 16, 
2014).
88
 This governor’s decision was challenged by some East Java NGO activists, 
who were concerned about monitoring the local budget. As Nasiruddin (Co-ordinator 
of the NGO alliance in East Java) insists, the provincial government neededto explain  
how social aid is relevant to KADIN. He also states that the Governor’s policyof 
taking funds that were meant to assist poor people and allocating them instead to 
entrepreneur associations such as KADIN was irrational (Jurnal3.com, September 16, 
2014). The East Java KADIN case is a good example of how the actual 
implementation of good governance agendas, framed by local academics and 
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 Personal communication with East Java entrepreneur TX, February 19, 2015 suggests that, due to 
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88 See ‘LSM Pertanyakan Pemberian Dana Hibah Untuk Kadin Jatim’ (NGO Asked the Social 
Assistance grant toward East Java Chambers of Commerce and Industry). Suara Surabaya, 
September 16, 2014,  
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technocrats, can be easily manipulated by local power alliances without much 
transparency and accountability. 
 East Java provides other examples of the expropriation of the local budget by 
dominant politico-business alliances. One is the case of the Puspa Agro (Agricultural 
Modern Market Center) in Jemundo, Sidoarjo, which was built on an area of around 
50 hectares. While originally a part of previous East Java Governor Imam Oetomo’s 
agricultural wholesale market program, local regulation No.14/2005 enabled it to be 
developed by PT Jatim Graha Utama, (a local state-owned enterprise), headed by Ir 
Erlangga Satriagung, a property entrepreneur and the head of the East Java Indonesian 
Real Estate Association. Subsequently, local regulation number 13/2008 granted PT 
JGU the authority to manage the land to develop Puspa Agro, which was intended to 
be the biggest and most complete wholesale market in Indonesia, integrating various 
agricultural products in one area. 
 There are several good reasons why such a wholesale market should be built 
in East Java. The first is the abundance of food production and horticulture in East 
Java; as indicated by the fact that East Java is able to supply food and horticultural 
products of up to around thirty-five per cent of the national stock. Second, there are 
still only limited opportunities for the sale of food produced by East Java’s peasants. 
Third, there are broad opportunities to increase agricultural yields into regional, 
national and international spheres (exports).
89
 
 However, the implementation of the Puspa Agro project appears to have 
provided another way for businesses and politicians to plunder the local budget. As 
noted above, the Puspa Agro wholesale market is managed by P.T. Jatim Graha 
Utama. The Surabaya Pagi daily (August 12, 2012) reports that Puspa Agro had cost 
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the East Java budget around Rp. 450 billion (AUD 45 million) up to 2012. However, 
after five years of operations up to 2012, PT Jatim Graha Utama (JGU)only provided 
revenue of Rp. 2 billion (AUD 200,000).
90
 According to East Java legislator Badrut 
Tamam, the East Java parliament never received a financial report from P.T. JGU 
concerning its management of the Puspa Agro project. The implication is clearly that 
P.T. JGU provided a means through which the local budget could be expropriated, in 
this case possibly as a source of capital for powerful individuals in the lucrative 
property business .
91
 The case of Puspa Agro management offers an example of how 
the same kinds of social interests that were dominant in the Soeharto era are still 
pervasive in East Java, in spite of democratisation and decentralisation. It also shows 
how a project meant to extend the workings of the market across society, in this 
instance by more fully incorporating small scale enterprises, can be taken over by 
these same interests. 
 Yet the Puspo Agro case is not a particularly widely known example of abuse 
of power, notwithstanding the controversy it has courted. Indeed, allegations abound 
about how money has flowed to strategic actors in civil society, such as activists and 
journalists who had been previously critical of this project.
92
 Still, Professor Hotman 
Siahaan
93
 suggests that Puspa Agro case was less an exampleof abuse of power for 
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 As the Head of the East Java Regional Research Council (based on East Java Governor’s Decision 
number 188/327/KPTS/013/2010 on the appointment of Regional Research Council members), 
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private financial gain than of a lack of communication between government and 
people. This problem of communication should be rectified, he suggests, by 
establishing a branch office in every region, to convey the importance and urgency of 
the project to the people.
94
 In making such a statement, Siahaan is effectively 
conceding that the role of intellectuals is to disseminate knowledge of good 
governance in ways that lend legitimacy to the policies of local power holders. 
 The East Java post-authoritarian experience yet again reveals the gap between 
good governance and participatory development ideals and their implementation as 
part of governance processes. The practices of governance in East Java in fact show 
similarities with those found at the national level. This is because, as mentioned by 
Robison and Rosser (2000: 190-192), the transition to free markets and democracy are 
not technical matters that can be overcome by reform agendas and institution 
building. The problem with Indonesia at the national and local levels is with the 
illiberal interests that are manifested in the politico-business alliances that dominate 
the bureaucracy and other political institutions. 
 Having explained the contradiction between the pro-poor, participatory 
development character of regional development planning and the practices of 
governance at the regional level, the next section elaborates specifically on how the 
social assistance program, as a fundamental part of regional development, can be 
utilised by predatory alliances to consolidate their local power and promote their own 
private interests. 
                                                                                                                                           
Professor Hotman Siahaan and his institution has an obligation to assess local development projects in 
East Java, such as the Puspa Agro market project. 
 
94 See ‘Puspa Agro Harus Punya Perwakilan di tiap Daerah’ (Puspa Agro Should have branch in 
every region). Lensa Indonesia, April 17, 2013. 
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5.3.Appropriating Social Assistance to Consolidate Local Power 
It is now appropriate to examine how the social aid program to assist East Java’s 
‘very poor’ households has been appropriated to defend the dominant power interests 
in East Java post-authoritarianism. At the same time, the program has also been 
incorporated into the political struggles among local elites. 
 The design of the social aid program, as a derivation of Jalin Kesra (Towards 
People’s Prosperity) for very poor households, took place with the assistance of East 
Java’s university lecturers and researchers who were selected by the East Java 
Province Work Units (SKPD).
95
 The program was initiated by the East Java 
government, with the stated aim of overcoming the problem of poverty in East Java, 
based on East Java Governor Regulation 56/2011, as the general guidelines 
implementation of the Jalin Kesra program. The East Java government argued that 
very poor households rarely become a priority of the government’s development 
program to alleviate poverty in the province. The Jalin Kesra East Java program was 
therefore established to concentrate on these very poor people; by considering and 
addressing the poverty issues specific to this group. This program was designed based 
on recommendations from East Java intellectuals who joined the East Java Regional 
Research Council, which collaborates with the Regional Research and Development 
Agency (Balitbangda) and with SKPD. 
 The politicisation of social aid programs by the dominant politico-business 
coalitions was achieved through collaboration between political actors in the 
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executive and legislative branches, which saw the politicisation of other social aid 
programs by dominant politico-business coalitions. This mechanism for control has 
been utilised to maintain and strengthen the political party coalition supporting 
Soekarwo. The Governor, it must be remembered, was also elected as Head of the 
East Java branch of the Democratic Party (the biggest political party in East Java from 
2009-14, with twenty-two seats out of the 100 seats in the Provincial Parliament). 
Soekarwo thus ensured strong political support for himself in the regional parliament, 
by virtue of this party position. Further, Soekarwo intended to extend his influence 
over other East Java political parties. For instance, one of Soekarwo’s strongest allies 
was Martono S. H., who was elected as head of Golkar in East Java on 28 November 
2009. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Martono was Soekarwo’s campaign manager in 
the 2008 East Java local election. He had a prominent role in collecting donations 
from businessmen on behalf of Soekarwo, and was deeply involved in campaign 
strategy. Soekarwo was also elected as Head of the 2010-14 Indonesian National 
Student Movement (GMNI) alumni association, which has a huge influence in one of 
the most prominent political parties in Indonesia, the PDIP (Quddus Salam, 2012: 84-
85). Due to his position in the GMNI, Soekarwo was able to exert influence over the 
PDIP, especially given his close connections with the head of East Java’s PDIP 
branch, H. Sirmadji. 
 The utilisation of regional social budgets has been conducted through the 
enhancement of social aid programs, which dramatically increased between 2009 and 
2013. It is suggested here that the social aid program provided members of the East 
Java legislature with the tools by which to establish localised patronage networks. 
NGO activist Abdul Quddus asserts that political party elites typically ensure the 
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participation of clients through the distribution of social aid at the grassroots level.
96
 
Further, Quddus reports that the regional legislative members were able to benefit 
directly from the social aid delivered to the community. Since the distribution process 
requires recommendations from political elites, they are able to take their own ‘cuts’ 
from any recommended amount.
97
 
 Therefore, the growth of the social aid program budget from 2010 to 2014 has 
benefited legislative elites; and East Java’s political parties more generally. In 2010, 
the East Java local budget allocated Rp. 827,326,000,000 for the Jalin Kesra aid 
program (with realisation to the amount of Rp. 730,034,000,000). The following year, 
the budget for the program was increased to Rp. 1,255,275,000,000 (the realisation of 
which was Rp. 1,220,650,000,000). In 2012 the amount increased again, to 
Rp.4,139,142,000,000 (the realisation was Rp.3,910,440,000,000), and in the 2013 
local budget, Rp. 5,065,518,000,000 was allocated. During this time, there were 
several discrepencies surrounding the timing of the realisations of the program 
budgets annually. From 2009 to 2012 the realisation was conducted in the last quarter 
of each year; but in 2013, the budget realisation for the program was conducted in the 
second quarter of the year – just before the 2013 local election. As well, the social 
assistance programwas conceived by intellectuals who served as advisors to the local 
government in the broader good governance reforms; which have become an integral 
part of the strategies employed by predatory elites to maintain their social 
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 (Details of the intellectuals’ role have been outlined at the beginning of 
the present section). 
 Such programs and budgets are not free from contestation between competing 
predatory alliance elites inside the East Java bureaucracy. Thus, the social aid budget 
co-ordinated by the East Java SKPD constitutes material resources for political elites; 
enabling them to sustain competing patronage networks and to maintain support 
bases. For instance, before Soekarwo and Saifullah Yusuf became running partners in 
the 2013 election, there was tension between the two, due to the latter’s lack of access 
to social assistance funds. Governor Soekarwo himself is believed to have controlled 
such access.
99
 The importance of social aid schemes is illustrated by the case of Jalin 
Kesra, which resulted in corruption cases in localities such as Pasuruan, Bangkalan, 
Sampang, Madiun, Kediri and Mojokerto.
100
 
 However, while local intellectuals must be aware of the problem of corruption 
in the implementation of social aid programs, as ‘experts’ they effectively shift the 
problem from issues of local politico-business network alliances, to the problem of 
institutional inadequacies. According to Siahaan, for example, the problem of 
providing social aid to very poor people is related to the Internal Affairs Minister’s 
Regulation, which decrees that public project tender processes must be handled by the 
Provincial Government, rather than by administrators at the district level. This 
regulation makes it difficult, according to Siahaan, for the Government to deliver 
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proper social aid to the people.
101
 By portraying the issue of manipulation of public 
money as a matter of institutional management, Siahaan obscures issues of power 
which enable predatory interests to be embedded in social aid programs. Other 
academics, such as Haryadi from Airlangga University, provide support for Hotman’s 
opinion. Haryardi refutes the possibility of the utilisation of social aid by the local 
power interests for their own political ends, including use during key political times 
such as in the lead up to local elections. Rather, Haryadi is on record as stating that 
since social aid is a policy which has been developed by the entire East Java 
executive, as well as its legislative branch, using accountable and transparent 
mechanisms, any accusations of politicisation of social aid for the benefits of the East 
Java dominant powers are irrelevant (Antaranews, September 11, 2013). However, 
others challenge Hotman’s claims. The head of East Java FITRA (Indonesian Forum 
for Budget Transparency), Ahmad Dahlan, has stated that civil society should be 
aware of the very real possibility of social aid manipulation, especially during key 
political moments such as local elections. Dahlan warned that the incumbent and 




 The hegemonic functions of local intellectuals in East Java’s governance 
processes are not only conducted through the production of intellectual legitimacy, 
but also by participating in organising the governance agenda itself. As 
representatives of dominant interests, intellectuals clearly perform organisational and 
connective functions in civil society. Among these functions, they enable the 
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extension of political domination by powerful groups in political society, into the civil 
society arena (Gramsci, 1979; Sassoon, 1987; Davies, 2011). 
 In one example of facilitating the reach of political power into civil society in 
East Java, local academics created the technical assistance book which acts as a 
toolkit for social assistance volunteers. This book specifies thatall vehicles and other 
forms of transport used for the distribution of social aid, as well as all banners 
advertising such aid distribution, must bear the following statement: ‘This is provided 
by Jalin Kesra social aid from the East Java Governor’. The Jalin Kesratechnical 
guidance manualalso states that social volunteers should convince recipients of aid 
that the social aid program comes from the East Java Governor, making little attempt 
to separate the person from the office. In response to the book’s directives, the logo 
and banner of Jalin Kesra –which originally stated that the social assistance comes 
from the East Java Provincial Government – were changed in 2011, to state that the 
program derives from the Governor himself. Scholars were instrumental in making 
these changes,
103
 reportedly while looking ahead to the forthcoming electoral contest 
in 2013.
104
 Indeed, emphasis on the social assistance provided by local government 
figured prominently in the electoral campaign that year. East Java NGOs have 
reported that the volunteers who disbursed the social assistance during this time — in 
the form of money to purchase the following requirements of community 
organisations and religious schools: livestock; farm equipment, and seed for catfish 
farming— did more than just target very poor households with aid. NGOs report that 
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the volunteers also encouraged aid recipients to vote for the incumbent KarSa pair.
105
 
The activities are reportedly facilitated by the process of volunteer recruitment, 
whereby politicians and bureaucrats insert their own cadres and supporters as social 
aid volunteers.
106
 Further evidence of the malfunction of the social assistance program 
can be seen from the actitivites which took place during the regional meeting of the 
East Java province apparatus at Hotel Utami Sidoarjo in (July 5, 2013). At this 
meeting, East Java provincial bureaucrats provided funds amounting to Rp. 60 million 
(AUD 6,000) to each village head and these funds were taken from the regional 
budget. While distributing the funds, the bureaucrats reportedly reminded the village 




 The appropriation of East Java’s social aid program by local elites is an 
example of how the conduct of governance, with which localintellectuals are closely 
connected, can and often does facilitate aims that diverge greatly from what is 
intended on paper. From this viewpoint, the inadequate provision of social welfare 
assistance in East Java is not just the result of technical institutional problems. It is 
also due substantially to the dominance of predatory interests in the operation of the 
province’s social aid programs. The reality of governance processes in East Java 
looks similar to the reality of decentralisation processes in many other Indonesian 
provinces.As noted by Nordholt (2012: 239), since the implementation ofregional 
autonomy, most local power holders in Indonesia have been able to build powerful 
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patron-client relationships based on their authority to manage local resources. 
Therefore, in Indonesia the processes of decentralisation and implementation of good 
governanceare more about consolidating the power and private interests of the 
regional elites and their politico-business alliances, than about strengthening civil 
society in accordance with the promises which have been given. 
 The involvement of local intellectuals in predatory elites alliances, through the 
processes of local governance, also takes place through the intellectuals’ role as 
technocratic designers of social aid programs; as has been discussed above. These 
overlapping roles of intellectuals – as both political consultants and development 
experts — ensure that they are able to construct programs that can obtain useful 
grassroots support for dominant elites. For example, the utilisation of social aid to 
consolidate the power of dominant local predatory alliances is supported by technical 
training programs, which are designed by intellectuals and academics allied to these 
local powers. Undertaking such training is supposed to acquaint volunteers with a 
code of conduct governing how they carry out their duties. However, the 2013 Jalin 
Kesra manual for volunteers does little to stem the misuse of program funds for 
political objectives, such as attaining grassroots support for office holders as 
described above (which the manual actually encourages); in spite of the veneer of 
accountability that such a publication helps to create. This is perhaps to be expected, 
given the broader context within which the program takes place. 
5.4.Local Development and Material Incentives 
This section addresses the important question of why East Java local intellectuals 
participate in development programs that are hijacked by dominant local elites. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, intellectuals tend to defend their participation in 
local governance as representing their broader commitment to the community. In this 
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way, they justifiy their acceptance of appointments by local leaders to strategic 
positions in provincial research agencies; as commisioners in local state-owned 
enterprises, or to administer provincial development projects. However, we have seen 
that their participation in predatory politics is influenced by the broader social and 
political environment in which intellectuals operate, which has tended to confine the 
options available to intellectuals, especially when taking into account their own 
interests in preserving their social status and attaining social advancement. 
As is well known, rational choice theory would expect these actors to utilise 
institutions to maximise their utility and interest. From this perspective, good 
governance reform requires social as well as material incentives to generate new 
sources of support for intellectuals (Goetz, 2007: 404; Riker, 1990: 174). However, 
the East Java provincial initiative in question should not be understood on the basis of 
rational choice assumptions operating at the level of the individual. In reality, the 
choices of East Java academics cannot be separated from the broader social context in 
which they find themselves. The academics must navigate through a system of power, 
within which the implementation of reforms against the interests of entrenched 
predatory elites would be extremely difficult. Indeed, reforms that may be intended to 
push forward a reform agenda incrementally may mutate into yet another instrument 
to sustain those interests. This reality militates against East Java intellectuals choosing 
to resist the pressures pushing them towards maintaining the interests of dominant 
local elites, over those of the local people. While this is not to declare the 
irresistibility of this dynamic, the evidence indicates that this tendency is readily 
discernible. 
Among the cases where local intellectuals have used their talents to promote 
the interests of dominant local elites, is the East Java program to disseminate and 
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socialise the new Village Government Act, which involved prominent Airlangga 
Universitylecturers. The program was conducted by a private research institute, itself 
an initiative of eight Airlangga University lecturers, but which also brought together 
other lecturers from universities across the province.
108
 Inevitably, this institute was 
closely connected to the provincial government, through persons trusted by Governor 
Soekarwo, including those who assisted with his reelection bid, such as II  and QE.
109
 
Many of these prominent local intellectuals, who were (and remain) close to the 
dominant local power, acted as mediators of this local development project conducted 
by this institute. The connection between these intellectuals and the CSWS (Center 
for Security and Welfare Studies), Faculty of Social and Political Science at 
Airlangga University, stems from the intellectuals’ roles as political consultants in the 
local elections, and from their authority in public institutions (such as the Regional 
Research Council). 
The program to socialise the Village Government Act was a significant one, 
involving village-level officials from all 38 districts of East Java, including members 
of the executive branch, village leaders (lurah-lurah) and village legislative bodies 
(Badan Perwakilan Desa). The program aimed to support village leaders to 
implement development projects, manage transparent budgets, undertake conflict 
resolution, and co-ordinate democratic leadership, as stated in Regulation 6/2014 on 
Village Government.
110
 Funding for the 3-year program — around Rp. 30 billion 
(US$ 3 million) — was allocated from the local budget.
111
 This amount of funding 
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was sufficient to pay junior academic staff, who joined the program as instructors, at 
around Rp. 8 million (US$ 800), which represented a significant supplement to their 
university salaries. In an important sense, the program can be understood as a form of 
political reward, given by the dominant local elites to East Java academics, to 
acknowledge their support in the 2013 East Java gubernatorial election. Further, 
implementation of this program only took place after lobbying by academics with 
close connections to East Java’s government.
112
 
Indeed, the program cannot be disassociated from the workings of local 
patronage politics. As stated by TB,
113
the social scientist from East Java prominent 
universities, there was a tendency to utilise this program to prepare village leaders to 
provide political support for future political campaigns. The East Java Governor and 
Vice-Governor (Soekarwo and Saifullah Yusuf respectively) regularly opened the 
training sessions and remained as participants, during which time they worked to 
garner support for future national elections (Governor Soekarwo), and forthe 
governorship bid in 2018 (Vice-Governor Saifullah Yusuf). The local intellectuals 
who facilitated these opportunities appear to have been chosen deliberately for their 
inclination to uphold the interests of the dominant local elites, rather than resisting 
this dynamic in favour of the local people’s interests. The intellectuals in this case 
seem to have embraced the underlying power dynamic willingly, in order to secure 
significant financial rewards. As mentioned earlier, this reality cannot be separated 
from the access to privileges enjoyed by East Java intellectuals, whereby the latter can 
participate in local development projects for personal gain. In the case of the program 
to socialise the Village Government Act, local intellectuals have no choice but to use 
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their connections with certain prominent intellectuals — those with direct access to 
predatory local power in East Java — if they want to obtain access to the socialisation 
project. 
But controversial cases such as these are not the exclusive domain of the 
Soekarwo Government, as the case of the P2SEM project illustrates. Before 
discussing the controversies surrounding this program, it will be important to provide 
some background. In the era of Governor Imam Oetomo, the Program Pemberdayaan 
Sosial Ekonomi Masyarakat (P2SEM — Social and Economic Society Empowerment 
Program) was implemented, geared to creating employment, building up poor 
people’s confidence, and increasing their purchasing power. The program involved 
providing financial assistance for social efforts such as building bridges, producing 
organic fertiliser and seeds, and improving farm- and village-based sanitation for poor 
inhabitants. This assistance was distributed through local NGOs, civil society groups, 
various Foundations and religious schools and was driven partly by local academics 
from state and private universities around East Java. By 2008, the program had 
distributed more than Rp. 200 billion (US$ 20 million) in funds. The recipient 
institutions were selected by the legislature; on the basis of proposals submitted by or 
on behalf of the institutions, and on the basis of recommendations by individual 
legislators.Proposals were collated by the Secretariat of the legislative branch, 
verified by regional co-ordination agencies at the district level, and forwarded to 
Bapemas (the Agency of Society Empowerment). After administrative requirements 
were met, the Governor ordered the East Java Financial Bureau to transfer funds to 
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the recipients’ bank accounts. Before such transfers, all grantees were invited to an 
orientation program, at which they were drilled about commitment to the project.
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However, several politicians, including the Head of East Java's parliament, 
K.H. Fathorrosjid, and the former Head of the Golkar parliamentary faction, 
Lambertus Wayong, became entangled in corruption allegations pertaining to the 
P2SEM project. The case has also ensnared a number of East Java academics, who 
are suspected of having misused project funds. In one example, an academic from the 
State University of Jember (UNEJ), Nuryadi, who was also head of an NGO called 
Insan Kreatif, was questioned about the use of Rp. 448,000,000 (US $44,800). His 
case involved collaboration with civil society leaders as well as local politicians.
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Similarly, Lambertus Wayong’s case involved collaboration with the Institute of 
Research and Society Services (LPPM), within the University of National 
Development-Veteran (UPN Veteran) in Surabaya. Lambertus Wayong’s case 
pertained to misuse of funds amounting to Rp. 1.9 billion (US $190 thousand), which 
were allocated to UPN so that the university could implement seven separate project 
activities. After disbursement of the funds, however, UPN received only Rp. 700 
million (US$ 70 thousand), with the remainder unaccounted for. An attorney dealing 
with the case cites an agreement between Wayong and university staff regarding ‘a 
cut’ that would be given to the former, who had recommended the university as a 
receipient of the funds.
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 Interview with former East Java head of Society Empowerment Agency, Totok Suwarto, by Tempo 
newspaper (May 25, 2009). 
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 Jatim.Vivanews.Com (February 23, 2010) ‘Mantan Ketua Fraksi Golkar Tersangka P2SEM: 
Diduga Korupsi Sekitar Rp 1,2 M’ (Ex-head of Golkar Legislative Fraction become a Suspect in 




It is well known that high ranking bureaucrats within BAPEMAS (East Java’s 
Society Empowerment Agency)
117
 have close connections with local state power 
holders. According to Fathorrosjid (Luwuraya.net, 2 January 2014), BAPEMAS is 
one of the primary institutions responsible for distributing social aid from the local 
budget; however, no bureaucrat from BAPEMAS has been implicated in this 
corruption case. This may be the result of negotiations between BAPEMAS officials 
and such institutions as the East Java courts, which, like other law enforcement 
intitutions in Indonesia, isconsidered to be widely corrupt.
118
 Even a former East Java 
Governor from the New Order era, Basofi Soedirman, is on record expressing surprise 
that law enforcement institutions have not targeted the elite intellectuals from 




These examples show that political elites prefer to develop strategic 
collaborations with their business alliances and thereby gain control over public 
resources, rather than transform society in the direction of market receptivity through 
governance reforms. Local development in East Java has become an arena wherein 
various actors, including local gangsters, domestic capitalists and academics, utilise 
their connections to expropriate the local budget for their own interests. A major role 
for intellectuals is to provide academic validity for the programs that enable this to 
take place. When academics state that the problems associated with implementation 
of development initiatives are rooted in institutional frameworks, rather than pointing 
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 The public institution under East Java Provincal Government co-ordination which is responsible for 
allocating social funds for society as a whole.  
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This was stated by Fathorrasjid during an interview in Medaeng Penitentiary in Surabaya, August 
15, 2013. The same allegation was also made by Abdul Manab, the Director of Jatim One,the NGO 
concerned with political and law enforcement issues in East Java (Jaringnews, January 2, 2014). 
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Kampus Jadi Tumbal P2SEM,  Basofi Soedirman, (The academics became scapegoat of P2SEM 
corruption case) Surya, March 3, 2010. 
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to the opaque political and economic alliances that preside over governance 
(including local budgets), these intellectuals are effectively helping to sustain the 
predatory alliances that control East Java’s democracy. Even local intellectuals’ 
efforts to reconcile the extension of the market as part of neo-liberal governance 
imperatives, and the demand to empower civil society through participatory 
democracy, have been absorbed into the logic of predatory power. Further, the 
processes behind thedisbursal of rewards to academics, for implementing certain local 
development programs have become part of the mechanism by which academics are 
absorbed into existing predatory networks. 
5.5.Conclusion 
The cases of East Java and Surabaya show that the role and function of intellectuals 
and experts in regional development do not conform with the notion of social agents 
who promote reform and good governance agendas. The critical political economy 
analysis used in this chapter to uncover the role and position of intellectuals in local 
struggles over power shows that intellectual engagement in local development 
practices has not supported the aims of good governance, such as transparency and 
the elimination of corruption. 
 In the context of decentralised democracy, the role of local academics in 
governance practices is determined by highly political conditions, such as public 
receptivity, the dynamics of political processes between the executive and legislative 
branches of governance, and the power elite’s consolidation, which requires 
acceptance by the grassroots of their political domination. These processes have 
enabled local politico-business alliances to capture tangible resources for their own 
interests. Under these social circumstances, local academics perform a significant role 
in local governance processes, but their function actually strengthens dominant 
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predatory interests, rather than advancing the ideals of good goverance agendas, such 
as transparency, accountability and anti-coruption efforts. In other words, the 
grandiose anti-political governance agendas which the intellectuals created, in an 
attempt to reconcile the imperatives of the free market and public participation, have 
only facilitated the dominance of politico-business interests, without advancing 
poverty reduction. Nor have their actions necessarily helped to extend the reach of 
neo-liberal markets into society.  
 Even though local academics are not protected by an authoritarian regime’s 
armour of coercive power, they have roles in the consolidation of predatory power 
alliances. They organise and design governance agendas, through which predatory 
elite alliances sustain their dominant position in local power. The absorption of 
progressive local academics into predatory power operations has resulted in local 
power operations directed by provincial and regional politico-business alliances. 
These alliances, in turn, make use of money politics throughout society, based on the 
alliances’ corrupted local clients. The capacity of dominant predatory powers to 
consolidate their hold on political society (in the executive and legislative branch, as 
well as in political parties), and the extension  of their power into virtually every part 
of society, via money politics operations based on social aid programs, has 
strengthened and sustained these predatory power interests. This situation has blocked 
the development of critical and progresive social forces by which intellectuals would 
be able to advance good governance agendas, such as public transparancy, social 
participation and anti-corruption programs. 
 It is clear that local intellectuals in East Java and Surabaya are situated as part 
of local predatory networks that seek to utilise the institutions of local governance and 
Neo-Institutional discourse to manipulate the governance agendas for their own 
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material gains. The function of intellectuals is significant in facilitating the 
consolidation of elite power in governance processes. Such a function involves 
influencing public opinion; organising governance agendas to enable the 
expropriation of concrete and tangible resources; and obtain the consent of the people 
to existing public policy. The case of local development in East Java and Surabaya 
shows that intellectuals systematically attempt to marginalise issues of corruption and 
alleged criminal activity from public debate, by portraying these as matters of 
institutional management. Hence, their claim to Neo-Institutionalist knowledge and 
expertise has enabled intellectuals and academics to enter into politico-business 
alliances and into local struggles over power and resources. 
 Meanwhile the subordination of intellectuals by dominant predatory alliances 
is also conducted through the appointment of academics to positions such as president 
commisioner of state-owned enterprises, or by the provision of projects that have 
pecuniary implications for those who share in them. In this way, the implementation 
of local governance in East Java is less related to neo-institutionalist solutions to 
improve the state apparatus or capacity of civil society, and more a vital part of the 
political co-optation of intellectuals by dominant elite alliances. 
 The next chapter considers the links between intellectuals and marginalised 
social groups, and examines how local intellectuals, acting as social agents, might 
envisage themselves as being organically connected to marginalised people and 










Intellectuals and Disorganised Social Movements 
in East Java: the Lapindo Mudflow Case 
 
6.1.Introduction 
This chapter concentrates on the links between intellectuals and marginalised social 
groups. It explains the position and contribution of local intellectuals as social agents 
who may see themselves as connected organically to marginalised sections of society, 
and as able to facilitate these marginalised groups to participate in governance 
processes. It reinforces the dissertation’s argument that the contribution of 
intellectuals to local governance processes and democratic politics in East Java is 
achieved not only through their roles as governance knowledge producers, but also 
through their actions as direct participants in a concrete struggle over power and 
wealth. As shown, Soeharto’s state successfully co-opted most of East Java’s 
intellectuals, while also creating social alliances between politico-business elites and 
prominent intellectuals. It has also been shown that intellectuals’ alliances with 
marginalised social groups have been tenuous, ill developed and largely politically 
ineffective. In effect, such marginalised groups as the peasantry or the urban 
proletariat have been too disorganised to produce their own true organic intellectuals 
in the Gramscian sense. 
 The previous two chapters have shown how the relationship between 
intellectuals and the predatory forces previously incubated by the New Order have 
evolved under conditions of free electoral competition and democratic governance. 
While many prominent intellectuals in East Java have become increasingly entangled 
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in the activities of predatory elites, this chapter examines the extent to which 
intellectuals play a role in grassroots political participation, or contribute to 
articulating the aspirations of marginalised communities. This would be expected 
within Neo-Institutionalist arguments about good governance reforms that would 
produce greater public participation in policy-making processes — even if only to 
produce citizenries that comply with the imperatives of life directed by the exigencies 
of the market. 
 The marginalised communities of concern to Indonesia’s intellectuals are 
understood here as consisting of community members, mostly poor, who may be 
integrated into development programs to some degree, but remain excluded from 
setting development priorities within a system of power dominated by elites (Bayat, 
2012: 18; Castells, 1983). Of course, this is not to say that these people are 
completely subject to the whims of others. Bayat (2012: 26) has argued firmly that the 
marginalised can potentially construct domains to conduct counter-hegemonic 
struggles. It seems, however, that efforts to develop social movements with the aid of 
intellectuals in East Java are obstructed by the realities of the local constellation of 
power. 
 This chapter specifically analyses intellectuals’ contribution to the response to 
the 2006 Lapindo disaster, which had devastating consequences for the properties, 
homes and living conditions of thousands of families in twelve villages around 
Porong, Sidoarjo (Schiller, Lucas & Sulistyanto, 2008: 52). It especially focuses on 
the role of intellectuals in the social movement that developed out of the case. It is 
shown that the ensuing social struggle over matters of responsibility for this event, 
and for appropriate compensation, was influenced greatly by the balance of power 
between national oligarchs and local predatory elites on the one hand, and the largely 
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disorganised masses on the other. This was the context within which intellectuals who 
were pro-Lapindo victims had to operate. 
 The ongoing legacy of the deep political disorganisation of civil society 
fragmented the social bases of the movement that came together around the Lapindo 
mudflow victims — rendering the latter susceptible to elite efforts to engender 
internal divisions. The critical discourse articulated by some intellectuals seemed 
disconnected from the dynamics of the gathering social movement, as few 
intellectuals had previously played strategic roles in sustained social resistance, 
despite the experience of some of them in the relatively brief period of widespread 
popular insurrection at the very end of the Soeharto regime. 
 Joseph’s observations on the importance of the structural basis for successful 
discursive and social practices are pertinent in this regard. As he explains, the 
articulation of counter-hegemony cannot be separated from its material place in social 
practices and structures (Joseph, 2002: 104). The implication is that the various 
political initiatives of intellectuals in the Lapindo affair — such as to create a counter-
hegemonic discourse disseminated through mass media, and even to help victims 
launch their lawsuits — have had limited success in the absence of well organised 
civil society movements. Without these, it is difficult to sustain counter-hegemonic 
discourses that fundamentally challenge the position of dominant interests. 
 Insofar as there is a minority of intellectuals that have tried to buck the trend 
of incorporation into predatory alliances, many of them are linked to Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs); although we have already seen that these are also 
not always beyond the reach of the co-optive powers of dominant local elites. By 
utilising entry points provided by these NGOs, intellectuals have tried to compensate 





 Such a tendency was apparent in the Lapindo case,and will now be 
analysed closely in the remainder of the chapter. 
6.2.The Chronology of the Lapindo Case and State Policies 
The Lapindo mudflow was a disaster that engulfed Sidoarjo and its citizens. It began 
on 29 May 2006, after a blowout of hot water, gas and mud triggered by exploration 
drilling for natural gas, nearly two miles below the earth’s surface, close to the 
blowout location. From the start of the disaster until at least 2008, the hot mudflow 
has comprised 100,000 to 150,000 cubic metres from deep within the earth, drowning 
1,500 hectares of agricultural and industrial areas in Porong, Sidoarjo and threatening 
human beings, animals and plants, and the whole Porong ecosystem. Several other 
localities besides the city were submerged by mudflow, including the villages of 
Renokenongo, Siring, Jatirejo, Glagah Harum, Kedungbendo, Ketapang and Besuki. 
The disaster has caused the deprivation of people’s livelihood, due to their land being 
submerged by the Lapindo mud. Many people lost their homes, land and other 
                                                 
120
 The historical context of Indonesia’s intellectuals during the New Order era (1970s up to 1990s) 
demonstrates the importance of NGOs as bases for intellectuals who organise civil society and criticise 
the government. The origin of Indonesia’s modern NGOs in the New Order era can be traced back to 
the early 1970s, when many intellectuals and former student activists who had been politically aligned 
with the military in 1965-66 tried to promote the ideology of modernisation outside the New Order 
political system. The reason intellectuals and former student activists were creating NGOs was because 
other spaces for political participation in the Soeharto political system were so narrow. The first wave 
of NGOs tended to compromise with the state, by also promoting the ideology of modernisation. 
However, since the 1970s and the failure of modernisation promises to deliver change for marginalised 
groups, a shift in orientation has occurred among intellectuals in NGOs-based on populist agendas. 
This trend has positioned intellectuals based within NGOs to challenge the elitism of the modernisation 
tradition; and has created radical critics of the authoritarian regime (Aspinall, 2005: 90; Eldridge, 1995: 
38-39). This critical tendency among NGOs was most markedin the 1990s —during the later years of 
the Soeharto era, after the New Order regime implemented keterbukaan, its ‘openness’ era. The 
willingness of intellectuals inside NGOs to criticise the government tradition was triggered also by 
corruption within the state realm – by the ruling party Golkar, the military and the bureaucracy, with 
land grabbing by military officers and the state apparatus – and by the absence of independent political 
parties inside the political system. This political situation contributed to the radicalisation of 
intellectuals in non-government and campus organisations and study clubs, and in political 
organisations such as PRD (People’s Democratic Party), which evolved into a critical culture of 
discourse toward the state in the New Order era. This situation contributed to the rise of NGOs as part 
of an alternative tradition among Indonesia intellectuals; onewhich tried to articulate marginalised 
people’s interests (Eldridge, 1995; Dhakidae, 2003: 509). 
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property as well as their jobs. Whole communities were devastated and physical 
infrastructure destroyed across numerous villages. In total, since 29 May 2006 the 
disaster has destroyed approximately 824 hectares of land and 10,430 houses 
belonging to citizens. The mudflow has also resulted in the destruction of thirty-one 
factories around the location, causing 2,441 people to lose their jobs (Azhar, 2012: 
88). 
According to the East Java Mudflow Information Centre, the disaster forced 
more than 37,100 residents (over 6,800 families) from the Porong and Tanggulangin 
sub-districts to move to temporary shelter camps (Schiller, Lucas, Sulistiyanto 2008: 
54). According to Rohman Budijanto, the chairman of Jawa Pos Pro-Otonomi 
Institute (the research institute under Jawa Pos media), there were approximately 
75,000 internally displaced persons in Sidoarjo district by 2008 who qualified for 
relief, the majority of whom moved to alternative accommodations after living in 
refugee camps for several months (Schiller, Lucas & Sulistiyanto, 2008: 54). There 
were also other costs that cannot be easily quantified, relating to damage to 
community ties, the destruction of local culture and the scattering of informal and 
formal social networks in the entire Porong and Tanggulangin communities. 
The National Planning Board (Bappenas) estimated that the total cost of 
dealing with the disaster in its first year alone was Rp. 44.7 trillion, which is more 
than $US4 billion. This estimate factored in the costs of some of the disaster’s 
peripheral environmental damage, such as subsistence. Although the consensus 
among scientists who independently assessed the situation was that the mudflow was 
triggered by exploration activities, the explanation propagated by some intellectuals 
linked to elites was that this was a natural disaster, triggered by earthquakes near the 
city of Yogyakarta. Since the mudflow was deemed a natural disaster by the North 
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Jakarta and South Jakarta district courts — on the basis of one expert witness 
statements
121
 — the company responsible for the drilling activities was ruled to have 
no responsibility to compensate for the losses caused by the mudflow (Schiller, Lucas 
& Sulistiyanto 2008: 70; Kurniawan 2010: 117). 
The corporate identity at the centre of the controversy is PT Lapindo Brantas 
Inc. (PT LBI). This company is a subsidiary of PT Energi Mega Persada TBK, which 
is in turn part of the Bakrie & Brothers business group, owned by the family of one of 
Indonesia’s most prominent politicians, Golkar leader Aburizal Bakrie. State 
responses to the case tended to protect Lapindo’s interests. This occurred in two ways. 
Firstly, high-level state institutions in the executive, legislative and judicial branches 
tended to focus on allocating state funds to respond to the Lapindo mudflow crisis, 
thereby concurring with the view that Lapindo Brantas was not responsible for the 
disaster. Secondly, Presidential decisions gradually decreased the Lapindo portion 
required to fund the response (Gustomy, 2010: 75; Batubara & Utomo 2012: 165-178; 
Azhar, 2010: 105). Agreement among the high-level state institutions to protect 
Lapindo Brantas’s interests is demonstrated by the policies and statements outlined 
below. All of these developments highlight the power and influence of the Bakrie 
family, which remains an integral part of the oligarchy inherited from the New Order 
period. 
Firstly, the National Mudflow Handling Supervisory Team, put together by 
the Indonesian House of Representatives, treated the Lapindo case as a natural 
disaster. A meeting of the Fifth Commission of the House of Representatives held 
after the disaster received advice from East Java Governor Imam Oetomo, who 
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 The expert witness to the court, Ir Agus Guntoro, a Lecturer of Geology in the Engineering 
Department of Trisakti University, convinced the panel of judges that the Lapindo Mudflow was 
triggered by a Yogyakarta earthquake on May 27, 2006, and completely unrelated to human error. His 
explanation was backed by other experts, including Prof Dr. Ir Sukandar Asikin, a Professor of 
Geology from the Engineering Department of the Institute of Bandung Engineering. 
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recommended that the Indonesian Government allocate funds from the 2007 National 
Budget and the 2008 Draft National Budget to repair public infrastructure damaged 
by the mudflow. The House of Representatives’ description of the Lapindo mudflow 
case as a natural disaster had consequences for justice, in particular by prompting the 
decision by police investigators to issue a termination of investigation letter, to block 
investigation of the case as a criminal matter (Azhar, 2010: 142). 
Secondly, the claim of a natural disaster was supported by the commander of 
the 5
th.
 Brawijaya Regional Command in East Java. General Syamsul Mappareppa 
went on public record to assert that the cause of the mudflow was not mining 
exploration but underground friction which lead to an earthquake in the Yogjakarta 
region(Radar Surabaya, June 5, 2006). This statement is significant, given that the 
military had no direct role in the Lapindo case; the release of such a 
statementindicates the degree to which public opinion was being actively steered by 
powerful players in the direction of the interests of the powerful Bakrie family. 
Thirdly, the President declared Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia 
(Presidential Decree Number 14 of 2007 and Presidential Decree No. 40 of 2009) on 
the Sidoarjo Mud Disaster Agency, stating that Lapindo Brantas was only required to 
pay compensation to parties in mudflow-affected areas up until 22 March 2007, and 
only through commercial transaction mechanisms. Reference to these mechanisms 
meant that Lapindo was only obligated to meet 20% of its obligations immediately 
withthe remaining 80% to be paid in instalments. Crucially, the dates specified in the 
ruling also meant that all areas newlyaffected by the expanding mudflow after 2007 
would be deemed to be the state’s responsibility. The regulatory policies regarding the 
Lapindo case after 8 September 2006 include Keppres No. 13/tahun 2006 
(Presidential Decree no. 13/2006), which related to technical and social problems and 
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the appointment of a national team to handle them, to be financed by the Lapindo 
Brantas corporation. Subsequently, the Government published Perpes no. 14 tahun 
2007 (Presidential Regulation no. 14/2007), which regulated the management of land 
and house transactions in the affected areas. 
Fourthly, the Court of South Jakarta (December 26, 2007, reference 
284/Pdt.G/2006/PN Jaksel) denied a lawsuit by Walhi (The Indonesian Forum for 
Environment)
122
 against Lapindo Brantas and its corporate partner in the Banjar Panji 
1 exploration venture, and government office-holders such as the Indonesian 
President, the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, various oil and gas 
executive agencies, the Indonesian Minister of the Environment, the East Java 
Governor and the Sidoarjo Mayor. The court declared that the defendants were not 
guilty, because the disaster was caused by natural events (the purported Yogjakarta 
earthquake). This legal precedent was strengthened by an assembly of judges at 
Central Jakarta Court, whose decision (number 384/Pdt.G/2006/PN.Jkt Pst) was 
reinforced and legitimised by the nation’s Supreme Court (decision number 270 K 
Pdt/2008). In addition to supporting the legal decisions, the Supreme Court on April 
3, 2009 declared the Lapindo mudflow to be a natural disaster. This Supreme Court 
decision was supplemented by the Constitutional Court, which authorised the use of 
the 2012 National Budget to finance the restoration of infrastructure destroyed by the 
Lapindo mudflow in Sidoarjo. This legal decision was further strengthened by the 
Constitution Court decision rejecting the law suit by Tjuk Sukiadi, Ali Akbar Azhar 
and Letjen TNI Marinir (purn) Soeharto,
123
 to test Article 14/Law 4/2012, which 
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 This Indonesian NGO focuses on environmental and ecological problems in Indonesia. It was 
established in November 1980. 
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Tjuk Sukiadi is senior lecturer in Economics at the Faculty of Economics and Business, University 
of Airlangga. Ali Akbar Azhar is the author of Konspirasi SBY-Bakrie, a book which reports on the 
predatory oligarchy collaborations in the Lapindo mudflow case. Soeharto is a retired marine general 
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legitimated the use of the National Budget for handling the Lapindo mudflow disaster. 
This decision reinforced the state position declaring that Lapindo Brantas 
Incorporation was innocent in the mudflow case.
124
 
The Government then appointed the Badan Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo 
(BPLS — Sidoarjo Mudflow Countermeasures Body) as the state institution 
responsible for handling the disaster outside the Lapindo mudflow impact map, as 
well as managing a variety of technical problems, including channelling the mudflow 
into the Porong River so that it could bedispersed into the sea and building and 
maintaining a dike to hold back the mud. This new institution, created by Presidential 
Regulation Number 40/2009, was to be financed only from the National Budget, and 
was to be chaired and vice-chaired by the Indonesian Minister of Public Works and 
the Minister for Social Affairs respectively. Meanwhile LBI’s only accorded 
responsibility was for land-house transactions, and earthworks to remove the 
mudflow. On July 17, 2008, the Government issued Perpres no. 48/2008 (Presidential 
regulation no. 48/2008), which addressed additional substantial compensation for the 
people of Porong. This policy recognised a new group of victims: those people who 
lived in areas that had become submerged by mud after 22 March 2007 (the date 
referencedin Presidential regulation no. 14/2007). The restitution of these victims was 
to be financed from the National Budget, with Lapindo Brantas only financing 
technical issues such as the prevention of mudflow. This regulation was reinforced by 
Perpres No. 40/2009 (Presidential regulation No. 40/2009). 
                                                                                                                                           
who became involved in the fight to defend the Lapindo mudflow victims. Both Sukiadi and Azhar are 
among the activists who supported the efforts of Lapindo mudflow victims, including participating in 
the victims’ group which claimed that Lapindo Brantas Incorporated was guilty of causing the Lapindo 
mudflow disaster through its resource exploration near the mudflow site. 
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 GKLL: Putusan MK Soal Lumpur Lapindo Dinginkan Porong (GKLL:Decision of the The 
Constitutional Court on Lapindo Mudflow calms Porong) RMOL.CO, Thursday, 13 December 2012).  
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State regulations tended to be insensitive to the Lapindo victims’ views and 
needs, while tending to protect Lapindo Brantas’ interests. Further, state policy and 
legal decisions have sought to protect LBI from the obligation of compensating the 
victims – not only for their material losses, but also for the many social and 
environmental costs related to education, social cohesion, workplaces, and pollution 
from disaster. State policy regarding the compensation scheme (20% down-payment 
and 80% instalment)also protected LBI from victims’ demands for other 
compensation. An array of victim groups, supported by intellectuals and social 
activists,lobbied for a ‘cash and carry scheme’ whereby Lapindo would pay for social 
and environmental damage immediately, but were unsuccessful (Batubara & Waluyo 
2012; Mudhoffir, 2013; Azhar, 2010). Leaders and co-ordinators of these victims’ 
groups voiced their concerns that government regulations regarding the disaster were 
made without consulting with the affected parties, or hearing their voices.  
 The state policies which havebeen so unresponsive to the interests of the 
Lapindo mudflow victims can be analysed in relation to the involvement of a major 
Indonesian oligarch in this case. The Indonesian political constellation in place at the 
time ensured that the Lapindo victims did not get sufficient support from political 
parties and parliament. This failure includes the Indonesian parliament’s formal 
declaration that the Lapindo mudflow was the result of a natural disaster — a decision 
widely seen as evidence of Bakrie’s influence within Indonesia’s ruling elites. 
President SBY and the parliament signalled a willingness to protect Bakrie’s interests, 
in particular with the formal declaration by the Minister of the State Secretariat (and 
Chairman of the National Mandate Party), Hatta Rajasa, that because the Lapindo 
mudflow was a natural disaster, all investigations into the possibility of human error 
were to be dismissed (Azhar 2010; Batubara and Waluyo 2012). 
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 State protection of Lapindo Brantas is inseparable from the fact that the largest 
shareholder in Lapindo Brantas — the Bakrie family — is the family of Golkar Party 
Chairman and former Welfare Minister Aburizal Bakrie. Bakrie was also head of 
Kadin (Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry) during the Soeharto era. The 
Bakrie family business survived the nation’s 1997 economic crisis and the ensuing 
International Monetary Fund-instigated reforms. Aburizal Bakrie himself was able to 
adapt to the new political and economic climate after the fall of the New Order and to 
thrive as politician and businessman.
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 The emergence of Bakrie as a prominent domestic business player in Indonesia is connected 
historically to the introduction by Soeharto of Presidential Decisions (Keppres) 14, 14a and 10 in 1979 
and 1990. Under the terms of Soeharto Keppres, the State Secretariat assumed control of allocation of 
contracts and of supply and construction related to government projects. The primary mechanism for 
allocation of the contracts was the so-called Team Ten. The State Secretariat’s important position 
within Soeharto’s complex politico-business relationships lay also in its control over Banpres (The 
Presidential Assistance Fund). This fund was an important access mechanism through which extra 
budgetary funding was channelled to the President, to be spent as he pleased. However, the primary 
social impact of Sekneg and Team Ten’s authority lay in the recruitment and consolidation of the 
pribumi (indigenous/non-ethnic Chinese) business group, with regard to allocation of contracts for 
supply and construction. Sekneg and Team Ten used their authority and control to assist the pribumi 
bourgeoisie, who were linked to the Soeharto patronage system andthe Soeharto family. Under 
Soeharto’s politico-business relations, some figures were connected to the aforementioned domestic 
bourgeois family, and to the former Pertamina director Ibnu Sutowo. Among these business figures 
were Fadel Muhammad, Imam Taufik, Arifin Panigoro and, most important of all, Aburizal Bakrie 
(Robison & Hadiz, 2004: 59-60; Winters, 1996: 123-41). Bakrie’s business empire developed in the 
Soeharto era. Based on his connection with the inner circle of Soeharto’s oligarchical relations, Bakrie 
became an important supplier of steel pipes to Pertamina; and expanded his interests though his 
involvement with the Soeharto family in plantations, mining, cattle ranching, oil distribution for 
Pertamina, and shares in Freeport mining (Robison & Hadiz, 2004: 85-86). Bakrie’s access to New 
Order state power was further strengthened by his position in political arenas. He became one of the 
pribumi bourgeois layers and Soeharto cronies who took MPR seats as representatives of functional 
group delegates in 1997 (Robison & Hadiz, 2004: 141-42). 
 
After Soeharto’s fall, Bakrie maintained his position and power. It is widely believed that one factor 
which made this possible was the subsidised credits which he obtained from the Minister of Co-
operatives, Adi Sasono, during the short Habibie presidency. Bakrie’s successful adaptation in the post-
Soeharto era is also widely believed to be related to his transition-era role as Head of Kadin under the 
Habibie presidency. During this time, there was a general flood of capital from Chinese entrepreneurs 
out of Indonesia. As head of Kadin and Indonesia’s largest pribumi conglomerate, Bakrie called on the 
government to redistribute the Chinese conglomerates’ assets to pribumi (ethnically Indonesian, non-
Chinese) entrepreneurs, in order to overcome the economic crisis. Bakrie even stated that the Chinese 
exodus was a golden opportunity for pribumi entrepreneurs to redistribute Chinese assets to pribumis. 
President Habibie took a similar attitude and arranged a meeting with Kadin in July 1998, stating that if 
the businessmen did not return in two weeks, he would instruct Kadin to take over the distribution of 
basic commodities. In terms of concrete policy, BULOG decided to allocate a quota of rice and other 
commodities to pribumi entrepreneurs (Eklof, 2003: 232). 
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 The Bakrie influence in the Indonesian political constellation was also 
indicated by his strong contribution to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 
Presidential campaign in 2004. Bakrie became Co-ordinating Minister of People’s 
Welfare in SBY’s 2004-09 Cabinet. President SBY also had a politico-economic 
interest in protecting Bakrie in the Lapindo mudflow case. SBY’s support for Bakrie’s 
interests cannot be separated from Bakrie’s contributions to SBY’s presidential 
candidacies in 2004 and 2009. Bakrie family contributions to SBY’s candidacies 
include Bakrie’s contributions to facilitating the Freedom Institute, a think-tank and 
political campaign institution led by Rizal Mallarangeng, as part of SBY’s political 
campaign institutions (Azhar 2010: 28). 
 Another obstacle which prevented SBY from adopting decisive policies 
direction towards Lapindo Brantas was in the legislative political arena. In the 
People’s Representative Council (lower house of Indonesia’s national legislature) at 
the time President SBY’s Democrat Party held relatively few parliamentary seats, in 
comparison to Golkar and the PDIP. This political configuration was reflected in the 
membership of Tim Pengawas Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo (Sidoarjo Mudflow 
Mitigation Monitoring Team), which had been established by the People’s 
Representative Council, and whose 24-person membership included six 
representatives from Golkar Party and four from the Democrat Party (Azhar, 2010: 
28). Bakrie’s influence was also in evidence on the occasion when opposition party 
members attempted to use their interpellation right to clarify government policy in the 
Lapindo case. This political initiative was a threat to the Golkar Party, given that 
Bakrie’s power network forms part of this politician’s political elites. The attempt to 
interrupt the order of parliamentary business, by demanding an official explanation 
(interpellation) was also perceived to be a political threat to President Yudhoyono, so 
210 
 
the Democrat Party likewise blocked this. In this situation, Bakrie thus obtained the 
support of two major political parties – the Golkar Party and the Democrat Party. The 
interpellation initiative, which was supported by 130 members of parliament from 
various parties, was eventually dropped when it received support from only one 
faction of the national legislature — the PKB. This example shows clearly how 
Bakrie and his political alliances were able to consolidate political support in the 
national parliament to protect their interests (Gustomy 2010: 72). 
By investigating the relationships between oligarchic power and intellectuals 
in civil society arenas, and observing how these relationships have protected the 
Lapindo Brantas Corporation and Bakrie family interests in the Lapindo mudflow 
case, it becomes clear that civil society in East Java cannot be described according to 
the Tocquevellian liberal perspective, as the defender of political freedom and a 
counterbalance to the state. The entities of civil society, such as the educational 
system, the universities and the mass media, act largely to secure the dominant ruling 
class’s interests through practices of hegemony. In the Lapindo case, only a few small 
progresive factions of academics engaged in the struggle against the company, while 
prominent academics tended instead — through deploying their authority as 
knowledge experts —to advocate for oligarchic interests, to legitimate state policy 
and depoliticise the case. 
6.3.Intellectuals in the Lapindo Struggle 
This Lapindo mudflow case shows that although intellectuals may have succeeded in 
articulating victims’ interests, both through discourse that swayed public opinion and 
through organised protests against the state’s tendency to protect the oligarchy behind 
corporate interests, these efforts were constrained greatly by the manoeuvres of elite 
coalitions, whose interests exert a profound influence on state policy. The local 
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intellectuals’ initiatives to open up the political field were thwarted by factionalisation 
within the Lapindo victims’ social support groups, and also by the efforts of the 
opposing camp of intellectuals, who actively supported the oligarchic interests by 
legitimising the state’s policies and the manoeuvres of Lapindo Brantas Corporation. 
It is important to acknowledge the efforts of some intellectuals in support of 
the Lapindo victims’ claims for compensation. The Lapindo victims required a viable 
strategy to advance their compensation claims, and to redress other injustices they felt 
they had suffered. Several intellectuals took asignificant role here, including to 
articulate victims’ concerns and helping to organise protest actions. They also 
attempted to give deeper political meaning and significance to the Lapindo case 
(Eyerman & Jamison 1991: 98), portraying it as a symptom of systemic social 
injustice. These intellectuals emerged from NGOs such as WALHI (The Environment 
Forum), YLBHI (Indonesian Legal Aid Institution), Urban Poor Linkage, Relawan 
Korban Lumpur Lapindo (Volunteers for Lapindo Mudflow Victims), and included 
academics from Airlangga University who established Serikat Dosen Progresif 
(Progressive Lecturers’ Union), as well as young activists from Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah (the two biggest Islamic mass organisations in Indonesia).
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 One NGO which continues to advocate for the victims of the Lapindo 
mudflow is Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (YLBHI — Indonesian 
Legal Aid Institution Foundation). YLBHI argued that the government has ignored 
the cultural, political, and economic rights of the victims in its handling of Lapindo 
mudflow problems.
127
 According to YLBHI’s Surabaya office, the state has tended to 
                                                 
126 Interview with Herlambang Perdana Wiratraman a member of the Progressive Lecturers 
Union, July 10, 2013.  
127
 Taufik Basari S. H. the officer of YLBHI in ‘Majelis Hakim Tolak Gugatan Lumpur Lapindo’ (The 








 Another active NGO is the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), founded by 
Wardah Hafidz, which focuses on the problem of urban poor marginalisation as a 
result of political oppression and economic exploitation. According to a former East 
Java UPC representative in the Lapindo case, Ambo Tang Daeng Matteru, the crucial 
problem is the state’s continuing denial that Lapindo Brantas’ activities in the Sumur 
Banjar Panji, Porong, and Sidoarjo regions were the primary cause of the disaster. 
UPC argues that in the interests of justice, the Lapindo Brantas Corporation should be 
found guilty in the mudflow case, and should be compelled to finance all costs for 
restitution of people’s rights and to redress the social, cultural and environment 
damage for which it is responsible.
129
 
 Another active victims’ support group is the aforementioned group of local 
academics in Surabaya, the Serikat Dosen Progresif (SDP— Progressive Lecturers 
Union). As noted, SDP was founded by several young academics from Airlangga 
University, predominantly from the law faculty (Joeni Arianto Koeniawan and 
Herlambang Perdana Wiratraman) and the social and political sciences faculty (Eddy 
Herry).
130
 This group differentiates its perspective from that of some elite academics 
from Airlangga University, who use the good-governance Neo-Institutionalist 
approach to facilitate the Lapindo corporate interest and moderate victim articulation 
to build compromise agreements between the Lapindo Corporation and its victims. 
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According to SDP, the implementation of the Neo-Institutionalist approach in the 
Lapindo mudflow case serves only to justify the interests of the politico-business 
client-led powers behind Lapindo Brantas, which should instead be held legally 
responsible for the drilling negligence which caused the mudflow disaster.
131
 
 Serikat Dosen Progressif has identified several fundamental problems in the 
government’s approach to handling the Lapindo case. First and foremost, there was a 
close relationship between the state apparatus of the SBY Cabinet and Bakrie himself, 
which, along with the fact that the Bakrie family owns Lapindo Brantas, led to corrupt 




 Several intellectuals agree that the other major problem with government 
policy on this issue is that all policy remains based on the erronous claim that the 
mudflow was the result of the Yogyakarta earthquake. SDP’s co-ordinator, 
Koerniawan, has criticised President SBY’s protection of PT Minarak Lapindo Jaya 
(PT MLJ), the company designated by the Bakrie to settle payments to mudflow 
victims
133
 and Bakrie’s economic interests, as a clear example of state institutions’ 
tendency to overlook corporate negligence in this and other cases. This view was 
perhaps presented best by Koerniawan, a lecturer in law, in a chapter in a book on the 
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Lapindo case, ‘Lumpur Lapindo: Sebuah Potret Mitos tentang Negara Hukum 
Indonesia’ (Lapindo Mudflow: a Portrait of Indonesian State Law Myth).
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 The activists and academics who advocate for the victims of the Lapindo 
mudflow have certain ideas in common about the issues at hand. Firstly, they agree 
that the mudflow was not caused by Yogyakarta earthquakes, but was triggered by 
corporate exploration activities. They consider that the absence of firm state action 
towards the corporation is related to the occupation of state authority by 
interconnecting oligarchic interests, resulting in a tendency to protect Lapindo Brantas 
from any accusations of wrongdoing. Secondly, they have sought to force Lapindo 
Brantas to compensate fully for the losses suffered by Lapindo victims. From their 
perspective, the corporation and the state did not adequately compensate the victims 
for all the damages they experienced after the disaster. Thirdly, they supported the 
Lapindo victims’ struggle for the fulfilment of their civil, social, economic and 
cultural rights after they were expelled from their own properties and communities in 
the wake of the mudflow disaster. These intellectuals considered that Lapindo Brantas 
and state authorities had not fulfilled the Lapindo mudflow victims’ basic rights as 




 WALHI, one of the prominent NGOs involved in the case, conducted a critical 
analysis of the ecological political economy. Based on this analysis, WALHI believes 
that in a case such as the Lapindo mudflow issue, the environmental problems cannot 
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be separated from Indonesia’s core strategic development paradigm, which focuses on 
the extraction of natural resources by the state apparatus. The ecological crises facing 
Indonesia – and there are many – cannot be separated from these connection between 
political power and the extractive industry, which, as the WALHI analysis shows, 
often exploit natural resources irresponsibly for private interests.
136
As observed by 
WALHI’s East Java director, Oni Mahardhika, this connection is shown clearly in oil 
and gas exploration permits which have been awarded for more than 20 blocks mining 
areas in the region; and evidenced further by the fact that the mining exploration 
undertaken by Lapindo Brantas violated government spatial plans, in that it explored 
in areas allocated not for exploration but for residential activity. These observations 
together reveal how not only the mismanagement and injustice in the aftermath of the 
disaster but also the disaster itself were a consequence of the oligarchic alliance 
between SBY and the Bakrie family; an alliance which utilised state institutions with 
impunity to enable natural resources exploitation that damaged the livelihoods of 
ordinary citizens while supporting their own interests. Based on WALHI’s analysis, 
the close power connection between Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Aburizal 
Bakrie in the government, and the dependence of the state on corporate natural 
resources exploration, were among the chief causes of government policy 
implementation favouring the power of capital over the mudflow victims. Further, 
Mahardhika avers that the problem of the Lapindo mudflow cannot be solved by 
payment of compensation and by displacing people from their homes. He says that the 
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solution to the Lapindo mudflow would be to restore to the people all their basic 
needs and rights that were held before the mudflow’s eruption.
137
 
 The Lapindo victims’ advocacy movement employed various strategies in 
response to the elite political agendas, with the aim of gaining broader public support 
for the mudflow victims. The aforementioned NGOs played significant roles in the 
movement, by spreading information through press releases, writing papers in books, 
educating people about the issues, disseminating information throughout society, and 
by suing Lapindo Brantas and the state. All strategies were peaceful and did not 
violate the rule of law. Most of the NGOs involved in the Lapindo movement agreed 
to establish a core organisation consisting of thirty-eight NGOs and community 
organisations, to create a social movement group, Gebrak Lapindo (Kick-Out 
Lapindo), in an effort to advance the movement.
138
 
 Based on their assessment of the problem, WALHI and YLBHI advocated for 
the mudflow victims by suing Lapindo Brantas and other institutions as co-
defendants, such as Energi Mega Persada Corporation, Pan Asia Incorporation, Kalila 
Pan Enterprise, Santos Brantas Incorporation, the then President of Indonesia, the 
then Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, the Oil and Gas Executive Agency 
(BP Migas), the then Environmental Minister, the then East Java Governor, and 
Sidoarjo Mayor in Southern Jakarta State Court. The WALHI lawsuit was based on 
the argument that there had been an unlawful act, which resulted in environmental 
damage. YLBHI also sued the Indonesian President, the Minister of Energy and 
Mineral Resources, the State Minister of Environment, the Oil and Gas Executive 
Agency (BP Migas), the East Java Governor, the Sidoarjo Mayor, and Lapindo 
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Brantas in Central Jakarta State Court, on the basis of the occurrence of unlawful 
conduct including the denial of the economic, social and cultural rights of the 
mudflow victims, as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution, regulation number 39/1999 
on Human Rights, and regulation no. 11 2005 on the ratification of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Kurniawan (2012: 122-23).This 
strategy was also supported indirectly by SDP, through the provision of legal 
education for the victims of Lapindo in Porong Sidoarjo, at a facility established for 
the purposes and known as the Sekolah Hukum Rakyat(SHR) or Peoples’ Law 
School. As Joeni Arianto Koerniawan, a lecturer in the law faculty at University of 
Airlangga, and the Co-ordinator of Legal Aid for Victims of the Lapindo mudflow, 
observed: 
 
The activities of the People’s Law School (SHR) for Victims of Lapindo have some 
clear objectives: First, is to raise awareness of rights and to promote legal literacy 
programs for victims, in order for them to know and understand what rights they 
have, and which rights have been violated by the mudflow events. Second, this 
program also has the mission of letting people know what legal recourse they have 
and how they can take this, in order to defend their rights. The structure of this 
teaching was chosen deliberately, because I think that this is the appropriate kind of 
activity for academics and particularly lecturers to undertake; an endeavour that is a 
kind of educational program for the public. The materials provided in the courses at 
the People’s Law School help to facilitate legal education in specific areas most 
relevant to the issues faced by the victims, such as human rights, Land Law, 
Environmental Law and the like; and must be modified in such a way that they are 
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This legal education program aimed not only to educate victims about their social 
rights as citizens, but also to develop people’s capabilities to defend their rights 
through legal action. The course endorsed the pursuit of judicial review to the 
Supreme Court’s Presidential Decree No. 14 of 2007, which is the legal basis for 
regulating efforts to solve the social and environmental problems caused by the 
mudflow. 
However, the Lapindo victim movement was not totally unified. Below, this 
chapter identifies the most prominent victim groups involved in the movement, and 
explains their individual distinct grievances and fundamental inter-group disputes. 
6.3.1. Pagar Rekontrak 
Pagar Rekontrak was created as the result of a collaboration between academics and 
social activists: Serikat Dosen Progresif — Universitas Airlangga (Progressive 
Lecturers’ Union — University of Airlangga), YLBHI, WALHI and UPC. This joint 
effort has a home base at Porong Market, a location set aside by the Sidoarjo Regency 
as a refuge site for Lapindo Mudflow victims (Gustomy, 2012: 56-58; Batubara & 
Utomo 2012). The main aim of this group was to oppose the compensation which had 
been offered by Lapindo Brantas Corporation and strengthened by Perpres 
No.14/2007. This group demanded instead the implementation of the proposed cash 
and carry scheme, through which the Lapindo Brantas Incorporation would settle all 
the material costs of residents via cash payments immediately. The members of Pagar 
Rekontrak agreed to reject the state’s other decisions and Lapindo offers, because 
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compensation based on transactions (buying and selling property) would involve 
people losing their land ownership. Pagar Rekontrak’s position was developed 
following discussions between the intellectuals and the Lapindo mudflow victims, 
which produced the consensus that the cause of the mudflow was corporate error, 
rather than natural events. Given this, the group argued, paying instalments through 
transactions only, without the social-environmental costs added on, would benefit 
Lapindo Brantas but not the people (Mudhoffir, 2013; 38). Pagar Rekontrak set goals 
of pursuing not only economic compensation, calculated on the basis of victims’ 
property and land, but also the restoration of people’s broader social and ecological 
environment (Mudhoffir, 2013: 38). In Pagar Rekontrak’s estimation, it was essential 
that victims’ basic needs and rights prior to the mudflow eruption were restored to 




 The Pagar Rekontrak group formulated its demands based on a number of  
principles. Firstly, it resolved to defend the social rights of residents. This meant 
holding the government responsible for restoring people’s rights to housing, health 
needs and reasonable work, in accordance with what they had held prior to the 
disaster. Secondly, Pagar Rekontrak sought for the government to restore people’s 
social communities and local environment, again commensurate with their social and 
environmental conditions before the mudflow incident. Pagar Rekontrak argued that 
the ecological damage and associated inability to raise livestock equated to lost 
income and livelihoods, and further, that the government’s option of relocating 
victims from Porong, Sidoajo to new areas was not sufficient, because the new 
locations were environmentally unfit for livestock. To this day, many people whose 
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communities and livelihoods were destroyed by the mudflow are still struggling to be 
granted restitution and acknowledgement of their social and environmental rights. 
Remarkably, these include many victims who remain unrecognised as victims, 
because their land, although clearly damaged or lost, was listed as falling outside the 
areas defined as “affected areas” by Lapindo Brantas and state policy. 
6.3.2. GKLL (The Lapindo Mudflow Victims’ Coalition) 
This group comprises the first refugees from the Lapindo mudflow disaster, whose 
land was able to be registered on the official “affected areas” map, based on Perpres 
number 14/2007. The Gabungan Korban Lumpur Lapindo (GKLL — The Lapindo 
Mudflow Victims’ Coalition) group accepted the state’s regulation which set up the 
aforementioned compensation scheme based on the cash and carry system, (20% 
down-payment and the remaining 80% to be paid in instalments). Some intellectuals, 
including Emha Ainun Nadjib, an artist from Yogyakarta, and Khairul Huda, General 
Secretary of GKLL and lecturer at the University of Muhammadiyah Sidoarjo, joined 
this group and determined its direction. The GKLL has aims which are in some ways 
different from those of the Pagar Rekontrak group. One key difference is that GKLL 
has been much more likely to compromise with the government and accept state 
regulations regarding forms of compensation for victims. As mentioned, GKLL 
accepted the state regulation which established the cash and carry compensation 
scheme. In contrast, as Khairul Huda (the General Secretary of GKLL) states, Pagar 
Rekontrak chose to fight for compensation for victims that comprised 100% cash, 
distributed immediately and has fought as well as for recognition and redress, by 
Lapindo, of important immaterial losses (social-environmental costs), including those 
associated with education, health, the environment, and community and social needs. 
Huda’s position, on behalf of GKLL, isthat these are unrealistic demands (Mudhoffir, 
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2013: 35). GKLL’s meek approach has won them some benefits: the group has 
negotiated successfully with the government on compensation rates including Rp. 
120,000 (US$12) per square metre for paddy fields, Rp 1,000,000 (US$100) per 
square metre for lost gardens, and Rp 1,500,000 (US$150) for destroyed buildings, in 
addition to winning modest living allowances and social assistance for victims.  Of all 
the victims’ groups that have attempted to fight for their rights and compensation for 
losses in the wake of the Lapindo mudflow, this is the group that has almost always 
reached agreement through negotation with Minarak Lapindo Jaya (Mudhoffir, 2013; 
33). 
GKLL’s success with respect to accepting compensation from PT MLJ cannot, 
however, be considered a strong victory for the Lapindo victims movement. Under 
the direction of well-known intellectuals Emha Ainun Nadjib and Khoirul Huda, the 
GKLL group tended to depoliticise the case, with the aim of reaching quick 
agreement with and obtaining compensation from the company. By following a 
strategy of depoliticisation, GKLL chose not to criticise the government’s operations 
or question where responsibility may lie in this case. Khoirul Huda observed that 
since GKLL represents the largest group of victims in the Lapindo mudflow 
movement, the group’s refusal to question political motives enables a large number of 
victims to receive compensation from Lapindo Brantas, at least to the level specified 
by state regulation.
141
 Going one step further, Emha Ainun Nadjib is on record stating 
that Lapindo Brantas Incorporated cannot be blamed. He notes that during the 
Supreme Court’s legal deliberations, Lapindo Brantas stated its innocence in this 
matter, which, according to Nadjib, means that Lapindo’s decision to compensate 
victims for their losses can only be interpreted as an act of charity by Lapindo Brantas 
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 These views about Lapindo Brantas’ lack of legal 
responsibility for the mudflow and its aftermath were also circulated by several local 
academics in East Java, as well as in the national public sphere. 
Such compliant statements by Emha Ainun Nadjib and Khairul Huda served to 
influence the perspectives and political initiatives of the GKLL group. The group 
mandated Emha Ainun Nadjib and Khairul Huda to make a deal with Lapindo Brantas 
Incorporated. By advancing the strategy of compromise with the company, GKLL 
effectively marginalised the political manoeuvres of other activists, who were 
attempting to criticise and conduct a more resistant approach toward the corporation 
and associated state decisions. Khairul Huda released a public statement criticising 
the efforts of activists to seek a judicial review into how the 2012 National Budget 
was used to finance the Lapindo mudflow compensation. Huda stated that these legal 
efforts were creating further problems for victims, who wanted instead to obtain their 
compensation immediately through negotiations with the company.
143
 This statement 
by Huda, however, overlooked and sidelined the activists’ initiatives on behalf of the 
victims. As is so often the case in Indonesia, however, efforts by the people to seek 
legal redress though the courts were blocked by the courts themselves. The 
Constitutional Court ruled against allowing the lawsuit to proceed. Khairul, in his role 
as General Secretary of GKLL, came out in support of this decision and declared that 
the ruling supported the finalisation of compensation processes arranged by the state. 
The Commissioner of PT Minarak Lapindo Jaya, Gesang Budiarso, then concluded 
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that the Constitutional Court’s ruling strengthened the Supreme Court’s decision 
regarding the innocence of Lapindo Brantas of the mudflow.
144
 
 However, things did not progress smoothly for GKLL in their negotiations 
with Lapindo Brantas. The group became divided, producing an off-shoot faction 
called Geppress (to be discussed below). The split within GKLL occurred following 
PT MLJ’s refusal to pay compensation to victims as demanded by Presidential 
Decision number 14/2007, which ordered Lapindo to make an immediate 20% down-
payment to victims, with the remaining 80% to be paid by mid-2008. To justify 
avoiding its financial commitments, Lapindo queried the legal status of land 
ownership, and also cited the global financial crisis. In particular, Lapindo neglected 
to pay the final 80% of payments, citing as its reasons the incomplete land certificates 
of the victims,  and the financial difficulties of the corporation following the GFC. 
Minarak Lapindo Jaya then attempted to change the compensation process from 20% 
immediate cash and 80% in instalments to a “cash and resettlement” mechanism, 
whereby Minarak Lapindo Jaya paid only the 20% down-payment, and would then 
build housing as part of a resettlement scheme for Lapindo mudflow victims. In 
response, some GKLL movement leaders continued to make concessions to Lapindo 
Brantas Corporation, and associated state actors, which others in GKLL believed 
disappointed many Lapindo victims. These concerned members of GKLL formed the 
breakaway Gepress group. The dispute within the GKLL group, and the formation of 
the new fraction Gepress, represented the new political articulation of the Lapindo 
mudflow movement. 
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6.3.3. Geppress (The Movement for Supporting Presidential Regulation 
No.14/2007) 
Geppress was officially established in the Renokenongo village hall in July 2008. The 
creation of Geppress as a faction of GKLL was provoked by the actions of some of 
the group’s leaders — in particular Emha Ainun Nadjib, who, on March 22, 2008, 
made a unilateral agreement with Lapindo Brantas regarding terms of compensation 
to victims, without seeking approval from or consulting with other victim groups. The 
agreement between Emha Ainun Nadjib, other GKLL leaders and PT MLJ approved 
the change in compensation from the cash and carry mechanism to the cash and 
resettlement mechanism (20% of compensation given as cash, and the remainder to be 
provided as resettlement). The ‘resettlement’ promised by PT MLJ involved a house 
and land for Lapindo mudflow victims, as part of purpose-built housing called 
Kahuripan Nirwana Village Complex (Utomo, 2010; 189). 
 As noted, PT MLJ argued that the previously-arranged 80% of compensation 
in instalments could not be paid to the many land owners who did not hold property 
certificates; PT MLJ claimed that such payment would be against both the Agrarian 
Basic Law and Presidential Regulation No.14/2007. However, PT MLJ’s statement on 
this matter is not in accordance with the National Land Agency Letter (Surat Badan 
Pertanahan Nasional) to the Head Office of the Sidoarjo Regency Land, which 
arranged the compensation mechanism not only for certificate holders, but also for 
non-certificated land owners (Letter C, Pethok D. or S. K. Gogol).
145
 This discrepancy 
between what PT MLJ was claiming could be done and what the official government 
letter indicated could be done did not pass unnoticed among many GKLL members 
who resolved to leave GKLL and form Geppress. As one of the intellectuals who 
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supported Geppress, Paring Waluyo Utomo, observed, the unilateral agreement made 
between PT MLJ and GKLL’s leadership highlighted the incapability of the state to 
guarantee the execution of its own regulations; in this case, the fulfilment of the 
original agreed compensation scheme for Lapindo mudflow victims (Utomo, 2010: 
187). 
 The change of compensation scheme triggered protests from victims. Rois 
Hariyanto, a member of the GKLL victim group, stated that he was disappointed with 
Nadjib. Hariyanto reported that victims through GKLL gave cash to pay Nadjibthirty 
million rupiah per village to resolve the problem, including paying for his services to 
connect the people with the corporation and the dominant political elite in Jakarta, 
including the Indonesian President.
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 Nadjib also persuaded the Lapindo victims to 
achieve a non-political approach to the Lapindo case, through showing that the case 
was not related to political and legal problems. Nadjib said that the Bakrie family had 
already funded victims to the tune of Rp. 6.200,000,000.
147
 He reiterated to victims 
that Bakrie and Lapindo Brantas were not responsible in this case, while also 
reiterating Bakrie’s “charitable” contribution to Lapindo victims.
148
 
 Geppress employed various strategies in order to articulate their interests, 
including undertaking mass demonstrations and blockading all access into the mud 
embankment, in order to stop construction work. Geppress also sought mediation 
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 Rois Hariyanto’s accusation toward Emha Ainun Nadjib has been refuted by Khoirul Huda, who 
said that GKLL never collected cash from people in order to give cash to Nadjib personally. As Huda 
states, the cash collected from the people by GKLL had been used for group activities. Further, Huda 
stated that Nadjib’s role in liaising between GKLL and Minarak Lapindo Jaya and the then President, 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono showed clearly that he was only a mediator, and never directed the 




 Keluarga Bakrie Buka Puasa dengan Korban Lumpur, (kompas.com, September 9, 2009). (Bakrie 




through the Human Rights National Commission, in an effort to meet the Minister of 
Public Works, Joko Kirmanto. This meeting conducted on September 2008. The 
group met the Minister, accompanied by Syafrudien Ngulma from the Human Rights 
National Commission. At the meeting, the Minister advised that victims should accept 
the new Lapindo cash and resettlement proposal, and refused to support the group’s 
aspirations to execute Perpres 2007 and compel Lapindo to pay the people through the 
original cash and carry mechanism. Geppress rejected the Minister’s recommendation 
and continued their protest, by undertaking demonstrations at Merdeka Palace and at 
the house of Aburizal Bakrie. These protests were not received positively by either 
the Government or Lapindo Brantas (Utomo, 2010: 186-2012). 
 Geppress’s demands for compensation based on Presidential Decision 
No.14/2007 met with similar failure to the efforts by Pagar Rekontrak described 
earlier. As mentioned above, Geppress demanded that the state defend its own 
decision on the case, instead of accepting other solutions that deviate from its policy 
that were recommended by Lapindo Brantas Incorporated. However, the state’s 
acceptance of the agreement was made between PT Minarak Lapindo Java and the 
GKLL group, shifting the terms of compensation and indicating the failure of 
Geppress’s efforts to struggle for their demands.
149
 The lack of success from their 
protests lead to many Geppress members drifting back to join GKLL again, and to 
accept the solutions dictated by PT Minarak Lapindo Jaya. Other Geppress members 
continued to resist — including through publication of a bulletin called Kanal Saluran 
Aspirasi Korban Lapindo, issued by Paring Waluyo Utomo et al. and broadcast over 
community radio around Sidoarjo; as well as through the creation of a protest website 
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(Mudhoffir, 2013: 41). Although these initiatives did not sway the negotiation process 
in the direction of protecting the rights of the mudflow victims, they did represent a 
counter-hegemonic discourse in the Lapindo case. 
The efforts of some intellectuals to articulate victims’ interests is important to 
acknowledge, regardless of the lack of success with respect to producing positive 
practical outcomes for victims. The willingness of some intellectuals to use discourse 
to challenge public opinion, and to organise protests against a state position that 
protects the oligarchy behind corporate interests – in particular the collaborative 
efforts between intellectuals and the victims of Lapindo who joined Pagar Rekontrak, 
did have some affect on political consciousness, and was able to exert political and 
legal pressure on the state and Lapindo Brantas Corporation. 
There are several reasons why Pagar Rekontrak’s efforts did not deliver 
positive outcomes for the mudflow victims who joined this group. Firstly, Pagar 
Rekontrak’s attempts to fight for their own compensation scheme was ignored by the 
government and by Lapindo, which chose to focus on the agreement reached between 
the state and the much larger GKLL group — which tended to agree with Keppres 
No. 14/2007.
150
 This alternative agreement became an excuse for the state apparatus 
to neglect the aspirations of Pagar Rekontrak (Mudhoffir 2013: 38).
151
 Secondly, the 
state chose not to involve Pagar Rekontrak in the participatory mechanism for 
discussing compensation scheme options, but instead quietly attempted to generate 
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 However, it should be noted that the commitment between GKLL and the state to approve Keppress 
No.14/2007 had been made before another dispute between the GKLL, Gepress and PT MLJ due to the 
other agreement between the company and GKLL, which changed the terms of compensation from 




conflict between the victims’ group and the market traders in Porong Sidoarjo
152
. 
Another government effort to weaken Pagar Rekontrak’s resistance included the 
government’s cancellation of various types of social assistance in Porong.
153
 Thirdly, 
these systematic political efforts by the state to undermine Pagar Rekontrak led to 
some of the group’s members gradually weakening and losing trust in Pagar 
Rekontrak’s leadership and in the intellectuals who advocated on the group’s behalf. 
Most Pagar Rekontrak members eventually joined GKLL, in order to obtain at least 
some compensation. GKLL also remained supported by intellectuals, such as Emha 
Ainun Nadjib and Khairul Huda. 
 Close examination of the role and position of intellectuals in the Lapindo 
mudflow social movements shows that local intellectuals’ attempts to open up the 
political field were unsuccessful, due largely to the lack of organisational cohesion 
among victims’ groups to facilitate supportive social conditions for effective protest. 
Each of the various groups in the Lapindo mudflow movement had different agendas 
and strategies, leading to an overall lack of cooperation, and even divisions between 
groups within this movement. The factionalisation and lack of social consolidation 
among the groups, driven by the contradictory agendas and strategies, weakened the 
movement’s efforts. In particular, GKLL’s approach was not helpful, including their 
opposition to other intellectuals’ and victims’ attempts to take legal action, which 
GKLL predicted would result only in the court declaring that the mudflow was caused 
by natural disaster and that Lapindo’s actions were not legally responsible for the 
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mudflow. Sibsequently,, this market became the base camp of the Pagar Rekontrak group. 
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  Friction within and between groups was also exacerbated by the lack of 
clarity in the state’s policies with regard to who should be held responsible for this 
disaster, and the state’s implementation of a buying and selling mechanism, which 
victims responded to differently, based on their different social interests. 
6.3.4. The Pro-Lapindo Intellectuals 
The Lapindo mudflow victims’ resistance in Sidoarjo East Java faced the additional 
problem of the prominent academics from East Java universities who advocated 
strongly in support of state policies and oligarchy agendas. These academics 
supported Lapindo interests because of their connection with dominant politico-
business alliances in local and national contexts, and did nothing to help create an 
autonomous space to support the victims of Lapindo. This shows that democratic 
institution building, which began in 1998, has not yet produced free association as 
understood in concepts of liberal democracy. The East Java academics’ support for 
LBI and for state policies reflects the continuing illiberal conditions in East Java civil 
society. Within the latter society, the Lapindo mudflow victims movement has not 
had access to an appropriately free public sphere to advance the process by which the 
respective groups appropriated democratic forms and practices for their own use. The 
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 State policy on Lapindo was framed by Keppres number 13/2006 and Perpres number 16/2007, 
which do not clarify whether the disaster was natural or triggered by human error. Policy was 
formulated gradually, based on the situation in the territories flooded by mud. The chronology of 
regulatory policies regarding the Lapindo case after September 8, 2006 include the government-
produced Presidential Decree number 13/2006, which concerned technical and social problems and set 
up a national team to handle the Sidoarjo mudflow  financed by Lapindo Brantas. The government 
appointed the Badan Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo (The Agency of Lapindo Mud Prevention) as a 
representative body. The administration and infrastructure was to be financed from the national budget, 
while Lapindo Brantas was responsible for land-house transactions and earthworks to remove the 
mudflow. On July 17, 2008, the government issued Presidential Regulation number 48/2008, which 
related to additional substantial compensation for Lapindo victims and the people of Porong. This 
policy identified new victims as being the people who lived in areas that became submerged by mud-
flood after March 22, 2007 (as stated by Presidential Regulation number 14/2007), whose restoration 
should be financed from the national budget, with Lapindo Brantas only financing technical matters. 
This regulation was reinforced by Presidential Regulation number 40/2009, which regulates additional 
extensive compensation. This regulation appoints the BPLS to handle compensation for areas outside 




East Java civil society arena, including mass media and social organisations, has 
remained  susceptible to penetration by the powers of large corporations and by state 
policy, instead of acting as an association to empower the critical articulation of 
oppressed social forces. 
By elaborating on the intersection of oligarchic power, political elites and 
intellectuals in civil society arenas which have protected Lapindo Brantas 
Incorporated and the Bakrie family’s political economic interests in the Lapindo 
mudflow, I show that the realm of civil society in East Java’s post-authoritarianism 
era cannot be described according to the Tocquevellian liberal democracy perspective, 
as a defender of political freedom and a counterbalance to the state. Key entities of 
civil society in Indonesia’s post-authoritarian era, including the education system, 
universities and the mass media, have acted to secure the dominant ruling class’ 
interests through practices of hegemony. With the exception of a few progresive 
factions of academics who have engaged in the victim movement’s struggle against 
Lapindo Brantas Inc., most prominent academics — through deployment of their 
authority as knowledge experts — have advocated for the oligarchic interests by using 
Neo-Institutionalist perspectives to legitimate state policy and depoliticise the 
Lapindo case. 
 The tendency for predatory power to tame and subjugate the mass media for 
its own interests was shown with the Lapindo Brantas manoeuvre to co-operate with 
certain elite intellectuals in East Java, and to use the local media to create a positive 
perception of Lapindo activities in Porong, Sidoarjo. Lapindo Brantas was able to use 
this collaboration to facilitate its efforts to create public agreement that the 
corporation should not be blamed in this case. Lapindo Brantas’ co-operation with 
JTV (a television network which was part of the Jawa Pos Group) led to the Bakrie 
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clan buying this media organisation and producing a television show called ‘Pojok 
Pitu’ (Seven Corners), which aimed to create a positive image of Lapindo Brantas. 
 The Bakrie family also bought the newspaper Surabaya Postholding, to 
produce and disseminate positive news about Lapindo Brantas’ activities; the family 
ensured that free copies of this newspaper were circulated to mudflow refugees in 
Porong (Gustomy 2010: 71). Two Lapindo executives, Bambang Prasetyo Widodo 
and Gesang Budiarso, were appointed as directors of the newspaper.
155
Ross Tapsell 
(2012:11), a lecturer in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National 
University who specialises in researching press freedom, observes that the change of 
ownership led to different relations inside the newsroom, whereby this media was 
now unwilling to report anything that might offend the owner’s business interests. 
The Lapindo executives appointed as managers of the newspaper ensured an 
atmosphere of hostility to support for the Lapindo mudflow victims, so that most 
intellectuals were reluctant to investigate or challenge the oligarchic and predatory 
power operations in this case. This situation also resulted from the weak 
interconnection of the prominent fields of civil society, given that most of the major 
intellectual figures supported oligarchic power. Once some prominent local 
intellectuals in the civil society arena became the ideological troops of dominant 
predatory alliances, any social movement initiatives that aimed to fight against 
oligarchic and predatory interests lost much of their potential power. 
 According to Schiller, Lucas and Sulistiyanto (2008: 69) some professionals 
and academics from ITS (Surabaya Institute of Technology), such as Kresnayana 
Yahya, together with Professor Hotman Siahaan from Airlangga University, were 
involved in organising meetings related to the Lapindo mudflow. These intellectuals 
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network are discussed in a previous section. 
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can be seen as acting in a role which attempts to manage governance processes in a 
time of crisis. However, it must be noted that Schiller, Lucas and Sulistiyanto (2008) 
do not refer to the fact that other academics and public intellectuals played active 
roles in support of Bakrie’s political manoeuvres. The attempt to protect Bakrie 
family interests through intellectual activity was not confined to eliciting support from 
geological experts friendly to Lapindo Brantas Incorporated, but also involved 
obtaining support from social scientists at Airlangga University. Their role was 
effectively to help create public consent for the idea that the Bakrie family could not 
be held responsible for the repercussions of the Lapindo mudflow. The function of 
prominent intellectuals in this case was to protect oligarchic interests by attempting to 
depoliticise potential sources of broad-based conflict. They used the language of 
governance to defuse critical public opinion (Davies, 2011: 118; Bourdieu, 1984: 
462). Another opinion about the collaboration between oligarchical power alliances 
and intellectuals at the national and local level was expressed by another SDP 
member from the Airlangga University law faculty, lecturer Herlambang Perdana 
Wiratraman, who concurred with other observers cited earlier, that the oligarchic 
alliance’s political manoeuvres and Bakrie’s economic interests had been hidden by 
prominent national and Surabaya intellectuals through using Neo-Institutionalist 
knowledge in this case. As Herlambang argues: 
  
The contribution of some prominent intellectuals in the Lapindo Mudflow 
case utterly strengthens the Bakrie clan’s interests, instead of advocating for 
the interests of the Lapindo victims. By using the authority of their knowledge 
as academics, they utilised their authority to deploy the Neo-Institutionalist 
framework, with state, corporate, and civil society collaboration as social 
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capital and social glue, connecting common purposes in order to hide the 
problems related to the manipulation of state institutions to protect Bakrie 




These intellectuals’ engagement in the Lapindo case developed into a struggle 
between academics protecting Bakrie family interests, and intellectuals who sought to 
hold Bakrie responsible for the disaster and were critical of what they saw as his 
abuse of power. The collaboration between Bakrie family interests and Surabaya 
social scientists was initiated at a meeting at the Shangrila Hotel in Surabaya in 2007. 
The result of the meeting included the publication of a weekly bulletin called Solusi 
by the academics who attended. This bulletin was published for 34 editions. Those 
who took positions as editors of the bulletin included senior political scientists such as 
Priyatmoko Dirdjosuseno, Haryadi, Wisnu Pramutanto, and academics from the 
Surabaya University Law Faculty, such as Martono –whose contribution to support 
Lapindo interests helped him to be promoted to head of East Java’s prominent 
political party. These social scientists also worked together under the auspices of a 
non-governmental organisation called La Cassa.
157
 This bulletin was circulatedamong 
strategic civil society institutions, such as the national and local mass media, 
universities as well as national and local government institutions.
158
 
 Significantly, the Solusi bulletin played a major role in supporting the position 
that the Lapindo mudflow was the result of a natural disaster. It also deployed a raft of 
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Interview with JI, an employee of Lapindo Brantas (February 13, 2013); Interview with Professor 
Soetandyo Wignjosoebroto, Professor of Sociology, Airlangga University, who was invited by Lapindo 
Brantas to make a commitment to support Bakrie at the Shangrila meeting, but who declined the 
invitation (January 3, 2013).   
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Neo-Institutionalist, social capital and free-market arguments to provide solutions for 
the socio-economic and environmental disaster that was caused. In general, the 
publication tried to influence public perception and create consent for oligarchic 
interests. Bakrie clan power interests deployed three strategic communicative 
persuasion techniques, as discussed below. 
 Firstly, the public intellectuals who supported the Bakrie position helped to 
suppress and divert discussion about responsibility for the disaster; shifting the 
discourse instead to technical problems related to the management of mudflows. 
Secondly, by using the ideas of interconnection and social capital with respect to the 
partnership between state, citizens and private collaborators, editions of Solusi tried to 
depoliticise the problem and divert attention from the political struggle between 
Lapindo victims and the politico-business dominant power. Thirdly, after easing the 
political tension between the elites and marginalised people, the publication explained 
the experts’ argument that the mudflow disaster was caused by earthquakes, rather 
than by corporate negligence. The publication also tried to build a common positive 
consensus about the Lapindo mudflow disaster, including through the argument that 
rather than harming victims’ long term economic interests, the event could be 
considered as a stimulant for residents’ economic productivity. 
 From the first edition, the editors of Solusi described their publication as being 
geared to solving problems arising from the Sidoarjo mudflow, and claimed they 
would accommodate the variety of interests connected to the case. Despite this claim, 
the publication had a clear tendency and agenda to protect the interests of the Bakrie 
family. The first publication of Solusi featured an article by political science lecturer 
from East Java prominent university II, which focused attention away from the 
problem of oligarchical interests — arguably in order to protect the oligarchs’ wealth 
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— and drew attention instead to technical problems for handling mudflows. Later 
editions of the publication continued to direct the public’s view away from questions 
about the responsibilities of the politico-business power alliances involved in the case. 
At the same time, the bulletin persuaded its readers to consider the state’s 
responsibility for financing the mudflow’s managerial governance. Solusi’s second 
edition, released on November 27, 2007, is an example of these efforts. In the edition, 
one of the key articles expressed concern about the damaging impact of the mudflow 
upon East Java’s economy and infrastructure. The publication then put forward the 
argument that the Government should allocate funds for BPLS (the Sidoarjo Mudflow 
Countermeasures Agency), to rehabilitate East Java and Sidoarjo infrastructure 
damaged by the mudflow. This was despite the fact the KPK (Corruption Eradication 
Commission) had warned the Government not to allocate such funds before the courts 
had decided whether the Bakrie-owned company Lapindo Brantas was guilty of the 
damage. The same edition also voiced the opinion that the KPK should not be 
‘prejudiced’ against the corporation, by suggesting that Lapindo Brantas may not 
carry out its responsibilities if found guilty. 
 Solusi also tried to influence its audience by presenting some academic claims 
that the disaster was caused by an earthquake. This was done particularly in Solusi 
Volume 15, which continued Solusi’s policy of featuring opinions favourable to LBI, 
but muting critical voices. The March 4-10 2008 edition of Solusi was dedicated to 
reports by a few geologists, including Dr Adriano Mazzini from the University of 
Oslo in Norway, who said that the mudflow was part of a natural phenomenon, 
possibly connected to a Yogyakarta earthquake and unrelated to Lapindo’s drilling 
activities. In contrast, Solusi chose not to publish the findings of research by Richard 
J. Davies, Richard E. Swarbick, Robert J. Evans and Mads Huuse, whose 2007 paper 
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‘Birth of a Mud Volcano: East Java, 29 May 2006’, published in Geological Society 
of America Today, argued that the mudflow was triggered by mining exploration in 
the Banjar Panji I area. Nor did Solusi include any mention of the World Geologists’ 
Association (AAPG) meeting at Cape Town, South Africa, on 26-29 October 2008, at 
which the majority of participants agreed that the Lapindo mudflow was triggered by 
mining exploration.  
 As further demonstration of its pro-Bakrie bias, Solusi presented some highly 
unusual arguments about the mudflow having positive consequences, including that it 
could become an object of tourism. In Volume 18, 2008, Solusi published an article 
entitled ‘Piknik ke Lumpur’ (Picnic at the Mudflow) anda prominent academic from 
Surabaya University who is also a senior Golkar politician, Anton Priyatno, wrote an 
opinion piece about the tourism potential of the mudflow, although he was careful to 
state that he was not suggesting that others should benefit economically from the 
suffering of the Lapindo mudflow victims. 
 Solusi (Volume 9, 22-28 January 2008) further highlighted the positive aspects 
of the disaster by suggesting that it stimulated economic entrepreneurship among the 
local population. The people were depicted as embracing the opportunity to create a 
motorcycle passenger tour service, as well as selling Video Compact Disks about the 
Lapindo mudflow and preparing food for visitors to affected areas. Solusi underlined 
that this sort of economic creativity would result in economic improvements, because 
of the new opportunities for entrepreneurship created by the disaster.159 
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Such accounts contradict news published by the national daily newspaper Kompas. According to 
Kompas, on June 2, 2013, victims of the disaster numbered 11,881 families who were still waiting for 
Lapindo Brantas to fulfil its promises to them for payment for their submerged land  as per purchase 
agreements. The newspaper reported that many people became trapped in a pattern of unemployment, 
and many experienced depression. Kompas also suggested that the economic benefit from new 
economic opportunities for the local population was limited at best. However Kompas also devoted 
space to the arguments on the subject made by the prominent Airlangga University Political Science 
lecturer QE. Arguing along Neo-Institutionalist lines, he suggested that all strategic actors must 
collaborate and create networks of governance in order to construct a solution for the general interest. 
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 In summary, there are strong indications that Surabaya academics were 
involved closely in efforts to neutralise attacks on the oligarchic system of power. The 
intellectuals’ involvement in solving the problem for marginalised people in the 
political arenas dominated by the oligarchic power network were absorbed by the 
latter to uphold their own interests. Further, the intellectuals’ expertise and perceived 
authority in governance knowledge and utilisation of Neo-Institutionalism and social 
capital ideas, which tended to be insensitive to power constellation problems, ensured 
that their contributions acted as powerful hegemonic tools of oligarchic power in the 
civil society arena. 
 The role of prominent intellectuals in this case was to protect oligarchic 
interests by attempting to depoliticise potential sources of broad-based conflict. 
Through Solusi, they used the language of governance to defuse critical public 
opinion. By mixing technical Neo-Institutionalist argument and social capital ideas on 
agency collaboration, this publication tried to neutralise the spontaneous political 
discourse of marginal people and to censor the argument that opposed the dominant 
power interest. In short, this publication could be seen as a hegemonic manoeuvre 
initiated by prominent intellectuals in civil society to bolster the particular dominant 
interests and translate them into common interests (Davies, 2011: 118; Gramsci, 
1971; Bourdieu, 1984: 462). 
 By elaborating on the role and position of intellectuals in civil society arenas 
which protected the Lapindo Brantas Corporation and Bakrie family political 
economic interests in the Lapindo mudflow case, I have shown that the entities of 
civil society in the post-authoritarian era, including the educational system, the 
universities and the mass media, acted to secure the dominant ruling class’s interests 
                                                                                                                                           




through practices of hegemony. Aside from the few progressive factions of academics 
who engaged with the victim movement’s struggle against Lapindo Brantas Inc., most 
prominent academics — through deploying their authority as knowledge experts — 
advocated oligarchic interests by using Neo-Institutionalist perspectives in order to 
legitimate state policy and depoliticise the Lapindo case. 
6.4.Conclusion 
This chapter reinforces the idea that the nexus of national-and-local political 
processes is continually being contested, and therefore that the local constellation of 
power influences outcomes greatly at the local level. Where the social agents of 
political liberalism or social democratic (or even more radical) reform are relatively 
weak, and are organised incoherently — as they are in East Java and Indonesia more 
generally — great difficulties may be encountered in inserting the interests of 
marginalised people into the contest. The illiberal tendency of civil society in the 
Lapindo case shows that, in practice, civil society has become an extension of 
dominant social forces to create consent for their benefit and interests, rather than a 
free public space for articulating citizens’ rights and resisting abuse of power by an 
oligarchical system. We see this tendency in the case of East Java — particularly with 
regard to the Lapindo mudflow case — despite the existence of a host of intellectuals 
affiliated with active civil society organisations, including environmental groups and 
other non-government organisations, and the opportunities for intellectuals to support 
these groups and the people’s causes they advocate, during public debates. The reality 
of grassroots political participation in East Java local governance processes shows the 
capacity of dominant local elites to use their superior political economic resources to 
steer the governance agenda and exclude the broader citizenry, in order to protect the 
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elites’ personal interests by using organic intellectuals derived mostly from prominent 
universities. 
 This chapter has also demonstrated how criticism of oligarchic power in the 
Lapindo case were neutralised by adopting strategies focusing on the potential 
economic opportunities created by the disaster, and by using a social capital 
framework which created opportunities for public-private collaboration between the 
contested agencies; in particular, collaboration with the meeker, more compliant 
victims’ groups. The aim was to effectively marginalise the social movements that 
were campaigning for the Lapindo Brantas to face criminal prosecution. Although the 
efforts of some intellectuals to defend the rights of the disaster victims have not yet 
led to policy changes, this does not take away from the significance of their struggle 
against the oligarchic power alliances. These efforts, including attempting to sue the 
corporations involved and relevant state institutions in court, writing and publishing 
books, educating victims about their interests and rights as citizens, organising press 
conferences, and producing opinion pieces in the mass media to improve public 
awareness about this case, can be seen as principled and indeed courageous in the 
context of the powers arrayed against them, despite being insufficient, to date, to 
withstand the tremendous resources of the powerful elite. 
 The position and approach of some other elite intellectuals and prominent 
agents of civil society, who engaged in political transactions with predatory power 
interests and utilised their social authority to legitimise suppression of the interests of 
the Lapindo mudflow victims, shows the fragility of civil society in Indonesia. It also 
demonstrates that some dominant agents of civil society choose to act as a shield for 
predatory interests, and to suppress the grassroots interests that are articulated by the 
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more sympathetic intellectuals and activists, thereby rejecting the bolder choice of 
becoming a vanguard of democratic struggle. 
 Clearly, the utilisation of a good governance-inspired framework by local 
dominant elites to carry out their role does not mean that neo-liberal regulatory 
regimes will become entrenched, as some of the purveyors of neo-Marxist critical 
perspectives have argued (Davies, 2011; Davies & Pill, 2012). As shown here, when 
local predatory elite networks effectively hijack the local institutions of governance, 
the entrenchment of the neo-liberal agenda is also curtailed. The problem is especially 
clear at the local level: there is, as yet, no real social base for a democratic institution-
building reform agenda which local intellectuals in Indonesia can latch onto. 
Similarly, the incoherence of civil society organisations which seek to represent the 
interests of a broader, marginalised citizenry provides few opportunities for the 
development of local intellectuals that can foster a ‘war of position’ — or intellectual 
struggle in which one class pursues hegemony through establishing cultural counter-













This thesis has shown that intellectuals are not separate from the constellation of 
power and interests in which they find themselves and that this hinders their ability 'to 
speak truth to power' (Said, 1994: 60-63, 75). Such ability to challenge power is also 
compromised by their social position, which is constructed within the context of 
specific social struggles within specific contexts. In particular, the social position of 
contemporary East Java intellectuals cannot be separated from the power relations 
that were created during the authoritarian Soeharto era, and which continue to prevail 
in the democratic era. The alliances in which intellectuals participate can be traced 
ultimately to those that were forged to overthrow Soekarno and demolish Leftist 
social forces in the 1960s. It is clear that the consolidation of New Order rule 
involved control over intellectual life through de-politicisation, and that de-
ideologisation was part of state strategy to suppress resistance from below. This 
created a relationship between intellectuals and the state whereby the former became 
strongly dependent on the latter’s apparatus, and were generally isolated from much 
of the rest of society. Indeed, deep-level state intervention in intellectual and social 
life created a specific process of inclusion and exclusion of types of knowledge, 
which contributed to the production of a form of mainstream ideology that served the 
interests of the holders of state power. From this specific knowledge-power 
mechanism, a particular kind of academic authority was created, which helped to 
legitimise New Order rule. Intellectuals have remained embedded within powerful 
coalitions at both national and local levels in the post-authoritarian era, while also 
being required to adapt to the new context of democratisation and decentralisation. In 
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the process, they have become increasingly involved in the challenges of political life 
and competition over control of resources. 
The research undertaken here has also shown that there are no vibrant liberal 
reformists or social democratic forces that have been able to challenge dominant local 
predatory alliances in East Java’s post-authoritarian politics. This greatly limits the 
options available to intellectuals. Such conditions make it exceedingly difficult for 
intellectuals to take up roles as independent critical agents. Instead, many have joined 
well-established predatory alliances as political consultants or as members of the 
technocratic apparatus of the local bureaucracy. In a nutshell, their contribution 
facilitates a range of practices that contradict the notions of good governance that are 
claimed to underlie institutional reform in Indonesia, and for which these same 
intellectuals frequently voice support. 
For the same reason, the actual practice of governance tends to follow the 
logic of predatory politics, neither serving the creation of liberal markets (as expected 
by neo-liberals) nor deepening people’s participation (as expected by democracy 
promoters). Predatory interests in East Java, nurtured since the New Order, have 
shown the capacity to selectively utilise ideas associated with technocratic good 
governance and neo-institutionalist reform for their own purposes. East Java 
intellectuals, as producers and disseminators of good governance and neo-
institutionalist knowledge in the public domain, have played a major role in enabling 
this, effectively creating a kind of hegemonic knowledge that helps to domesticate 
dissenting ideas (Gramsci, 1971: 5-7). Many of these intellectuals claim academic 
credentials as lecturers of prominent universities, though some are also journalists and 
social activists. Their notional authority over scientific knowledge, including that 
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pertaining to good governance, has allowed intellectuals to play decisive roles within 
elite coalitions comprising political and business interests.  
Through close analysis of important events and controversial issues, this 
dissertation has demonstrated that intellectuals in East Java have worked 
systematically to influence public opinion and help organise governance agendas in 
order to facilitate the expropriation of tangible resources by local elites, who have 
benefitted greatly from democratisation and decentralisation. At the same time, the 
intellectuals have helped to ensure public compliance with public policy that has the 
potential to harm the interests of ordinary people. In particular, the provincial and 
local electoral contests which this research has scrutinised have been marked by 
collaborations between formal and informal networks that connect intellectuals and 
civil society institutions — such as the mass media — in ways that assist the 
entrenchment of existing relations of power. It has been seen, for example, that 
intellectuals tend to marginalise issues of corruption and abuse of power from public 
debate, often by portraying these as matters of institutional management rather than of 
political struggle.  
Nevertheless, it has been shown too that there are a number of intellectuals 
who go against the current, and attempt to develop connections to the marginalised 
and oppressed. To date, the social effects of these intellectuals’ activities have been 
quite limited, because reformist and progressive intellectuals lack an adequate social 
base from which to advance counterhegemonic agendas. The disorganisation of civil 
society, which remains a major legacy of the New Order, helps to ensure the absence 
of such a social base. This is the case in spite of a multitude of intellectuals with 
backgrounds in NGOs and other civil society organisations in East Java, as is the case 
in much of Indonesia. In the Lapindo affair, for instance, some intellectuals did resist 
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the Bakrie-owned Lapindo Brantas Incorporated but their efforts were inconsequential 
when pitted against the tremendous resources of their foes. The support of some 
intellectuals for the Lapindo mudflow victims failed as a result of their weak 
connections to civil society at large, and the fact that major fellow intellectuals were 
in the service of oligarchical power. 
This dissertation began by providing a critique of major scholarly approaches 
that address the role of intellectuals in politics. It has been shown that three of these 
approaches — the Neo-Institutionalist, the Neo-Foucauldian, and the Neo-Gramscian 
— were deficient with respect to explaining adequately the proliferation of good 
governance discourse in contemporary Indonesia, and specifically the role played by 
intellectuals in both its proliferation and its mutation into actual practices that 
contradict core assumptions of the good governance agenda. Not one of the three 
approaches seriously considers the possibility that entrenched local elites might utilise 
neo-liberal agendas of institutional reform to accumulate wealth, or to protect their 
own political and economic interests. As a result, it was found, the three standpoints 
are not able to adequately grasp how intellectuals may play a significant supporting 
role in the local elites’ appropriation of the good governance agenda. 
Evidence has been put forward herein, questioning the assumptions of the neo-
institutionalist approach, which assumes that local intellectuals can enhance 
democratic and governance institution-building due to their knowledge and expertise. 
It has been seen, on the contrary, that the predatory alliances which emerged during 
the New Order authoritarian era retain their resilience, fashioning new and intimate 
relationships with both the national and local-level intellectual apparatus, so as to 
preserve and enhance their social and political interests. It has also been shown that, 
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in practice, intellectuals in local politics and governance tend to serve these predatory 
interests, instead of furthering good governance reforms.  
The inadequacy of the Neo-Foucauldian claim that neo-liberal governance 
programs have the capacity to discipline and create neo-liberal order was also 
demonstrated. It has been shown that dominant national and local predatory alliances 
effectively block such a possibility with the help of local intellectuals, who have in 
reality become organically connected to them. Rather than enforcing a neo-liberal 
order, intellectuals facilitate practices that maintain predatory power even as the 
language of neo-liberal reform is selectively adopted. 
The Neo-Gramscian approach claims that intellectuals and national as well as 
local elites have become the loyal tools of global capitalist interests, acting as their 
comprador agents, has also been shown to be mistaken. It has been demonstrated, in 
contrast, that transnational capital’s interests can be hindered by an existing power 
structure which facilitates politico-business alliances that actively seek to promote 
their own interests, utilising their control over the institutions and resources of the 
state. Rather than agents of global capitalist interests, it has been further demonstrated 
that the local intelligentsia in East Java have become the agents of these local 
alliances. 
In contrast, the thesis has offered a critical political economy approach to the 
study of intellectuals and politics. It has shown that the role and position of 
intellectuals in post-authoritarian East Java should be understood in relation to 
concrete struggles over power and resources in which predatory alliances compete 
with each other, and which involve state as well as civil society-based institutions. 
The absence of challenges to these alliances restricts the ability of intellectuals to 
advance good governance as well as broader democratic agendas. A decade and a half 
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after the fall of Soeharto, there remains little in terms of coherent social forces from 
which to launch such challenges, and to which a significant number of intellectuals 
can latch onto in order to press for more genuine reforms in the East Java political 
arena. 
There are some limitations, however, regarding what has been analysed and 
achieved within this study. First, this research has concentrated on the social role of 
local intellectuals; especially academics, but including other types of intellectuals, 
such as journalists and social activists. The thesis has not, however, analysed social 
struggles related to the governance of universities in East Java, which provides some 
of the context for the role of intellectuals in politics today. Such struggles involve 
matters to do with privatisation of tertiary education. Further research, which captures 
the struggles within the university as an institution, could contribute to understanding 
market processes in Indonesia’s educational field, and how these have affected the 
social standing and material interests of intellectuals and therefore their political 
propensities. 
Second, the thesis does not address the role of religious intellectuals such as 
ulama in contests over local governance. As Gramsci (1971) contends, clerics can be 
categorised as traditional intellectuals whose roles as the articulators of traditional 
land-owning groups also contribute to the social struggle. A study that focuses on 
traditional intellectuals such as the ’ulama’, who are socially influential in East Java 
because of the historical standing of the NU, may uncover more dimensions to the 
study of local contests over local power. Though East Java’s social structure is 
different from that of Italy in the twentieth century, the NU happens to be dominated 
by ’ulama’ emerging from traditional land-owning families in the province, thus 
248 
 
presenting some interesting historical commonalities with the case of the Catholic 
Church that Gramsci had encountered. 
Third, this study has focused on local social struggles over particular matters 
that have little to do with the direct interests of international donors. Further research 
could examine local social welfare programs in relation to contests for access to 
international aid funds. Again, this may uncover another dimension in the struggle 
over local power in the period of democratisation and decentralisation in Indonesia, 
and the role played by intellectuals within it. This is especially the case given that 
intellectuals have often mediated between governments and international donors, due 
to traditional claims to neutral scientific knowledge as well as the attributes of 
selflessness and asceticism often associated with intellectual life. 
In spite of such limitations, the findings of this dissertation might have broader 
relevance for contemporary Indonesia more generally. It has been suggested here that 
the empirical evidence of the absorption of local intellectuals into predatory local 
alliances is a reflection of the political economy structure of Indonesia in the post-
authoritarian era; in other words, that the case of East Java can be seen in some ways 
as a miniature version of the Indonesian case itself. If this is accepted, then much of 
the discourse about the desirability of a technocratic cabinet consisting of experts and 
intellectual figures, and who are not members of political parties, is shown to be 
potentially naive. This study has demonstrated longstanding relationships between 
intellectuals and state power holders in East Java that contradict completely the notion 
of non-partisan intellectuals scientifically enforcing good governance agendas without 
the interference of social interests. Of course, determining the extent to which this 




As mentioned earlier, this dissertationhas shown that intellectuals who have 
taken the route of supporting social movements have not had much success. In fact, 
the research indicates that the creation of a vibrant social movement to challenge 
powerful predatory alliances does not depend on the availability of intellectuals to 
contribute to the development of such a movement. In contrast, the effectiveness of 
intellectuals to promote particular social agendas is determined largely by the capacity 
of civil society-based interests to organise coherently. From this point of view, it is 
not intellectuals who produce social movements, but rather the latter’s capacity to 
produce its own organic intellectuals, more or less in the Gramscian sense, when 
sufficiently well organised. Much of this observation has been drawn from the 
experience of the failure of the social movement that coalesced, always tenuously, 
around the Lapindo case. Again, establishing how broadly this suggestion holds 
within Indonesia will require analysis of other social movements emerging out of 
disputes in other Indonesian regions. 
Despite the normal limitations in scope inherent in any dissertation, and the 
importance of further research, this work has established clearly that the problems of 
predatory power and oligarchic domination in Indonesia cannot be overcome by the 
injection of Neo-Institutionalist norms and agendas, or by depending on capacity-
building initiatives that are facilitated by experts and academics. Such experts and 
academics have been shown to be anything but devoid of self-interest. Initiatives to 
address the problems of predatory capitalism in Indonesia in the post-authoritarian era 
should be understood as belonging firmly in the realm of political struggle. The 
revamping of the constellation of power in post-authoritarian Indonesia is ultimately a 
political project, one that would have revolutionary implications. It is certainly not a 
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technocratic project, as understood by Neo-Institutionalists, which can rely on 
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